CVE-2002-1976

Published Dec 31, 2002

Last updated 4 months ago

CVSS info 2.1

Overview

Description
ifconfig, when used on the Linux kernel 2.2 and later, does not report when the network interface is in promiscuous mode if it was put in promiscuous mode using PACKET_MR_PROMISC, which could allow attackers to sniff the network without detection, as demonstrated using libpcap.
Source
cve@mitre.org
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 2.0

Type
Primary
Base score
2.1
Impact score
2.9
Exploitability score
3.9
Vector string
AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-Other

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NFSv4: include MAY_WRITE in open permission mask for O_TRUNC POSIX requires write permission to truncate a file, so an open() that specifies O_TRUNC must be authorized for write access regardless of the O_ACCMODE access mode. nfs_open_permission_mask() builds the access mask passed to nfs_may_open(), which is the local authorization gate for OPENs the client serves itself from a cached write delegation via the can_open_delegated() path in nfs4_try_open_cached(). The mask is derived from O_ACCMODE alone, so an open(O_RDONLY | O_TRUNC) against a file the caller cannot write requests only MAY_READ and passes the local check. The OPEN is then satisfied locally and the truncation is issued to the server as a SETATTR(size=0) over the delegation stateid, which the server accepts under standard write-delegation semantics. POSIX requires that this open fail with EACCES. Include MAY_WRITE in the mask whenever O_TRUNC is set so the local check matches the access the server would have enforced.•CVE-2026-64298
  2. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: module: decompress: check return value of module_extend_max_pages() module_extend_max_pages() calls kvrealloc() internally and returns -ENOMEM on allocation failure. The return value is never checked. If the initial allocation fails, info->pages remains NULL and info->max_pages remains 0. Subsequent calls to module_get_next_page() will attempt to dynamically grow the array by calling module_extend_max_pages(info, 0) since info->used_pages is 0. This results in kvrealloc(NULL, 0) returning ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which is treated as a success, leading to a dereference of ZERO_SIZE_PTR and a kernel oops. Fix: add the missing error check after module_extend_max_pages() and return immediately on failure. This matches the pattern used by every other kvrealloc() caller in the module loading path. [Sami: Corrected the analysis in the commit message.]•CVE-2026-64297
  3. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exfat: bound uniname advance in exfat_find_dir_entry() In exfat_find_dir_entry(), each TYPE_EXTEND (file name) entry advances the output pointer by a fixed amount while the loop guard only tracks the accumulated name length: if (++order == 2) uniname = p_uniname->name; else uniname += EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN; len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname); name_len += len; unichar = *(uniname+len); *(uniname+len) = 0x0; uniname grows by EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN (15) per name entry, but name_len grows only by the actual extracted length, which is shorter when a name fragment contains an early NUL. The only guard is `name_len >= MAX_NAME_LENGTH`, so a crafted directory with many short name fragments lets uniname run far past the p_uniname->name[MAX_NAME_LENGTH + 3] buffer while name_len stays small, causing an out-of-bounds read and write at *(uniname+len). The sibling extractor exfat_get_uniname_from_ext_entry() already stops on a short fragment (the lockstep `len != EXFAT_FILE_NAME_LEN` guard added in commit d42334578eba ("exfat: check if filename entries exceeds max filename length")); exfat_find_dir_entry() never got the equivalent. Track the per-entry write offset as a count and reject a fragment once the offset, or the offset plus the extracted length, would exceed MAX_NAME_LENGTH, before forming the output pointer.•CVE-2026-64296
  4. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: page_ext: add count limit to page_ext_iter_next to prevent invalid PFN access The page_ext iteration API does not validate if the PFN still belongs to a valid section while advancing the iterator. When dynamically adding memory in the hotplug path, it can lead to a NULL pointer dereference during page_ext_lookup at the boundary of the last valid section when iterator count equals __pgcount. The for_each_page_ext() macro calls page_ext_iter_next() as its loop increment. for_each_page_ext() does a "__page_ext = page_ext_iter_next(&__iter)" at the end. This causes page_ext_iter_next() to increment iter->index past __pgcount and call page_ext_lookup(start_pfn + __pgcount). During memory hotplug (online), the PFN at start_pfn + __pgcount may belong to a section that has not yet been initialized, causing page_ext_lookup() to trigger a NULL pointer dereference. [ 14.555124][ T846] Call trace: [ 14.555125][ T846] lookup_page_ext+0x6c/0x108 (P) [ 14.555127][ T846] page_ext_lookup+0x30/0x3c [ 14.555129][ T846] __reset_page_owner+0x11c/0x260 [ 14.571201][ T846] __free_pages_ok+0x5e8/0x8e0 [ 14.571204][ T846] __free_pages_core+0x78/0xf0 [ 14.571206][ T846] generic_online_page+0x14/0x24 [ 14.597782][ T846] online_pages+0x178/0x30c [ 14.597784][ T846] memory_block_change_state+0x284/0x32c [ 14.597787][ T846] memory_subsys_online+0x4c/0x64 [ 14.597789][ T846] device_online+0x88/0xb0 [ 14.597791][ T846] online_memory_block+0x30/0x40 [ 14.597793][ T846] walk_memory_blocks+0xac/0xe8 [ 14.597794][ T846] add_memory_resource+0x280/0x298 [ 14.656161][ T846] add_memory+0x60/0x98 Move the iteration boundary enforcement inside the iterator functions, so callers cannot inadvertently access beyond the requested range.•CVE-2026-64295
  5. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: do file ownership checks with the proper mount idmap Ever since idmapped mounts were introduced, inode ownership checks (for side-channel protection) in mincore() and madvise(MADV_PAGEOUT) were done against the nop_mnt_idmap, which completely ignores the file's mount's idmap. This results in odd edgecases like: 1) mount/bind-mount with an idmap userA:userB:1 2) userB runs an owner_or_capable() check on file that is owned by userA on-disk/in-memory, but owned by userB after idmap translation 3) owner_or_capable() mysteriously fails as the correct idmap wasn't supplied In the case of mincore/madvise MADV_PAGEOUT, this is usually benign, because file_permission(file, MAY_WRITE) will probably succeed, as it uses the proper idmap internally, but it does not need to be the case on e.g a 0444 file where even the owner itself doesn't have permissions to write to it. Since this is clearly not trivial to get right, introduce a file_owner_or_capable() that can carry the correct semantics, and switch the various users in mm to it. The issue was found by manual code inspection & an off-list discussion with Jan Kara.•CVE-2026-64294

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.