CVE-2005-2969

Published Oct 18, 2005

Last updated 2 months ago

CVSS info 5.0

Overview

Description
The SSL/TLS server implementation in OpenSSL 0.9.7 before 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 before 0.9.8a, when using the SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING option, disables a verification step that is required for preventing protocol version rollback attacks, which allows remote attackers to force a client and server to use a weaker protocol than needed via a man-in-the-middle attack.
Source
secalert@redhat.com
NVD status
Modified
Products
openssl

Risk scores

CVSS 2.0

Type
Primary
Base score
5
Impact score
2.9
Exploitability score
10
Vector string
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-Other

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Vendor comments

  • Red HatRed Hat Enterprise Linux 5 is not vulnerable to this issue as it contains a backported patch.

Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. Issue summary: When CMS password-based decryption (RFC 3211 / PWRI key unwrap) processes attacker-supplied CMS data, an attacker-chosen stream-mode KEK cipher can trigger a heap out-of-bounds read in kek_unwrap_key(). Impact summary: A heap buffer over-read may trigger a crash which leads to Denial of Service for an application if the input buffer ends at a memory page boundary and the following page is unmapped. There is no information disclosure as the over-read bytes are not revealed to the attacker. The key unwrapping function performs a check-byte test as specified in the RFC that reads 7 bytes from a heap allocation that is based on the wrapped key length from the message. There is a minimum length check based on the block length of the wrapping cipher. However the cipher is selected from an OID carried in the attacker's PWRI keyEncryptionAlgorithm with no requirement that the cipher be a block cipher. When an attacker selects a stream-mode cipher the guard will be ineffective and the allocated buffer containing the unwrapped key can be too small to fit the check-bytes specified in the RFC and a buffer over-read can happen. Applications calling CMS_decrypt() or CMS_decrypt_set1_password() (equivalently openssl cms -decrypt -pwri_password ...) on untrusted CMS data are vulnerable to this issue. No password knowledge is required: the over-read happens during the unwrap attempt before any authentication succeeds. The over-read is limited to a few bytes and is not written to output, so there is no information disclosure. Triggering a crash requires the allocation to border unmapped memory, which is unlikely with the normal allocator. The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue.•CVE-2026-9076
  2. Issue summary: A signed integer overflow when sizing the destination buffer for Unicode output in ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() can lead to a heap buffer overflow. Impact summary: A heap buffer overflow may lead to a crash or possibly attacker controlled code execution or other undefined behaviour. In ASN1_mbstring_copy() and ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() the destination size for Unicode output is computed in a signed int: by left shift of the input character count for BMPSTRING (UTF-16) and UNIVERSALSTRING (UTF-32), and by summing per-character byte counts for UTF8STRING. The calculation overflows when the input reaches around 2^30 characters. In the worst case (UNIVERSALSTRING at 2^30 characters) the size wraps to zero, OPENSSL_malloc(1) is called, and the subsequent character copy writes several gigabytes past the one-byte allocation. X.509 certificate processing routes through ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(), whose DIRSTRING_TYPE mask excludes UNIVERSALSTRING and whose per-NID size limits cap the input length; no network protocol or certificate-handling path in OpenSSL exercises the overflow. Triggering the bug requires an application that calls ASN1_mbstring_copy() or ASN1_mbstring_ncopy() directly, or registers a custom string type via ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(), with attacker-controlled input on the order of half a gigabyte or more. For these reasons this issue was assigned Low severity. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.•CVE-2026-7383
  3. Issue summary: The implementations of AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) mishandle the authentication of AAD (Additional Authenticated Data) with an empty ciphertext allowing a forgery of such messages. Impact summary: An attacker can forge empty messages with arbitrary AAD to the victim's application using these ciphers. AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) are nonce-misuse-resistant AEAD modes: they accept a key, nonce, optional AAD (bytes that are authenticated but not encrypted), and plaintext, and produces ciphertext plus a 16-byte tag. On decrypt, `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()` is documented to return success only if the tag is verified succesfully. In OpenSSL's provider implementation of these ciphers, the expected tag is computed only when decryption function is invoked with non-empty data. If the caller supplies AAD and then calls `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()` without invocation of the ciphertext update, which can happen when the received ciphertext length is zero, the tag is never recalculated and still holds its all-zeros value. When AES-GCM-SIV is used, an attacker who sends arbitrary AAD, empty ciphertext, and all-zeros tag passes authentication under any key they do not know, single-shot. When AES-SIV is used, for mounting the attack it's necessary for the application to reuse the decryption context without resetting the key. AES-SIV is implemented since OpenSSL 3.0. AES-GCM-SIV is implemented since OpenSSL 3.2. No protocols implemented in OpenSSL itself (TLS/CMS/PKCS7/HPKE/QUIC) support either AES-GCM-SIV or AES-SIV. To mount an attack, the applications must implement their own protocol and use the EVP interface. Also they must skip the ciphertext update when a message with an empty ciphertext arrives. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as these algorithms are not FIPS approved and the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.•CVE-2026-45446
  4. Issue summary: A specially crafted PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed message could trigger a use-after-free during PKCS#7 signature verification. Impact summary: A use-after-free may result in process crashes, heap corruption, or potentially remote code execution. When processing a PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed message, if the SignedData digestAlgorithms field is present as an empty ASN.1 SET, OpenSSL may incorrectly free a caller-owned BIO during PKCS7_verify(). A subsequent use of the BIO by the calling application results in a use-after-free condition. In the common case this occurs when the application later calls BIO_free() on the BIO originally passed to PKCS7_verify(). Depending on allocator behavior and application-specific BIO usage patterns, this may result in a crash or other memory corruption. In some application contexts this may potentially be exploitable for remote code execution. Applications that process PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed messages using OpenSSL PKCS#7 APIs may be affected. Applications using the CMS APIs for this processing are not affected. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.•CVE-2026-45447
  5. Issue summary: When an application drives an AES-OCB context through the public EVP_Cipher() one-shot interface, the application-supplied initialisation vector (IV) is silently discarded. Impact summary: Every message encrypted under the same key uses the same effective nonce regardless of the IV supplied by the caller, resulting in (key, nonce) reuse and loss of confidentiality. If the same code path is used to compute the authentication tag, the tag depends only on the (key, IV) pair and not on the plaintext or ciphertext, allowing universal forgery of arbitrary ciphertext from a single captured message. OpenSSL provides two ways to drive a cipher: the documented streaming interface (EVP_CipherUpdate / EVP_CipherFinal_ex) and a lower-level one-shot, EVP_Cipher(), whose documentation explicitly recommends against use by applications in favour of EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex(). The OCB provider's streaming handler flushes the application-supplied IV into the OCB context before processing data; the one-shot handler did not. Every call to EVP_Cipher() on an AES-OCB context therefore ran with the all-zero key-derived offset state left by cipher initialisation, regardless of the caller's IV. If EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() is subsequently used to obtain the authentication tag, the deferred IV setup runs at that point and clears the running checksum that should have been accumulated over the plaintext. The resulting tag is a function of (key, IV) only and verifies against any ciphertext produced under the same (key, IV) pair. The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected: AES-OCB is not a TLS cipher suite, and libssl does not call EVP_Cipher() in any case. Applications that drive AES-OCB through the documented streaming AEAD API (EVP_CipherUpdate / EVP_CipherFinal_ex) are not affected. Only applications that combine the AES-OCB cipher with the EVP_Cipher() one-shot API are vulnerable. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as AES-OCB is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.•CVE-2026-45445

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.