CVE-2020-15104

Published Jul 14, 2020

Last updated 2 years ago

Overview

Description
In Envoy before versions 1.12.6, 1.13.4, 1.14.4, and 1.15.0 when validating TLS certificates, Envoy would incorrectly allow a wildcard DNS Subject Alternative Name apply to multiple subdomains. For example, with a SAN of *.example.com, Envoy would incorrectly allow nested.subdomain.example.com, when it should only allow subdomain.example.com. This defect applies to both validating a client TLS certificate in mTLS, and validating a server TLS certificate for upstream connections. This vulnerability is only applicable to situations where an untrusted entity can obtain a signed wildcard TLS certificate for a domain of which you only intend to trust a subdomain of. For example, if you intend to trust api.mysubdomain.example.com, and an untrusted actor can obtain a signed TLS certificate for *.example.com or *.com. Configurations are vulnerable if they use verify_subject_alt_name in any Envoy version, or if they use match_subject_alt_names in version 1.14 or later. This issue has been fixed in Envoy versions 1.12.6, 1.13.4, 1.14.4, 1.15.0.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Modified

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.4
Impact score
2.5
Exploitability score
2.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Severity
MEDIUM

CVSS 2.0

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
4.9
Exploitability score
8
Vector string
AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:P/I:P/A:N

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-346
nvd@nist.gov
CWE-346

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. Issue summary: The implementations of AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) mishandle the authentication of AAD (Additional Authenticated Data) with an empty ciphertext allowing a forgery of such messages. Impact summary: An attacker can forge empty messages with arbitrary AAD to the victim's application using these ciphers. AES-SIV (RFC 5297) and AES-GCM-SIV (RFC 8452) are nonce-misuse-resistant AEAD modes: they accept a key, nonce, optional AAD (bytes that are authenticated but not encrypted), and plaintext, and produces ciphertext plus a 16-byte tag. On decrypt, `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()` is documented to return success only if the tag is verified succesfully. In OpenSSL's provider implementation of these ciphers, the expected tag is computed only when decryption function is invoked with non-empty data. If the caller supplies AAD and then calls `EVP_DecryptFinal_ex()` without invocation of the ciphertext update, which can happen when the received ciphertext length is zero, the tag is never recalculated and still holds its all-zeros value. When AES-GCM-SIV is used, an attacker who sends arbitrary AAD, empty ciphertext, and all-zeros tag passes authentication under any key they do not know, single-shot. When AES-SIV is used, for mounting the attack it's necessary for the application to reuse the decryption context without resetting the key. AES-SIV is implemented since OpenSSL 3.0. AES-GCM-SIV is implemented since OpenSSL 3.2. No protocols implemented in OpenSSL itself (TLS/CMS/PKCS7/HPKE/QUIC) support either AES-GCM-SIV or AES-SIV. To mount an attack, the applications must implement their own protocol and use the EVP interface. Also they must skip the ciphertext update when a message with an empty ciphertext arrives. The FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected by this issue, as these algorithms are not FIPS approved and the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.CVE-2026-45446