CVE-2022-33682

Published Sep 23, 2022

Last updated 2 years ago

Overview

Description
TLS hostname verification cannot be enabled in the Pulsar Broker's Java Client, the Pulsar Broker's Java Admin Client, the Pulsar WebSocket Proxy's Java Client, and the Pulsar Proxy's Admin Client leaving intra-cluster connections and geo-replication connections vulnerable to man in the middle attacks, which could leak credentials, configuration data, message data, and any other data sent by these clients. The vulnerability is for both the pulsar+ssl protocol and HTTPS. An attacker can only take advantage of this vulnerability by taking control of a machine 'between' the client and the server. The attacker must then actively manipulate traffic to perform the attack by providing the client with a cryptographically valid certificate for an unrelated host. This issue affects Apache Pulsar Broker, Proxy, and WebSocket Proxy versions 2.7.0 to 2.7.4; 2.8.0 to 2.8.3; 2.9.0 to 2.9.2; 2.10.0; 2.6.4 and earlier.
Source
security@apache.org
NVD status
Modified

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.9
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
2.2
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

security@apache.org
CWE-295
nvd@nist.gov
CWE-295

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request.CVE-2026-63978