CVE-2022-49738

Published Mar 27, 2025

Last updated 8 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to do sanity check on i_extra_isize in is_alive() syzbot found a f2fs bug: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2891 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in is_alive fs/f2fs/gc.c:1117 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in gc_data_segment fs/f2fs/gc.c:1520 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_garbage_collect+0x386a/0x3df0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1734 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888076557568 by task kworker/u4:3/52 CPU: 1 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u4:3 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4-syzkaller-00362-gfef7fd48922d #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022 Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0) Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:284 [inline] print_report+0x15e/0x45d mm/kasan/report.c:395 kasan_report+0xbb/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:495 data_blkaddr fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:2891 [inline] is_alive fs/f2fs/gc.c:1117 [inline] gc_data_segment fs/f2fs/gc.c:1520 [inline] do_garbage_collect+0x386a/0x3df0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1734 f2fs_gc+0x88c/0x20a0 fs/f2fs/gc.c:1831 f2fs_balance_fs+0x544/0x6b0 fs/f2fs/segment.c:410 f2fs_write_inode+0x57e/0xe20 fs/f2fs/inode.c:753 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0xcfc/0x1440 fs/fs-writeback.c:1652 writeback_sb_inodes+0x54d/0xf90 fs/fs-writeback.c:1870 wb_writeback+0x2c5/0xd70 fs/fs-writeback.c:2044 wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2187 [inline] wb_workfn+0x2dc/0x12f0 fs/fs-writeback.c:2227 process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289 worker_thread+0x665/0x1080 kernel/workqueue.c:2436 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306 The root cause is that we forgot to do sanity check on .i_extra_isize in below path, result in accessing invalid address later, fix it. - gc_data_segment - is_alive - data_blkaddr - offset_in_addr
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.1
Impact score
5.2
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-125
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
CWE-125

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: tmc-etr: Fix race condition between sysfs and perf mode When trying to run perf and sysfs mode simultaneously, the WARN_ON() in tmc_etr_enable_hw() is triggered sometimes: WARNING: CPU: 42 PID: 3911571 at drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c:1060 tmc_etr_enable_hw+0xc0/0xd8 [coresight_tmc] [..snip..] Call trace: tmc_etr_enable_hw+0xc0/0xd8 [coresight_tmc] (P) tmc_enable_etr_sink+0x11c/0x250 [coresight_tmc] (L) tmc_enable_etr_sink+0x11c/0x250 [coresight_tmc] coresight_enable_path+0x1c8/0x218 [coresight] coresight_enable_sysfs+0xa4/0x228 [coresight] enable_source_store+0x58/0xa8 [coresight] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x68 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x120/0x1b8 vfs_write+0x2c8/0x388 ksys_write+0x74/0x108 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x64/0x148 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x3c/0x130 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0 el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Since the enablement of sysfs mode is separeted into two critical regions, one for sysfs buffer allocation and another for hardware enablement, it's possible to race with the perf mode. Fix this by double check whether the perf mode's been used before enabling the hardware in sysfs mode. mode: [sysfs mode] [perf mode] tmc_etr_get_sysfs_buffer() spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) [sysfs buffer allocation] spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) tmc_etr_enable_hw() drvdata->etr_buf = etr_perf->etr_buf spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) tmc_etr_enable_hw() WARN_ON(drvdata->etr_buf) // WARN sicne etr_buf initialized at the perf side spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) With this fix, we retain the check for CS_MODE_PERF in get_etr_sysfs_buf. This ensures we verify whether the perf mode's already running before we actually allocate the buffer. Then we can save the time of allocating/freeing the sysfs buffer if race with the perf mode.CVE-2026-46272