CVE-2022-49796

Published May 1, 2025

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: kprobe: Fix potential null-ptr-deref on trace_array in kprobe_event_gen_test_exit() When test_gen_kprobe_cmd() failed after kprobe_event_gen_cmd_end(), it will goto delete, which will call kprobe_event_delete() and release the corresponding resource. However, the trace_array in gen_kretprobe_test will point to the invalid resource. Set gen_kretprobe_test to NULL after called kprobe_event_delete() to prevent null-ptr-deref. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000070 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 246 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc1-00174-g9522dc5c87da-dirty #248 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b3f840-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__ftrace_set_clr_event_nolock+0x53/0x1b0 Code: e8 82 26 fc ff 49 8b 1e c7 44 24 0c ea ff ff ff 49 39 de 0f 84 3c 01 00 00 c7 44 24 18 00 00 00 00 e8 61 26 fc ff 48 8b 6b 10 <44> 8b 65 70 4c 8b 6d 18 41 f7 c4 00 02 00 00 75 2f RSP: 0018:ffffc9000159fe00 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88810971d268 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff8881080be600 RSI: ffffffff811b48ff RDI: ffff88810971d058 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffc9000159fe58 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffffffa0001064 R13: ffffffffa000106c R14: ffff88810971d238 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f89eeff6540(0000) GS:ffff88813b600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000070 CR3: 000000010599e004 CR4: 0000000000330ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __ftrace_set_clr_event+0x3e/0x60 trace_array_set_clr_event+0x35/0x50 ? 0xffffffffa0000000 kprobe_event_gen_test_exit+0xcd/0x10b [kprobe_event_gen_test] __x64_sys_delete_module+0x206/0x380 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xd8/0x190 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x1c/0x50 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f89eeb061b7
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-476

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163