CVE-2022-50118

Published Jun 18, 2025

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/perf: Optimize clearing the pending PMI and remove WARN_ON for PMI check in power_pmu_disable commit 2c9ac51b850d ("powerpc/perf: Fix PMU callbacks to clear pending PMI before resetting an overflown PMC") added a new function "pmi_irq_pending" in hw_irq.h. This function is to check if there is a PMI marked as pending in Paca (PACA_IRQ_PMI).This is used in power_pmu_disable in a WARN_ON. The intention here is to provide a warning if there is PMI pending, but no counter is found overflown. During some of the perf runs, below warning is hit: WARNING: CPU: 36 PID: 0 at arch/powerpc/perf/core-book3s.c:1332 power_pmu_disable+0x25c/0x2c0 Modules linked in: ----- NIP [c000000000141c3c] power_pmu_disable+0x25c/0x2c0 LR [c000000000141c8c] power_pmu_disable+0x2ac/0x2c0 Call Trace: [c000000baffcfb90] [c000000000141c8c] power_pmu_disable+0x2ac/0x2c0 (unreliable) [c000000baffcfc10] [c0000000003e2f8c] perf_pmu_disable+0x4c/0x60 [c000000baffcfc30] [c0000000003e3344] group_sched_out.part.124+0x44/0x100 [c000000baffcfc80] [c0000000003e353c] __perf_event_disable+0x13c/0x240 [c000000baffcfcd0] [c0000000003dd334] event_function+0xc4/0x140 [c000000baffcfd20] [c0000000003d855c] remote_function+0x7c/0xa0 [c000000baffcfd50] [c00000000026c394] flush_smp_call_function_queue+0xd4/0x300 [c000000baffcfde0] [c000000000065b24] smp_ipi_demux_relaxed+0xa4/0x100 [c000000baffcfe20] [c0000000000cb2b0] xive_muxed_ipi_action+0x20/0x40 [c000000baffcfe40] [c000000000207c3c] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x8c/0x250 [c000000baffcfee0] [c000000000207e2c] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x2c/0xa0 [c000000baffcff10] [c000000000210a04] handle_percpu_irq+0x84/0xc0 [c000000baffcff40] [c000000000205f14] generic_handle_irq+0x54/0x80 [c000000baffcff60] [c000000000015740] __do_irq+0x90/0x1d0 [c000000baffcff90] [c000000000016990] __do_IRQ+0xc0/0x140 [c0000009732f3940] [c000000bafceaca8] 0xc000000bafceaca8 [c0000009732f39d0] [c000000000016b78] do_IRQ+0x168/0x1c0 [c0000009732f3a00] [c0000000000090c8] hardware_interrupt_common_virt+0x218/0x220 This means that there is no PMC overflown among the active events in the PMU, but there is a PMU pending in Paca. The function "any_pmc_overflown" checks the PMCs on active events in cpuhw->n_events. Code snippet: <<>> if (any_pmc_overflown(cpuhw)) clear_pmi_irq_pending(); else WARN_ON(pmi_irq_pending()); <<>> Here the PMC overflown is not from active event. Example: When we do perf record, default cycles and instructions will be running on PMC6 and PMC5 respectively. It could happen that overflowed event is currently not active and pending PMI is for the inactive event. Debug logs from trace_printk: <<>> any_pmc_overflown: idx is 5: pmc value is 0xd9a power_pmu_disable: PMC1: 0x0, PMC2: 0x0, PMC3: 0x0, PMC4: 0x0, PMC5: 0xd9a, PMC6: 0x80002011 <<>> Here active PMC (from idx) is PMC5 , but overflown PMC is PMC6(0x80002011). When we handle PMI interrupt for such cases, if the PMC overflown is from inactive event, it will be ignored. Reference commit: commit bc09c219b2e6 ("powerpc/perf: Fix finding overflowed PMC in interrupt") Patch addresses two changes: 1) Fix 1 : Removal of warning ( WARN_ON(pmi_irq_pending()); ) We were printing warning if no PMC is found overflown among active PMU events, but PMI pending in PACA. But this could happen in cases where PMC overflown is not in active PMC. An inactive event could have caused the overflow. Hence the warning is not needed. To know pending PMI is from an inactive event, we need to loop through all PMC's which will cause more SPR reads via mfspr and increase in context switch. Also in existing function: perf_event_interrupt, already we ignore PMI's overflown when it is from an inactive PMC. 2) Fix 2: optimization in clearing pending PMI. Currently we check for any active PMC overflown before clearing PMI pending in Paca. This is causing additional SP ---truncated---
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-674

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163