CVE-2022-50441

Published Oct 1, 2025

Last updated 9 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Lag, fix failure to cancel delayed bond work Commit 0d4e8ed139d8 ("net/mlx5: Lag, avoid lockdep warnings") accidentally removed a call to cancel delayed bond work thus it may cause queued delay to expire and fall on an already destroyed work queue. Fix by restoring the call cancel_delayed_work_sync() before destroying the workqueue. This prevents call trace such as this: [ 329.230417] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 329.231444] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode [ 329.232233] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page [ 329.233007] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 329.233476] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP [ 329.234012] CPU: 5 PID: 145 Comm: kworker/u20:4 Tainted: G OE 6.0.0-rc5_mlnx #1 [ 329.235282] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 329.236868] Workqueue: mlx5_cmd_0000:08:00.1 cmd_work_handler [mlx5_core] [ 329.237886] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_lock+0xc/0x20 [ 329.238585] Code: f0 0f b1 17 75 02 f3 c3 89 c6 e9 6f 3c 5f ff 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 <f0> 0f b1 17 75 02 f3 c3 89 c6 e9 45 3c 5f ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f [ 329.241156] RSP: 0018:ffffc900001b0e98 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 329.241940] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff82374ae0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 329.242954] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000014 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 329.243974] RBP: ffff888106ccf000 R08: ffff8881004000c8 R09: ffff888100400000 [ 329.244990] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff826669f8 R12: 0000000000002000 [ 329.246009] R13: 0000000000000005 R14: ffff888100aa7ce0 R15: ffff88852ca80000 [ 329.247030] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88852ca80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 329.248260] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 329.249111] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000016d675001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0 [ 329.250133] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 329.251152] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 329.252176] PKRU: 55555554
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-476

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163