CVE-2024-58090

Published Mar 27, 2025

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/core: Prevent rescheduling when interrupts are disabled David reported a warning observed while loop testing kexec jump: Interrupts enabled after irqrouter_resume+0x0/0x50 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 560 at drivers/base/syscore.c:103 syscore_resume+0x18a/0x220 kernel_kexec+0xf6/0x180 __do_sys_reboot+0x206/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 The corresponding interrupt flag trace: hardirqs last enabled at (15573): [<ffffffffa8281b8e>] __up_console_sem+0x7e/0x90 hardirqs last disabled at (15580): [<ffffffffa8281b73>] __up_console_sem+0x63/0x90 That means __up_console_sem() was invoked with interrupts enabled. Further instrumentation revealed that in the interrupt disabled section of kexec jump one of the syscore_suspend() callbacks woke up a task, which set the NEED_RESCHED flag. A later callback in the resume path invoked cond_resched() which in turn led to the invocation of the scheduler: __cond_resched+0x21/0x60 down_timeout+0x18/0x60 acpi_os_wait_semaphore+0x4c/0x80 acpi_ut_acquire_mutex+0x3d/0x100 acpi_ns_get_node+0x27/0x60 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x1cb/0x2d0 acpi_rs_set_srs_method_data+0x156/0x190 acpi_pci_link_set+0x11c/0x290 irqrouter_resume+0x54/0x60 syscore_resume+0x6a/0x200 kernel_kexec+0x145/0x1c0 __do_sys_reboot+0xeb/0x240 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 This is a long standing problem, which probably got more visible with the recent printk changes. Something does a task wakeup and the scheduler sets the NEED_RESCHED flag. cond_resched() sees it set and invokes schedule() from a completely bogus context. The scheduler enables interrupts after context switching, which causes the above warning at the end. Quite some of the code paths in syscore_suspend()/resume() can result in triggering a wakeup with the exactly same consequences. They might not have done so yet, but as they share a lot of code with normal operations it's just a question of time. The problem only affects the PREEMPT_NONE and PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY scheduling models. Full preemption is not affected as cond_resched() is disabled and the preemption check preemptible() takes the interrupt disabled flag into account. Cure the problem by adding a corresponding check into cond_resched().
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163