CVE-2025-21809

Published Feb 27, 2025

Last updated 8 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc, afs: Fix peer hash locking vs RCU callback In its address list, afs now retains pointers to and refs on one or more rxrpc_peer objects. The address list is freed under RCU and at this time, it puts the refs on those peers. Now, when an rxrpc_peer object runs out of refs, it gets removed from the peer hash table and, for that, rxrpc has to take a spinlock. However, it is now being called from afs's RCU cleanup, which takes place in BH context - but it is just taking an ordinary spinlock. The put may also be called from non-BH context, and so there exists the possibility of deadlock if the BH-based RCU cleanup happens whilst the hash spinlock is held. This led to the attached lockdep complaint. Fix this by changing spinlocks of rxnet->peer_hash_lock back to BH-disabling locks. ================================ WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.13.0-rc5-build2+ #1223 Tainted: G E -------------------------------- inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. swapper/1/0 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: ffff88810babe228 (&rxnet->peer_hash_lock){+.?.}-{3:3}, at: rxrpc_put_peer+0xcb/0x180 {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: mark_usage+0x164/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x544/0x990 lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 rxrpc_peer_keepalive_worker+0x144/0x440 process_one_work+0x486/0x7c0 process_scheduled_works+0x73/0x90 worker_thread+0x1c8/0x2a0 kthread+0x19b/0x1b0 ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 irq event stamp: 972402 hardirqs last enabled at (972402): [<ffffffff8244360e>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x2e/0x50 hardirqs last disabled at (972401): [<ffffffff82443328>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x18/0x60 softirqs last enabled at (972300): [<ffffffff810ffbbe>] handle_softirqs+0x3ee/0x430 softirqs last disabled at (972313): [<ffffffff810ffc54>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x44/0x110 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock); <Interrupt> lock(&rxnet->peer_hash_lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by swapper/1/0: #0: ffffffff83576be0 (rcu_callback){....}-{0:0}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x7/0x30 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G E 6.13.0-rc5-build2+ #1223 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x80 print_usage_bug.part.0+0x227/0x240 valid_state+0x53/0x70 mark_lock_irq+0xa5/0x2f0 mark_lock+0xf7/0x170 mark_usage+0xe1/0x180 __lock_acquire+0x544/0x990 lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280 _raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 rxrpc_put_peer+0xcb/0x180 afs_free_addrlist+0x46/0x90 [kafs] rcu_do_batch+0x2d2/0x640 rcu_core+0x2f7/0x350 handle_softirqs+0x1ee/0x430 __irq_exit_rcu+0x44/0x110 irq_exit_rcu+0xa/0x30 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7f/0xa0 </IRQ>
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-667
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
CWE-667

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: tmc-etr: Fix race condition between sysfs and perf mode When trying to run perf and sysfs mode simultaneously, the WARN_ON() in tmc_etr_enable_hw() is triggered sometimes: WARNING: CPU: 42 PID: 3911571 at drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c:1060 tmc_etr_enable_hw+0xc0/0xd8 [coresight_tmc] [..snip..] Call trace: tmc_etr_enable_hw+0xc0/0xd8 [coresight_tmc] (P) tmc_enable_etr_sink+0x11c/0x250 [coresight_tmc] (L) tmc_enable_etr_sink+0x11c/0x250 [coresight_tmc] coresight_enable_path+0x1c8/0x218 [coresight] coresight_enable_sysfs+0xa4/0x228 [coresight] enable_source_store+0x58/0xa8 [coresight] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x68 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x120/0x1b8 vfs_write+0x2c8/0x388 ksys_write+0x74/0x108 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x64/0x148 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x3c/0x130 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0 el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Since the enablement of sysfs mode is separeted into two critical regions, one for sysfs buffer allocation and another for hardware enablement, it's possible to race with the perf mode. Fix this by double check whether the perf mode's been used before enabling the hardware in sysfs mode. mode: [sysfs mode] [perf mode] tmc_etr_get_sysfs_buffer() spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) [sysfs buffer allocation] spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) tmc_etr_enable_hw() drvdata->etr_buf = etr_perf->etr_buf spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) tmc_etr_enable_hw() WARN_ON(drvdata->etr_buf) // WARN sicne etr_buf initialized at the perf side spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) With this fix, we retain the check for CS_MODE_PERF in get_etr_sysfs_buf. This ensures we verify whether the perf mode's already running before we actually allocate the buffer. Then we can save the time of allocating/freeing the sysfs buffer if race with the perf mode.โ€ขCVE-2026-46272