CVE-2025-21973

Published Apr 1, 2025

Last updated 5 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eth: bnxt: fix kernel panic in the bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx} When qstats-get operation is executed, callbacks of netdev_stats_ops are called. The bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx} collect per-queue stats from sw_stats in the rings. But {rx | tx | cp}_ring are allocated when the interface is up. So, these rings are not allocated when the interface is down. The qstats-get is allowed even if the interface is down. However, the bnxt_get_queue_stats{rx | tx}() accesses cp_ring and tx_ring without null check. So, it needs to avoid accessing rings if the interface is down. Reproducer: ip link set $interface down ./cli.py --spec netdev.yaml --dump qstats-get OR ip link set $interface down python ./stats.py Splat looks like: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 1680fa067 P4D 1680fa067 PUD 16be3b067 PMD 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1495 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.14.0-rc4+ #32 5cd0f999d5a15c574ac72b3e4b907341 Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME Z690-P D4, BIOS 0603 11/01/2021 RIP: 0010:bnxt_get_queue_stats_rx+0xf/0x70 [bnxt_en] Code: c6 87 b5 18 00 00 02 eb a2 66 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 01 RSP: 0018:ffffabef43cdb7e0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffc04c8710 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffabef43cdb858 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8d504e850000 RBP: ffff8d506c9f9c00 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: ffff8d506bcd901c R10: 0000000000000015 R11: ffff8d506bcd9000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffffabef43cdb8c0 R14: ffff8d504e850000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f2c5462b080(0000) GS:ffff8d575f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000167fd0000 CR4: 00000000007506f0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15a/0x460 ? sched_balance_find_src_group+0x58d/0xd10 ? exc_page_fault+0x6e/0x180 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? bnxt_get_queue_stats_rx+0xf/0x70 [bnxt_en cdd546fd48563c280cfd30e9647efa420db07bf1] netdev_nl_stats_by_netdev+0x2b1/0x4e0 ? xas_load+0x9/0xb0 ? xas_find+0x183/0x1d0 ? xa_find+0x8b/0xe0 netdev_nl_qstats_get_dumpit+0xbf/0x1e0 genl_dumpit+0x31/0x90 netlink_dump+0x1a8/0x360
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.1
Impact score
5.2
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: tmc-etr: Fix race condition between sysfs and perf mode When trying to run perf and sysfs mode simultaneously, the WARN_ON() in tmc_etr_enable_hw() is triggered sometimes: WARNING: CPU: 42 PID: 3911571 at drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c:1060 tmc_etr_enable_hw+0xc0/0xd8 [coresight_tmc] [..snip..] Call trace: tmc_etr_enable_hw+0xc0/0xd8 [coresight_tmc] (P) tmc_enable_etr_sink+0x11c/0x250 [coresight_tmc] (L) tmc_enable_etr_sink+0x11c/0x250 [coresight_tmc] coresight_enable_path+0x1c8/0x218 [coresight] coresight_enable_sysfs+0xa4/0x228 [coresight] enable_source_store+0x58/0xa8 [coresight] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x68 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x120/0x1b8 vfs_write+0x2c8/0x388 ksys_write+0x74/0x108 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x64/0x148 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x3c/0x130 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0 el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Since the enablement of sysfs mode is separeted into two critical regions, one for sysfs buffer allocation and another for hardware enablement, it's possible to race with the perf mode. Fix this by double check whether the perf mode's been used before enabling the hardware in sysfs mode. mode: [sysfs mode] [perf mode] tmc_etr_get_sysfs_buffer() spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) [sysfs buffer allocation] spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) tmc_etr_enable_hw() drvdata->etr_buf = etr_perf->etr_buf spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) tmc_etr_enable_hw() WARN_ON(drvdata->etr_buf) // WARN sicne etr_buf initialized at the perf side spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) With this fix, we retain the check for CS_MODE_PERF in get_etr_sysfs_buf. This ensures we verify whether the perf mode's already running before we actually allocate the buffer. Then we can save the time of allocating/freeing the sysfs buffer if race with the perf mode.CVE-2026-46272