CVE-2025-22023

Published Apr 16, 2025

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: xhci: Don't skip on Stopped - Length Invalid Up until commit d56b0b2ab142 ("usb: xhci: ensure skipped isoc TDs are returned when isoc ring is stopped") in v6.11, the driver didn't skip missed isochronous TDs when handling Stoppend and Stopped - Length Invalid events. Instead, it erroneously cleared the skip flag, which would cause the ring to get stuck, as future events won't match the missed TD which is never removed from the queue until it's cancelled. This buggy logic seems to have been in place substantially unchanged since the 3.x series over 10 years ago, which probably speaks first and foremost about relative rarity of this case in normal usage, but by the spec I see no reason why it shouldn't be possible. After d56b0b2ab142, TDs are immediately skipped when handling those Stopped events. This poses a potential problem in case of Stopped - Length Invalid, which occurs either on completed TDs (likely already given back) or Link and No-Op TRBs. Such event won't be recognized as matching any TD (unless it's the rare Link TRB inside a TD) and will result in skipping all pending TDs, giving them back possibly before they are done, risking isoc data loss and maybe UAF by HW. As a compromise, don't skip and don't clear the skip flag on this kind of event. Then the next event will skip missed TDs. A downside of not handling Stopped - Length Invalid on a Link inside a TD is that if the TD is cancelled, its actual length will not be updated to account for TRBs (silently) completed before the TD was stopped. I had no luck producing this sequence of completion events so there is no compelling demonstration of any resulting disaster. It may be a very rare, obscure condition. The sole motivation for this patch is that if such unlikely event does occur, I'd rather risk reporting a cancelled partially done isoc frame as empty than gamble with UAF. This will be fixed more properly by looking at Stopped event's TRB pointer when making skipping decisions, but such rework is unlikely to be backported to v6.12, which will stay around for a few years.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.8
Impact score
5.9
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-416

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163