CVE-2025-22090

Published Apr 16, 2025

Last updated 5 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm/pat: Fix VM_PAT handling when fork() fails in copy_page_range() If track_pfn_copy() fails, we already added the dst VMA to the maple tree. As fork() fails, we'll cleanup the maple tree, and stumble over the dst VMA for which we neither performed any reservation nor copied any page tables. Consequently untrack_pfn() will see VM_PAT and try obtaining the PAT information from the page table -- which fails because the page table was not copied. The easiest fix would be to simply clear the VM_PAT flag of the dst VMA if track_pfn_copy() fails. However, the whole thing is about "simply" clearing the VM_PAT flag is shaky as well: if we passed track_pfn_copy() and performed a reservation, but copying the page tables fails, we'll simply clear the VM_PAT flag, not properly undoing the reservation ... which is also wrong. So let's fix it properly: set the VM_PAT flag only if the reservation succeeded (leaving it clear initially), and undo the reservation if anything goes wrong while copying the page tables: clearing the VM_PAT flag after undoing the reservation. Note that any copied page table entries will get zapped when the VMA will get removed later, after copy_page_range() succeeded; as VM_PAT is not set then, we won't try cleaning VM_PAT up once more and untrack_pfn() will be happy. Note that leaving these page tables in place without a reservation is not a problem, as we are aborting fork(); this process will never run. A reproducer can trigger this usually at the first try: https://gitlab.com/davidhildenbrand/scratchspace/-/raw/main/reproducers/pat_fork.c WARNING: CPU: 26 PID: 11650 at arch/x86/mm/pat/memtype.c:983 get_pat_info+0xf6/0x110 Modules linked in: ... CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 11650 Comm: repro3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5+ #92 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:get_pat_info+0xf6/0x110 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ... untrack_pfn+0x52/0x110 unmap_single_vma+0xa6/0xe0 unmap_vmas+0x105/0x1f0 exit_mmap+0xf6/0x460 __mmput+0x4b/0x120 copy_process+0x1bf6/0x2aa0 kernel_clone+0xab/0x440 __do_sys_clone+0x66/0x90 do_syscall_64+0x95/0x180 Likely this case was missed in: d155df53f310 ("x86/mm/pat: clear VM_PAT if copy_p4d_range failed") ... and instead of undoing the reservation we simply cleared the VM_PAT flag. Keep the documentation of these functions in include/linux/pgtable.h, one place is more than sufficient -- we should clean that up for the other functions like track_pfn_remap/untrack_pfn separately.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: tmc-etr: Fix race condition between sysfs and perf mode When trying to run perf and sysfs mode simultaneously, the WARN_ON() in tmc_etr_enable_hw() is triggered sometimes: WARNING: CPU: 42 PID: 3911571 at drivers/hwtracing/coresight/coresight-tmc-etr.c:1060 tmc_etr_enable_hw+0xc0/0xd8 [coresight_tmc] [..snip..] Call trace: tmc_etr_enable_hw+0xc0/0xd8 [coresight_tmc] (P) tmc_enable_etr_sink+0x11c/0x250 [coresight_tmc] (L) tmc_enable_etr_sink+0x11c/0x250 [coresight_tmc] coresight_enable_path+0x1c8/0x218 [coresight] coresight_enable_sysfs+0xa4/0x228 [coresight] enable_source_store+0x58/0xa8 [coresight] dev_attr_store+0x20/0x40 sysfs_kf_write+0x4c/0x68 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x120/0x1b8 vfs_write+0x2c8/0x388 ksys_write+0x74/0x108 __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x64/0x148 do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38 el0_svc+0x3c/0x130 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc8/0xd0 el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Since the enablement of sysfs mode is separeted into two critical regions, one for sysfs buffer allocation and another for hardware enablement, it's possible to race with the perf mode. Fix this by double check whether the perf mode's been used before enabling the hardware in sysfs mode. mode: [sysfs mode] [perf mode] tmc_etr_get_sysfs_buffer() spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) [sysfs buffer allocation] spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) tmc_etr_enable_hw() drvdata->etr_buf = etr_perf->etr_buf spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) spin_lock(&drvdata->spinlock) tmc_etr_enable_hw() WARN_ON(drvdata->etr_buf) // WARN sicne etr_buf initialized at the perf side spin_unlock(&drvdata->spinlock) With this fix, we retain the check for CS_MODE_PERF in get_etr_sysfs_buf. This ensures we verify whether the perf mode's already running before we actually allocate the buffer. Then we can save the time of allocating/freeing the sysfs buffer if race with the perf mode.CVE-2026-46272