CVE-2025-22123

Published Apr 16, 2025

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: fix to avoid accessing uninitialized curseg syzbot reports a f2fs bug as below: F2FS-fs (loop3): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 7 kworker/u8:7: attempt to access beyond end of device BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed1604ea3dfa RIP: 0010:get_ckpt_valid_blocks fs/f2fs/segment.h:361 [inline] RIP: 0010:has_curseg_enough_space fs/f2fs/segment.h:570 [inline] RIP: 0010:__get_secs_required fs/f2fs/segment.h:620 [inline] RIP: 0010:has_not_enough_free_secs fs/f2fs/segment.h:633 [inline] RIP: 0010:has_enough_free_secs+0x575/0x1660 fs/f2fs/segment.h:649 <TASK> f2fs_is_checkpoint_ready fs/f2fs/segment.h:671 [inline] f2fs_write_inode+0x425/0x540 fs/f2fs/inode.c:791 write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1525 [inline] __writeback_single_inode+0x708/0x10d0 fs/fs-writeback.c:1745 writeback_sb_inodes+0x820/0x1360 fs/fs-writeback.c:1976 wb_writeback+0x413/0xb80 fs/fs-writeback.c:2156 wb_do_writeback fs/fs-writeback.c:2303 [inline] wb_workfn+0x410/0x1080 fs/fs-writeback.c:2343 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3236 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa66/0x1840 kernel/workqueue.c:3317 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3398 kthread+0x7a9/0x920 kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:148 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Commit 8b10d3653735 ("f2fs: introduce FAULT_NO_SEGMENT") allows to trigger no free segment fault in allocator, then it will update curseg->segno to NULL_SEGNO, though, CP_ERROR_FLAG has been set, f2fs_write_inode() missed to check the flag, and access invalid curseg->segno directly in below call path, then resulting in panic: - f2fs_write_inode - f2fs_is_checkpoint_ready - has_enough_free_secs - has_not_enough_free_secs - __get_secs_required - has_curseg_enough_space - get_ckpt_valid_blocks : access invalid curseg->segno To avoid this issue, let's: - check CP_ERROR_FLAG flag in prior to f2fs_is_checkpoint_ready() in f2fs_write_inode(). - in has_curseg_enough_space(), save curseg->segno into a temp variable, and verify its validation before use.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-908

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163