CVE-2025-27516

Published Mar 5, 2025

Last updated 4 months ago

Overview

Description
Jinja is an extensible templating engine. Prior to 3.1.6, an oversight in how the Jinja sandboxed environment interacts with the |attr filter allows an attacker that controls the content of a template to execute arbitrary Python code. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker needs to control the content of a template. Whether that is the case depends on the type of application using Jinja. This vulnerability impacts users of applications which execute untrusted templates. Jinja's sandbox does catch calls to str.format and ensures they don't escape the sandbox. However, it's possible to use the |attr filter to get a reference to a string's plain format method, bypassing the sandbox. After the fix, the |attr filter no longer bypasses the environment's attribute lookup. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.6.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Modified
Products
jinja, debian_linux

Risk scores

CVSS 4.0

Type
Secondary
Base score
5.4
Impact score
-
Exploitability score
-
Vector string
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Severity
MEDIUM

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
8.8
Impact score
6
Exploitability score
2
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-1336

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. Fast DDS is a C++ implementation of the DDS (Data Distribution Service) standard of the OMG (Object Management Group ). ParticipantGenericMessage is the DDS Security control-message container that carries not only the handshake but also on going security-control traffic after the handshake, such as crypto-token exchange, rekeying, re-authentication, and token delivery for newly appearing endpoints. On receive, the CDR parser is invoked first and deserializes the `message_data` (i .e., the `DataHolderSeq`) via the `readParticipantGenericMessage โ†’ readDataHolderSeq` path. The `DataHolderSeq` is parsed sequentially: a sequence count (`uint32`), and for each DataHolder the `class_id` string (e.g. `DDS:Auth:PKI-DH:1.0+Req`), string properties (a sequence of key/value pairs), and binary properties (a name plus an octet-vector). The parser operat es at a stateless level and does not know higher-layer state (for example, whether the handshake has already completed), s o it fully unfolds the structure before distinguishing legitimate from malformed traffic. Because RTPS permits duplicates, delays, and retransmissions, a receiver must perform at least minimal structural parsing to check identity and sequence n umbers before discarding or processing a message; the current implementation, however, does not "peek" only at a minimal header and instead parses the entire `DataHolderSeq`. As a result, prior to versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11, this parsi ng behavior can trigger an out-of-memory condition and remotely terminate the process. Versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11 p atch the issue.โ€ขCVE-2025-62603