CVE-2025-37840

Published May 9, 2025

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: rawnand: brcmnand: fix PM resume warning Fixed warning on PM resume as shown below caused due to uninitialized struct nand_operation that checks chip select field : WARN_ON(op->cs >= nanddev_ntargets(&chip->base) [ 14.588522] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 14.588529] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1392 at drivers/mtd/nand/raw/internals.h:139 nand_reset_op+0x1e0/0x1f8 [ 14.588553] Modules linked in: bdc udc_core [ 14.588579] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1392 Comm: rtcwake Tainted: G W 6.14.0-rc4-g5394eea10651 #16 [ 14.588590] Tainted: [W]=WARN [ 14.588593] Hardware name: Broadcom STB (Flattened Device Tree) [ 14.588598] Call trace: [ 14.588604] dump_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c [ 14.588622] r7:00000009 r6:0000008b r5:60000153 r4:c0fa558c [ 14.588625] show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x7c [ 14.588639] dump_stack_lvl from dump_stack+0x18/0x1c [ 14.588653] r5:c08d40b0 r4:c1003cb0 [ 14.588656] dump_stack from __warn+0x84/0xe4 [ 14.588668] __warn from warn_slowpath_fmt+0x18c/0x194 [ 14.588678] r7:c08d40b0 r6:c1003cb0 r5:00000000 r4:00000000 [ 14.588681] warn_slowpath_fmt from nand_reset_op+0x1e0/0x1f8 [ 14.588695] r8:70c40dff r7:89705f41 r6:36b4a597 r5:c26c9444 r4:c26b0048 [ 14.588697] nand_reset_op from brcmnand_resume+0x13c/0x150 [ 14.588714] r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:c24f8010 r6:c228a3f8 r5:c26c94bc r4:c26b0040 [ 14.588717] brcmnand_resume from platform_pm_resume+0x34/0x54 [ 14.588735] r5:00000010 r4:c0840a50 [ 14.588738] platform_pm_resume from dpm_run_callback+0x5c/0x14c [ 14.588757] dpm_run_callback from device_resume+0xc0/0x324 [ 14.588776] r9:c24f8054 r8:c24f80a0 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:00000010 r4:c24f8010 [ 14.588779] device_resume from dpm_resume+0x130/0x160 [ 14.588799] r9:c22539e4 r8:00000010 r7:c22bebb0 r6:c24f8010 r5:c22539dc r4:c22539b0 [ 14.588802] dpm_resume from dpm_resume_end+0x14/0x20 [ 14.588822] r10:c2204e40 r9:00000000 r8:c228a3fc r7:00000000 r6:00000003 r5:c228a414 [ 14.588826] r4:00000010 [ 14.588828] dpm_resume_end from suspend_devices_and_enter+0x274/0x6f8 [ 14.588848] r5:c228a414 r4:00000000 [ 14.588851] suspend_devices_and_enter from pm_suspend+0x228/0x2bc [ 14.588868] r10:c3502910 r9:c3501f40 r8:00000004 r7:c228a438 r6:c0f95e18 r5:00000000 [ 14.588871] r4:00000003 [ 14.588874] pm_suspend from state_store+0x74/0xd0 [ 14.588889] r7:c228a438 r6:c0f934c8 r5:00000003 r4:00000003 [ 14.588892] state_store from kobj_attr_store+0x1c/0x28 [ 14.588913] r9:00000000 r8:00000000 r7:f09f9f08 r6:00000004 r5:c3502900 r4:c0283250 [ 14.588916] kobj_attr_store from sysfs_kf_write+0x40/0x4c [ 14.588936] r5:c3502900 r4:c0d92a48 [ 14.588939] sysfs_kf_write from kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x104/0x1f0 [ 14.588956] r5:c3502900 r4:c3501f40 [ 14.588960] kernfs_fop_write_iter from vfs_write+0x250/0x420 [ 14.588980] r10:c0e14b48 r9:00000000 r8:c25f5780 r7:00443398 r6:f09f9f68 r5:c34f7f00 [ 14.588983] r4:c042a88c [ 14.588987] vfs_write from ksys_write+0x74/0xe4 [ 14.589005] r10:00000004 r9:c25f5780 r8:c02002fA0 r7:00000000 r6:00000000 r5:c34f7f00 [ 14.589008] r4:c34f7f00 [ 14.589011] ksys_write from sys_write+0x10/0x14 [ 14.589029] r7:00000004 r6:004421c0 r5:00443398 r4:00000004 [ 14.589032] sys_write from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x5c [ 14.589044] Exception stack(0xf09f9fa8 to 0xf09f9ff0) [ 14.589050] 9fa0: 00000004 00443398 00000004 00443398 00000004 00000001 [ 14.589056] 9fc0: 00000004 00443398 004421c0 00000004 b6ecbd58 00000008 bebfbc38 0043eb78 [ 14.589062] 9fe0: 00440eb0 bebfbaf8 b6de18a0 b6e579e8 [ 14.589065] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The fix uses the higher level nand_reset(chip, chipnr); where chipnr = 0, when doing PM resume operation in compliance with the controller support for single die nand chip. Switching from nand_reset_op() to nan ---truncated---
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel, debian_linux

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.8
Impact score
5.9
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163