CVE-2025-38196

Published Jul 4, 2025

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/rsrc: validate buffer count with offset for cloning syzbot reports that it can trigger a WARN_ON() for kmalloc() attempt that's too big: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6488 at mm/slub.c:5024 __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x520/0x640 mm/slub.c:5024 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6488 Comm: syz-executor312 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-gd7fa1af5b33e #0 PREEMPT Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025 pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x520/0x640 mm/slub.c:5024 lr : __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:-1 [inline] lr : __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x3b4/0x640 mm/slub.c:5012 sp : ffff80009cfd7a90 x29: ffff80009cfd7ac0 x28: ffff0000dd52a120 x27: 0000000000412dc0 x26: 0000000000000178 x25: ffff7000139faf70 x24: 0000000000000000 x23: ffff800082f4cea8 x22: 00000000ffffffff x21: 000000010cd004a8 x20: ffff0000d75816c0 x19: ffff0000dd52a000 x18: 00000000ffffffff x17: ffff800092f39000 x16: ffff80008adbe9e4 x15: 0000000000000005 x14: 1ffff000139faf1c x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: ffff7000139faf21 x10: 0000000000000003 x9 : ffff80008f27b938 x8 : 0000000000000002 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 x5 : 00000000ffffffff x4 : 0000000000400dc0 x3 : 0000000200000000 x2 : 000000010cd004a8 x1 : ffff80008b3ebc40 x0 : 0000000000000001 Call trace: __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x520/0x640 mm/slub.c:5024 (P) kvmalloc_array_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1065 [inline] io_rsrc_data_alloc io_uring/rsrc.c:206 [inline] io_clone_buffers io_uring/rsrc.c:1178 [inline] io_register_clone_buffers+0x484/0xa14 io_uring/rsrc.c:1287 __io_uring_register io_uring/register.c:815 [inline] __do_sys_io_uring_register io_uring/register.c:926 [inline] __se_sys_io_uring_register io_uring/register.c:903 [inline] __arm64_sys_io_uring_register+0x42c/0xea8 io_uring/register.c:903 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x58/0x17c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:767 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 which is due to offset + buffer_count being too large. The registration code checks only the total count of buffers, but given that the indexing is an array, it should also check offset + count. That can't exceed IORING_MAX_REG_BUFFERS either, as there's no way to reach buffers beyond that limit. There's no issue with registrering a table this large, outside of the fact that it's pointless to register buffers that cannot be reached, and that it can trigger this kmalloc() warning for attempting an allocation that is too large.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163