CVE-2025-38279

Published Jul 10, 2025

Last updated 3 days ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Do not include stack ptr register in precision backtracking bookkeeping Yi Lai reported an issue ([1]) where the following warning appears in kernel dmesg: [ 60.643604] verifier backtracking bug [ 60.643635] WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2315 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:4302 __mark_chain_precision+0x3a6c/0x3e10 [ 60.648428] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [ 60.650471] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 2315 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.15.0-rc4-gef11287f8289-dirty #327 PREEMPT(full) [ 60.654385] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE [ 60.656682] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 60.660475] RIP: 0010:__mark_chain_precision+0x3a6c/0x3e10 [ 60.662814] Code: 5a 30 84 89 ea e8 c4 d9 01 00 80 3d 3e 7d d8 04 00 0f 85 60 fa ff ff c6 05 31 7d d8 04 01 48 c7 c7 00 58 30 84 e8 c4 06 a5 ff <0f> 0b e9 46 fa ff ff 48 ... [ 60.668720] RSP: 0018:ffff888116cc7298 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 60.671075] RAX: 54d70e82dfd31900 RBX: ffff888115b65e20 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 60.673659] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 00000000ffffffff [ 60.676241] RBP: 0000000000000400 R08: ffff8881f6f23bd3 R09: 1ffff1103ede477a [ 60.678787] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed103ede477b R12: ffff888115b60ae8 [ 60.681420] R13: 1ffff11022b6cbc4 R14: 00000000fffffff2 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 60.684030] FS: 00007fc2aedd80c0(0000) GS:ffff88826fa8a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 60.686837] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 60.689027] CR2: 000056325369e000 CR3: 000000011088b002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 60.691623] Call Trace: [ 60.692821] <TASK> [ 60.693960] ? __pfx_verbose+0x10/0x10 [ 60.695656] ? __pfx_disasm_kfunc_name+0x10/0x10 [ 60.697495] check_cond_jmp_op+0x16f7/0x39b0 [ 60.699237] do_check+0x58fa/0xab10 ... Further analysis shows the warning is at line 4302 as below: 4294 /* static subprog call instruction, which 4295 * means that we are exiting current subprog, 4296 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as 4297 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in 4298 * the current frame should be zero by now 4299 */ 4300 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { 4301 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); 4302 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); 4303 return -EFAULT; 4304 } With the below test (also in the next patch): __used __naked static void __bpf_jmp_r10(void) { asm volatile ( "r2 = 2314885393468386424 ll;" "goto +0;" "if r2 <= r10 goto +3;" "if r1 >= -1835016 goto +0;" "if r2 <= 8 goto +0;" "if r3 <= 0 goto +0;" "exit;" ::: __clobber_all); } SEC("?raw_tp") __naked void bpf_jmp_r10(void) { asm volatile ( "r3 = 0 ll;" "call __bpf_jmp_r10;" "r0 = 0;" "exit;" ::: __clobber_all); } The following is the verifier failure log: 0: (18) r3 = 0x0 ; R3_w=0 2: (85) call pc+2 caller: R10=fp0 callee: frame1: R1=ctx() R3_w=0 R10=fp0 5: frame1: R1=ctx() R3_w=0 R10=fp0 ; asm volatile (" \ @ verifier_precision.c:184 5: (18) r2 = 0x20202000256c6c78 ; frame1: R2_w=0x20202000256c6c78 7: (05) goto pc+0 8: (bd) if r2 <= r10 goto pc+3 ; frame1: R2_w=0x20202000256c6c78 R10=fp0 9: (35) if r1 >= 0xffe3fff8 goto pc+0 ; frame1: R1=ctx() 10: (b5) if r2 <= 0x8 goto pc+0 mark_precise: frame1: last_idx 10 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1 mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 9: (35) if r1 >= 0xffe3fff8 goto pc+0 mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 8: (bd) if r2 <= r10 goto pc+3 mark_preci ---truncated---
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.8
Impact score
5.9
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163