CVE-2025-38365

Published Jul 25, 2025

Last updated 3 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix a race between renames and directory logging We have a race between a rename and directory inode logging that if it happens and we crash/power fail before the rename completes, the next time the filesystem is mounted, the log replay code will end up deleting the file that was being renamed. This is best explained following a step by step analysis of an interleaving of steps that lead into this situation. Consider the initial conditions: 1) We are at transaction N; 2) We have directories A and B created in a past transaction (< N); 3) We have inode X corresponding to a file that has 2 hardlinks, one in directory A and the other in directory B, so we'll name them as "A/foo_link1" and "B/foo_link2". Both hard links were persisted in a past transaction (< N); 4) We have inode Y corresponding to a file that as a single hard link and is located in directory A, we'll name it as "A/bar". This file was also persisted in a past transaction (< N). The steps leading to a file loss are the following and for all of them we are under transaction N: 1) Link "A/foo_link1" is removed, so inode's X last_unlink_trans field is updated to N, through btrfs_unlink() -> btrfs_record_unlink_dir(); 2) Task A starts a rename for inode Y, with the goal of renaming from "A/bar" to "A/baz", so we enter btrfs_rename(); 3) Task A inserts the new BTRFS_INODE_REF_KEY for inode Y by calling btrfs_insert_inode_ref(); 4) Because the rename happens in the same directory, we don't set the last_unlink_trans field of directoty A's inode to the current transaction id, that is, we don't cal btrfs_record_unlink_dir(); 5) Task A then removes the entries from directory A (BTRFS_DIR_ITEM_KEY and BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY items) when calling __btrfs_unlink_inode() (actually the dir index item is added as a delayed item, but the effect is the same); 6) Now before task A adds the new entry "A/baz" to directory A by calling btrfs_add_link(), another task, task B is logging inode X; 7) Task B starts a fsync of inode X and after logging inode X, at btrfs_log_inode_parent() it calls btrfs_log_all_parents(), since inode X has a last_unlink_trans value of N, set at in step 1; 8) At btrfs_log_all_parents() we search for all parent directories of inode X using the commit root, so we find directories A and B and log them. Bu when logging direct A, we don't have a dir index item for inode Y anymore, neither the old name "A/bar" nor for the new name "A/baz" since the rename has deleted the old name but has not yet inserted the new name - task A hasn't called yet btrfs_add_link() to do that. Note that logging directory A doesn't fallback to a transaction commit because its last_unlink_trans has a lower value than the current transaction's id (see step 4); 9) Task B finishes logging directories A and B and gets back to btrfs_sync_file() where it calls btrfs_sync_log() to persist the log tree; 10) Task B successfully persisted the log tree, btrfs_sync_log() completed with success, and a power failure happened. We have a log tree without any directory entry for inode Y, so the log replay code deletes the entry for inode Y, name "A/bar", from the subvolume tree since it doesn't exist in the log tree and the log tree is authorative for its index (we logged a BTRFS_DIR_LOG_INDEX_KEY item that covers the index range for the dentry that corresponds to "A/bar"). Since there's no other hard link for inode Y and the log replay code deletes the name "A/bar", the file is lost. The issue wouldn't happen if task B synced the log only after task A called btrfs_log_new_name(), which would update the log with the new name for inode Y ("A/bar"). Fix this by pinning the log root during renames before removing the old directory entry, and unpinning af ---truncated---
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel, debian_linux

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
4.7
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-362

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163