CVE-2025-38557

Published Aug 19, 2025

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: HID: apple: validate feature-report field count to prevent NULL pointer dereference A malicious HID device with quirk APPLE_MAGIC_BACKLIGHT can trigger a NULL pointer dereference whilst the power feature-report is toggled and sent to the device in apple_magic_backlight_report_set(). The power feature-report is expected to have two data fields, but if the descriptor declares one field then accessing field[1] and dereferencing it in apple_magic_backlight_report_set() becomes invalid since field[1] will be NULL. An example of a minimal descriptor which can cause the crash is something like the following where the report with ID 3 (power report) only references a single 1-byte field. When hid core parses the descriptor it will encounter the final feature tag, allocate a hid_report (all members of field[] will be zeroed out), create field structure and populate it, increasing the maxfield to 1. The subsequent field[1] access and dereference causes the crash. Usage Page (Vendor Defined 0xFF00) Usage (0x0F) Collection (Application) Report ID (1) Usage (0x01) Logical Minimum (0) Logical Maximum (255) Report Size (8) Report Count (1) Feature (Data,Var,Abs) Usage (0x02) Logical Maximum (32767) Report Size (16) Report Count (1) Feature (Data,Var,Abs) Report ID (3) Usage (0x03) Logical Minimum (0) Logical Maximum (1) Report Size (8) Report Count (1) Feature (Data,Var,Abs) End Collection Here we see the KASAN splat when the kernel dereferences the NULL pointer and crashes: [ 15.164723] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000006: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 15.165691] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000030-0x0000000000000037] [ 15.165691] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 10 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 6.15.0 #31 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 15.165691] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 [ 15.165691] RIP: 0010:apple_magic_backlight_report_set+0xbf/0x210 [ 15.165691] Call Trace: [ 15.165691] <TASK> [ 15.165691] apple_probe+0x571/0xa20 [ 15.165691] hid_device_probe+0x2e2/0x6f0 [ 15.165691] really_probe+0x1ca/0x5c0 [ 15.165691] __driver_probe_device+0x24f/0x310 [ 15.165691] driver_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0 [ 15.165691] __device_attach_driver+0x169/0x220 [ 15.165691] bus_for_each_drv+0x118/0x1b0 [ 15.165691] __device_attach+0x1d5/0x380 [ 15.165691] device_initial_probe+0x12/0x20 [ 15.165691] bus_probe_device+0x13d/0x180 [ 15.165691] device_add+0xd87/0x1510 [...] To fix this issue we should validate the number of fields that the backlight and power reports have and if they do not have the required number of fields then bail.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-476

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163