CVE-2025-38601

Published Aug 19, 2025

Last updated 8 days ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: clear initialized flag for deinit-ed srng lists In a number of cases we see kernel panics on resume due to ath11k kernel page fault, which happens under the following circumstances: 1) First ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() call Last interrupt received for each group: ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 0 22511ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 1 14440788ms before [..] ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to receive control response completion, polling.. ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: Service connect timeout ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to connect to HTT: -110 ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to start core: -110 ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: firmware crashed: MHI_CB_EE_RDDM ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: already resetting count 2 ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to wait wlan mode request (mode 4): -110 ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: qmi failed to send wlan mode off: -110 ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: failed to reconfigure driver on crash recovery [..] 2) At this point reconfiguration fails (we have 2 resets) and ath11k_core_reconfigure_on_crash() calls ath11k_hal_srng_deinit() which destroys srng lists. However, it does not reset per-list ->initialized flag. 3) Second ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats() call sees stale ->initialized flag and attempts to dump srng stats: Last interrupt received for each group: ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 0 66785ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 1 14485062ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 2 14485062ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 3 14485062ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 4 14780845ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 5 14780845ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 6 14485062ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 7 66814ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 8 68997ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 9 67588ms before ath11k_pci 0000:01:00.0: group_id 10 69511ms before BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffa007404eb010 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 10022d067 PMD 100b01067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats+0x2b4/0x3b0 [ath11k] Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body+0xae/0xb0 ? page_fault_oops+0x381/0x3e0 ? exc_page_fault+0x69/0xa0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? ath11k_hal_dump_srng_stats+0x2b4/0x3b0 [ath11k (HASH:6cea 4)] ath11k_qmi_driver_event_work+0xbd/0x1050 [ath11k (HASH:6cea 4)] worker_thread+0x389/0x930 kthread+0x149/0x170 Clear per-list ->initialized flag in ath11k_hal_srng_deinit().
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel, debian_linux

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-909

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163