CVE-2025-39779

Published Sep 11, 2025

Last updated 4 days ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: subpage: keep TOWRITE tag until folio is cleaned btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() calls folio_start_writeback() the first time a folio is written back, and it also clears the PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE tag even if there are still dirty blocks in the folio. This can break ordering guarantees, such as those required by btrfs_wait_ordered_extents(). That ordering breakage leads to a real failure. For example, running generic/464 on a zoned setup will hit the following ASSERT. This happens because the broken ordering fails to flush existing dirty pages before the file size is truncated. assertion failed: !list_empty(&ordered->list) :: 0, in fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1899 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/zoned.c:1899! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 1906169 Comm: kworker/u130:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.16.0-rc6-BTRFS-ZNS+ #554 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: Supermicro Super Server/H12SSL-NT, BIOS 2.0 02/22/2021 Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs] RIP: 0010:btrfs_finish_ordered_zoned.cold+0x50/0x52 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002efdbd60 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000004c RBX: ffff88811923c4e0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff827e38b1 RDI: 00000000ffffffff RBP: ffff88810005d000 R08: 00000000ffffdfff R09: ffffffff831051c8 R10: ffffffff83055220 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881c2458c00 R13: ffff88811923c540 R14: ffff88811923c5e8 R15: ffff8881c1bd9680 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88a04acd0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f907c7a918c CR3: 0000000004024000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x4a/0x60 [btrfs] btrfs_work_helper+0xf9/0x490 [btrfs] process_one_work+0x204/0x590 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f worker_thread+0x1d6/0x3d0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x118/0x230 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x205/0x260 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Consider process A calling writepages() with WB_SYNC_NONE. In zoned mode or for compressed writes, it locks several folios for delalloc and starts writing them out. Let's call the last locked folio folio X. Suppose the write range only partially covers folio X, leaving some pages dirty. Process A calls btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() when building a bio. This function call clears the TOWRITE tag of folio X, whose size = 8K and the block size = 4K. It is following state. 0 4K 8K |/////|/////| (flag: DIRTY, tag: DIRTY) <-----> Process A will write this range. Now suppose process B concurrently calls writepages() with WB_SYNC_ALL. It calls tag_pages_for_writeback() to tag dirty folios with PAGECACHE_TAG_TOWRITE. Since folio X is still dirty, it gets tagged. Then, B collects tagged folios using filemap_get_folios_tag() and must wait for folio X to be written before returning from writepages(). 0 4K 8K |/////|/////| (flag: DIRTY, tag: DIRTY|TOWRITE) However, between tagging and collecting, process A may call btrfs_subpage_set_writeback() and clear folio X's TOWRITE tag. 0 4K 8K | |/////| (flag: DIRTY|WRITEBACK, tag: DIRTY) As a result, process B won't see folio X in its batch, and returns without waiting for it. This breaks the WB_SYNC_ALL ordering requirement. Fix this by using btrfs_subpage_set_writeback_keepwrite(), which retains the TOWRITE tag. We now manually clear the tag only after the folio becomes clean, via the xas operation.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163