CVE-2025-40300

Published Sep 11, 2025

Last updated 20 days ago

CVSS medium 5.5

Overview

AI description

Automated description summarized from trusted sources.

CVE-2025-40300, also known as VMSCAPE, is a Spectre-based vulnerability that affects AMD Zen CPUs (Zen 1 through Zen 5) and Intel Coffee Lake processors. It exploits incomplete branch predictor isolation in cloud environments, allowing a malicious guest user to potentially leak secrets from the hypervisor in the host domain. This attack is the first of its kind to enable a malicious guest VM to leak arbitrary memory from an unmodified hypervisor without requiring code modifications. The VMSCAPE attack targets the KVM/QEMU virtualization stack, demonstrating how attackers can extract cryptographic keys and other sensitive infrastructure secrets. Researchers have shown that VMSCAPE can leak memory data at a rate of 32 bytes per second, potentially extracting disk encryption keys in approximately 18 minutes on AMD Zen 4 processors. The vulnerability stems from the incomplete isolation of branch prediction state across virtualization boundaries, specifically between guest and host user processes. Linux kernel developers have released patches to mitigate VMSCAPE by adding an Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB) on VMEXIT.

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that exploits insufficient branch predictor isolation between a guest and a userspace hypervisor (like QEMU). Existing mitigations already protect kernel/KVM from a malicious guest. Userspace can additionally be protected by flushing the branch predictors after a VMexit. Since it is the userspace that consumes the poisoned branch predictors, conditionally issue an IBPB after a VMexit and before returning to userspace. Workloads that frequently switch between hypervisor and userspace will incur the most overhead from the new IBPB. This new IBPB is not integrated with the existing IBPB sites. For instance, a task can use the existing speculation control prctl() to get an IBPB at context switch time. With this implementation, the IBPB is doubled up: one at context switch and another before running userspace. The intent is to integrate and optimize these cases post-embargo. [ dhansen: elaborate on suboptimal IBPB solution ]
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel, debian_linux

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

  1. Critical Security Patch for #Ubuntu 22.04 LTS on AWS The USN-7861-4 advisory details patches for multiple Linux kernel vulnerabilities, including the high-severity VMSCAPE flaw (CVE-2025-40300). Read more: 👉 https://t.co/AiCVtMz1Gb #Security https://t.co/cz6WFVD9iO

    @Cezar_H_Linux

    20 Nov 2025

    27 Impressions

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  2. ⚠️ CVE-2025-40300 - Ubuntu Xilinx ZynqMP VMSCAPE Info Exposure Ubuntu systems running on Xilinx ZynqMP SoCs are vulnerable to VMSCAPE side-channel attacks (CVE-2025-40300). What's clever: attackers exploit timing variations in the ARM TrustZone Secure Monitor Call interfac

    @the_c_protocol

    14 Nov 2025

    1 Impression

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  3. 🚨 CVE-2025-40300 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that exploits insufficient branch predictor isolation between a guest and a userspace hypervisor (like QEMU). Existing

    @AnonOzzyDude

    14 Nov 2025

    175 Impressions

    2 Retweets

    3 Likes

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  4. "vulnérable à BPI et VMScape (CVE-2025-40300) sur Coffee Lake+ ; patches microcode requis."

    @Kraal11118

    22 Oct 2025

    18 Impressions

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  5. Actively exploited CVE : CVE-2025-40300

    @transilienceai

    5 Oct 2025

    29 Impressions

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  6. VMScape: la nueva vulnerabilidad que rompe el aislamiento entre máquinas virtuales y el hipervisor https://t.co/PJzn0oo0nX Investigadores de la ETH de Zúrich dieron a conocer mediante una publicación de blog, un nuevo ataque denominado VMScape (CVE-2025-40300), capaz de eludir

    @laboratoriolinu

    27 Sept 2025

    31 Impressions

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  7. ⚠️ VMScape (CVE-2025-40300) : une vulnérabilité de type Spectre permet à une VM de compromettre l’hyperviseur (hôte) sur CPU Intel & AMD via KVM/QEMU. Un patch Linux (IBPB-on-VMEXIT) est déjà dispo. #cybersécurité #Linux #Virtualisation 👉 https://t.co/FwNG

    @Guardia_School

    20 Sept 2025

    259 Impressions

    2 Retweets

    3 Likes

    1 Bookmark

    0 Replies

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  8. VMScape (CVE-2025-40300): Spectre-BTI Breaks VM Isolation — What Cloud & Virtualization Teams Must Do Now. Read the full report on - https://t.co/89mAWtoL5s https://t.co/usw0dQnfVi

    @cyberbivash

    15 Sept 2025

    8 Impressions

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  9. 🗣️ VMScape (CVE-2025-40300): A New CPU Flaw Threatens Cloud Security https://t.co/fjIWR1Jch9

    @fridaysecurity

    15 Sept 2025

    60 Impressions

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  10. 仮想マシンからホスト環境へ直接侵入する新たな投機的実行攻撃「VMSCAPE」が確認された。暗号鍵などの機密情報が盗まれる恐れがあり、クラウド基盤に深刻な影響を及ぼす。 この脆弱性（CVE-2025-40300）はAMD Z

    @yousukezan

    11 Sept 2025

    5170 Impressions

    15 Retweets

    31 Likes

    17 Bookmarks

    0 Replies

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  11. CVE-2025-40300 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/vmscape: Add conditional IBPB mitigation VMSCAPE is a vulnerability that exploits insufficie… https://t.co/4gW6S2WV2H

    @CVEnew

    11 Sept 2025

    552 Impressions

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  12. New VMScape attack breaks guest-host isolation on AMD, Intel CPUs / CVE-2025-40300 / AMD has released a security bulletin about the problem. intel?! https://t.co/FFq8LMWxQH

    @JensHilbig

    11 Sept 2025

    31 Impressions

    0 Retweets

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Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure hugepage is in by slot before checking max mapping level When recovering hugepages in the shadow MMU, verify that the base gfn of the shadow page is actually contained within the target memslot, *before* querying the max mapping level given the shadow page's gfn. Failure to pre-check the validity of the gfn can lead to an out-of-bounds access to the slot's lpage_info (which typically manifests as a host #PF because the lpage_info is vmalloc'd) if the guest creates a hugepage mapping (in its PTEs) that extends "below" the bounds of a memslot. When faulting in memory for a guest, and the size of the guest mapping is greater than KVM's (current) max mapping, then KVM will create a "direct" shadow page (direct in that there are no gPTEs to shadow, and so the target gfn is a direct calculation given the base gfn of the shadow page). The hugepage recovery flow looks for such direct shadow pages, as forcing 4KiB mappings when dirty logging generates the guest > host mapping size case. When the 4KiB restriction is lifted, then KVM can replace the shadow page with a hugepage. But if KVM originally used a smaller mapping than the guest because the range of memory covered by the guest hugepage exceeds the bounds of a memslot, then KVM will link a direct shadow page with a gfn that is outside the bounds of the memslot being used to fault in memory. The rmap entry added for the leaf mapping is correct and within bounds, but the gfn of the leaf SPTE's parent shadow page will be out of bounds. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000806ffc #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 1002a7067 PMD 10612f067 PTE 0 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 13 UID: 1000 PID: 757 Comm: mmu_stress_test Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-48ce1e26eace-x86_pir_to_irr_comments-vm #341 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level+0x79/0x2b0 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_mmu_recover_huge_pages+0x21b/0x320 [kvm] kvm_set_memslot+0x1ee/0x590 [kvm] kvm_set_memory_region.part.0+0x3a1/0x4d0 [kvm] kvm_vm_ioctl+0x9bf/0x15d0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0xbb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f21c0f1a9bf </TASK> Don't bother pre-checking the bounds of the potential hugepage, i.e. don't check that e.g. sp->gfn + KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(sp->role.level + 1) is also within the memslot, as the checks performed by kvm_mmu_max_mapping_level() are a superset of the basic bounds checks. I.e. pre-checking the full range would be a dubious micro-optimization.•CVE-2026-63807
  2. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: Replace guest-triggerable BUG_ON() in ioeventfd datamatch with get_unaligned() Drop a BUG_ON() that has been reachable since it was first added, way back in 2009, and instead use get_unaligned() to perform potentially-unaligned accesses. For a given store, KVM x86's emulator tracks the entire value in the destination operand, x86_emulate_ctxt.dst. If the destination is memory, and the target splits multiple pages and/or is emulated MMIO, then KVM handles each fragment independently. E.g. on a page split starting at page offset 0xffc, KVM writes 4 bytes to the first page, then the remaining bytes to the second page, using ctxt->dst as the source for both (with appropriate offsets). If the destination splits a page *and* hits emulated MMIO on the second page, then KVM will complete the write to the first page, then emulate the MMIO access to the second page. If there is a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd at offset 0 of the second page, then KVM will process the remainder of the store as a potential ioeventfd signal. Putting it all together, if the guest emits a store that splits a page starting at page offset N, and the second page has a datamatch-enabled ioeventfd at offset 0, then KVM will check for datamatch using &dst.valptr[N] as the source. Due to dst (and thus dst.valptr) being 32-byte aligned, if N is not aligned to @len, the BUG_ON() fires. E.g. with a 16-byte store at page offset 0xffc, to an ioeventfd of len 8, all initial checks in ioeventfd_in_range() will succeed, and the BUG_ON() fires due to @val being 4-byte aligned, but not 8-byte aligned. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/eventfd.c:783! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 615 Comm: repro Not tainted 7.1.0-rc2-ff238429d1ea #365 PREEMPT Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:ioeventfd_write+0x6c/0x70 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> __kvm_io_bus_write+0x85/0xb0 [kvm] kvm_io_bus_write+0x53/0x80 [kvm] vcpu_mmio_write+0x66/0xf0 [kvm] emulator_read_write_onepage+0x12a/0x540 [kvm] emulator_read_write+0x109/0x2b0 [kvm] x86_emulate_insn+0x4f8/0xfb0 [kvm] x86_emulate_instruction+0x181/0x790 [kvm] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x313/0x630 [kvm] vmx_handle_exit+0x18a/0x590 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xc81/0x1c90 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2d5/0x970 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8a/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0xb7/0x890 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53 RIP: 0033:0x7f19c931a9bf </TASK> Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- In a perfect world, the fix would be to simply delete the BUG_ON(), as KVM x86 doesn't perform alignment checks on "normal" memory accesses at CPL0. Sadly, C99 ruins all the fun; while the x86 architecture plays nice, dereferencing an unaligned pointer directly is undefined behavior in C, e.g. triggers splats when running with CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT=y.•CVE-2026-63806
  3. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: nx - fix nx_crypto_ctx_exit argument nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit calls nx_crypto_ctx_exit with crypto_shash_ctx(...) but crypto_shash_ctx gives a nx_crypto_ctx *, not a crypto_tfm *. Fix the type in nx_crypto_ctx_exit and drop the bogus crypto_tfm_ctx call. This fixes the following oops: BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access at 0xc0403effffffffc8 Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000396cb4 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#15] Call Trace: nx_crypto_ctx_shash_exit+0x24/0x60 crypto_shash_exit_tfm+0x28/0x40 crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140 crypto_exit_ahash_using_shash+0x20/0x40 crypto_destroy_tfm+0x98/0x140 hash_release+0x1c/0x30 alg_sock_destruct+0x38/0x60 __sk_destruct+0x48/0x2b0 af_alg_release+0x58/0xb0 __sock_release+0x68/0x150 sock_close+0x20/0x40 __fput+0x110/0x3a0 sys_close+0x48/0xa0 system_call_exception+0x140/0x2d0 system_call_common+0xf4/0x258 .. which came from hardlink(1) opportunistically using AF_ALG. The same problem exists with nx_crypto_ctx_skcipher_exit getting a context it wasn't expecting, but apparently nobody hit that for years.•CVE-2026-63805
  4. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gfs2: fix use-after-free in gfs2_qd_dealloc gfs2_qd_dealloc(), called as an RCU callback from gfs2_qd_dispose(), accesses the superblock object sdp through qd->qd_sbd after freeing qd. It does so to decrement sd_quota_count and wake up sd_kill_wait. However, by the time the RCU callback runs, gfs2_put_super() may have already freed sdp via free_sbd(). This can happen when gfs2_quota_cleanup() is called during unmount: it disposes of quota objects via call_rcu() and then waits on sd_kill_wait with a 60-second timeout. If the timeout expires, or if gfs2_gl_hash_clear() triggers additional qd_put() calls that schedule more RCU callbacks after the wait completes, gfs2_put_super() will proceed to free the superblock while RCU callbacks referencing it are still pending. Add an rcu_barrier() before free_sbd() in gfs2_put_super() to ensure all pending RCU callbacks (including gfs2_qd_dealloc) have completed before the superblock is freed.•CVE-2026-63804
  5. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hdlc_ppp: sync per-proto timers before freeing hdlc state Each PPP control protocol (LCP/IPCP/IPV6CP) embedded in struct ppp registers a timer via timer_setup(). That struct ppp is the hdlc->state allocation, which detach_hdlc_protocol() frees with kfree() in both teardown paths: unregister_hdlc_device() and the re-attach inside attach_hdlc_protocol(). The ppp proto never registered a .detach callback, so detach_hdlc_protocol() performs no timer synchronization before the kfree(). The only cancel, timer_delete(&proto->timer) in ppp_cp_event(), is partial (it does not wait for a running callback) and only runs on the ->CLOSED transition; ppp_stop()/ppp_close() do not sync either. A ppp_timer callback already executing (blocked on ppp->lock) survives the kfree and then dereferences proto->state / ppp->lock in freed memory, leading to a use-after-free. Fix this by adding a .detach helper that calls timer_shutdown_sync() on every per-proto timer. detach_hdlc_protocol() invokes proto->detach(dev) before kfree(hdlc->state), so timer_shutdown_sync() now runs on both free paths. timer_shutdown_sync() is used instead of timer_delete_sync() because the keepalive path re-arms the timer through add_timer()/mod_timer() and shutdown blocks any re-activation during teardown. Initialize the per-protocol timers in ppp_ioctl() when the protocol is attached, and remove the now-redundant timer_setup() from ppp_start(), so that the timers are initialized exactly once at attach time and ppp_timer_release() never operates on uninitialized timer_list structures. attach_hdlc_protocol() uses kmalloc() (not kzalloc), so struct ppp's protos[i].timer is uninitialized garbage until the first timer_setup(); without this init-at-attach, attaching the PPP protocol without ever bringing the device up would leave timer_shutdown_sync() operating on uninitialized memory in .detach. Moving the init out of ppp_start() (which only runs on NETDEV_UP) into the attach path makes the initialization unconditional and avoids initializing the same timer_list twice. This bug was found by static analysis.•CVE-2026-63803

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.