CVE-2025-64438

Published Feb 3, 2026

Last updated 10 days ago

Overview

Description
Fast DDS is a C++ implementation of the DDS (Data Distribution Service) standard of the OMG (Object Management Group ). Prior to versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11, a remotely triggerable Out-of-Memory (OOM) denial-of-service exists in Fast -DDS when processing RTPS GAP submessages under RELIABLE QoS. By sending a tiny GAP packet with a huge gap range (`gapList .base - gapStart`), an attacker drives `StatefulReader::processGapMsg()` into an unbounded loop that inserts millions of s equence numbers into `WriterProxy::changes_received_` (`std::set`), causing multi-GB heap growth and process termination. No authentication is required beyond network reachability to the reader on the DDS domain. In environments without an RSS limit (non-ASan / unlimited), memory consumption was observed to rise to ~64 GB. Versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11 patch t he issue.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
fast_dds

Risk scores

CVSS 4.0

Type
Secondary
Base score
1.7
Impact score
-
Exploitability score
-
Vector string
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Severity
LOW

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
3.9
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-835

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. Fast DDS is a C++ implementation of the DDS (Data Distribution Service) standard of the OMG (Object Management Group ). ParticipantGenericMessage is the DDS Security control-message container that carries not only the handshake but also on going security-control traffic after the handshake, such as crypto-token exchange, rekeying, re-authentication, and token delivery for newly appearing endpoints. On receive, the CDR parser is invoked first and deserializes the `message_data` (i .e., the `DataHolderSeq`) via the `readParticipantGenericMessage → readDataHolderSeq` path. The `DataHolderSeq` is parsed sequentially: a sequence count (`uint32`), and for each DataHolder the `class_id` string (e.g. `DDS:Auth:PKI-DH:1.0+Req`), string properties (a sequence of key/value pairs), and binary properties (a name plus an octet-vector). The parser operat es at a stateless level and does not know higher-layer state (for example, whether the handshake has already completed), s o it fully unfolds the structure before distinguishing legitimate from malformed traffic. Because RTPS permits duplicates, delays, and retransmissions, a receiver must perform at least minimal structural parsing to check identity and sequence n umbers before discarding or processing a message; the current implementation, however, does not "peek" only at a minimal header and instead parses the entire `DataHolderSeq`. As a result, prior to versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11, this parsi ng behavior can trigger an out-of-memory condition and remotely terminate the process. Versions 3.4.1, 3.3.1, and 2.6.11 p atch the issue.CVE-2025-62603