CVE-2026-10664

Published Jul 12, 2026

Last updated 6 days ago

CVSS medium 5.0

Overview

Description
The nRF70 Wi-Fi driver's power-save event handler nrf_wifi_event_proc_get_power_save_info() in drivers/wifi/nrf_wifi/src/wifi_mgmt.c copied TWT (Target Wake Time) flow entries from an nrf_wifi_umac_event_power_save_info event into the fixed-size twt_flows[WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS] (8-element) array of a caller-supplied struct wifi_ps_config, looping over event-provided num_twt_flows without validating it against WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS or checking event_len. When num_twt_flows exceeds 8, the handler writes past the destination array (which is typically on the caller's stack, e.g. the wifi ps shell command) -- an out-of-bounds write of ~40-byte TWT entries -- and reads twt_flow_info[i] past the event buffer. The event is delivered by the nRF70 co-processor firmware in response to a host-initiated power-save GET, so reaching the overflow requires the firmware to emit a malformed or out-of-range event; the trust boundary is host-to-trusted-coprocessor rather than a direct remote-AP write, with over-the-air influence on the flow count being indirect and bounded by the 3-bit TWT flow-id space. Affected: builds with CONFIG_NRF70_STA_MODE on releases through v4.4.0. The fix rejects events with num_twt_flows > WIFI_MAX_TWT_FLOWS or with event_len shorter than the claimed entries, and adds a NULL check on the caller buffer.
Source
vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
zephyr

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Secondary
Base score
5
Impact score
3.4
Exploitability score
1.6
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org
CWE-787

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

  1. 🚨*CVE* CVE-2026-10664 The nRF70 Wi-Fi driver's power-save event handler nrf_wifi_event_proc_get_power_save_info() in drivers/wifi/nrf_wifi/src/wifi_mgmt.c copied TWT (Target Wake Time) flo… https://t.co/PPwLl1zpUN ----- Traducción: CVE-2026-10664 El … https://t.co/utmtNg

    @infoflowcloud

    12 Jul 2026

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  2. 🐛 VULNERABILITIES CVE Notify: 🚨 [CVE-2026-10664](https://t.co/bsvbLWz5Yb... https://t.co/3r3r4HFkRt #ZeroDay #PatchManagement #Vulnerability

    @MalwareObserver

    12 Jul 2026

    45 Impressions

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Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. The Nuvoton NuMaker HSUSBD USB device-controller driver (drivers/usb/udc/udc_numaker.c) armed the control Data IN stage unconditionally (base->CEPTXCNT = len in numaker_hsusbd_ep_trigger). Because the HSUSBD hardware cannot disarm a control Data IN already armed for a previous transfer, a USB host that cancels an in-flight control transfer (timeout) and then issues a new SETUP packet can drive the driver out of sync: stale data may be transmitted in the new transfer and the control endpoint can become permanently stuck NAK'ing every subsequent control transfer. A malicious or buggy host (physical/adjacent attacker driving the bus) can repeatedly cancel-and-re-SETUP to wedge the device's USB control endpoint, denying service to the device's USB function (the device stops enumerating/responding on the control pipe) until a USB reset or re-plug. The flaw is an availability-only denial of service; the FIFO copy loops (bounded by net_buf length and the hardware BUFFULL flag) and the net_buf lifecycle are independent of the arming desync, so there is no out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, or information leak. The fix monitors the IN-token and new-SETUP events (k_event) and only arms control Data IN when an IN token is present and no new SETUP has arrived, cancelling the current transfer on a new SETUP. Affects boards using the Nuvoton NuMaker HSUSBD controller (CONFIG_UDC_NUMAKER with DT_HAS_NUVOTON_NUMAKER_HSUSBD_ENABLED); shipped in v4.4.0.•CVE-2026-10668
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References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.