CVE-2026-12045

Published Jun 19, 2026

Last updated 2 months ago

CVSS critical 9.4

Overview

AI description

Automated description summarized from trusted sources.

CVE-2026-12045 describes a read-only transaction bypass vulnerability found in the AI Assistant feature of pgAdmin 4, affecting versions from 9.13 before 9.16. An attacker capable of influencing database content that the AI Assistant reads can exploit this flaw through prompt injection. This allows the attacker to execute arbitrary SQL queries with the privileges of the pgAdmin user's database role. The vulnerability arises because the AI Assistant's `execute_sql_query` tool, designed to run LLM-generated SQL within a `BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY` wrapper, did not adequately restrict the LLM-supplied query. A multi-statement payload starting with transaction-ending commands like `COMMIT`, `END`, `ROLLBACK`, or `ABORT` could terminate the read-only transaction, causing subsequent statements to run in autocommit mode. If the pgAdmin user holds superuser privileges, this can be escalated to remote code execution on the database server via `COPY ... TO PROGRAM`.

Description
Read-only transaction bypass in the pgAdmin 4 AI Assistant allows an attacker who can influence database content that the assistant reads to execute arbitrary SQL with the privileges of the pgAdmin user's database role. The AI Assistant's execute_sql_query tool runs LLM-generated SQL inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper to prevent data modification. The LLM-supplied query was forwarded to the database driver without restriction to a single statement or to read-only verbs, so a multi-statement payload beginning with COMMIT, END, ROLLBACK, or ABORT terminated the read-only transaction and ran subsequent statements in autocommit mode. The trailing ROLLBACK then had no effect. Delivery is via prompt injection: an attacker who can write content into any object the AI Assistant may inspect (a row, a column value, a comment) can cause the LLM to emit the multi-statement payload as a tool call. With ordinary write privileges on the pgAdmin user's role the attacker can perform unauthorised data modification. When the pgAdmin user's role is a PostgreSQL superuser or holds pg_execute_server_program, the chain extends to remote code execution on the database server host via COPY ... TO PROGRAM. Fix validates the LLM-supplied query up front: it must parse to exactly one non-empty / non-comment statement whose leading real token (after stripping whitespace, comments, and punctuation) is one of SELECT, WITH, EXPLAIN, SHOW, VALUES, or TABLE. Transaction-control verbs, DML, DDL, CALL, COPY, DO, SET/RESET, and everything else are rejected before any database work happens. PostgreSQL's READ ONLY mode continues to backstop data-modifying CTEs, EXPLAIN ANALYZE on writes, and volatile side effects. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.16.
Source
f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
pgadmin_4

Risk scores

CVSS 4.0

Type
Secondary
Base score
9.4
Impact score
-
Exploitability score
-
Vector string
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Severity
CRITICAL

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
8.8
Impact score
5.9
Exploitability score
2.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007
CWE-77

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

  1. pgAdmin 4 9.17 patches seven vulnerabilities, including three incomplete fixes from 9.16. New Critical flaws enable OS command injection via data export (CVE-2026-17566) and credential leakage during server duplication (CVE-2026-17349). An incomplete prior fix for CVE-2026-12045

    @WorldCyberNewsX

    3 Aug 2026

    13 Impressions

    0 Retweets

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  2. Warning: Critical vulnerabilities (#RCE + stored #XSS) in #pgAdmin 4 allow unauthenticated remote code execution and credential theft. #CVE-2026-12048 #CVE-2026-12046 #CVE-2026-12045 CVSS(3.1): 9.3/9.0. Read the advisory https://t.co/0zR03sn89w and #Patch #Patch #Patch

    @CCBalert

    22 Jun 2026

    317 Impressions

    1 Retweet

    0 Likes

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  3. ⚠️⚠️ CVE-2026-12046 (CVSS 9.5) + CVE-2026-12045 + CVE-2026-12048 (CVSS 9.3): pgAdmin 4 server-mode flaws enable unauth RCE and stored XSS in PostgreSQL admin UI. 🔗FOFA Link: https://t.co/U7JSrUmayI 🎯66.4K+ Results are found on https://t.co/NBEEGu7ePJ in the past yea

    @fofabot

    22 Jun 2026

    4221 Impressions

    12 Retweets

    30 Likes

    20 Bookmarks

    0 Replies

    0 Quotes

  4. pgAdmin 4で重大(Critical)な脆弱性3件が修正。安全でないピクルのデシリアライゼーションCVE-2026-12046がCVSSスコア9.5、AIアシスタントの読み取り専用トランザクション回避CVE-2026-12045が9.4、蓄積型XSSのCVE-2026-12048が9.

    @__kokumoto

    22 Jun 2026

    686 Impressions

    0 Retweets

    1 Like

    1 Bookmark

    0 Replies

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  5. Three critical pgAdmin 4 vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-12046, CVE-2026-12048, CVE-2026-12045) risk XSS and RCE. Update to pgAdmin 4 9.16 now. #pgAdmin #PostgreSQL #XSS #RCE #CVE #Vulnerability https://t.co/RHAfR82LDP https://t.co/msfkHZZ9l1

    @Daily_CyberSec

    22 Jun 2026

    470 Impressions

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Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. pgAdmin 4's Import/Export Data tool builds a psql \copy (...) command line by interpolating a user-supplied SQL query into a Jinja template and passing the rendered line to psql via --command. To stop an attacker from breaking out of the (...) wrapper, create_import_export_job() (route POST /import_export/job/<sid>, gated only by the ordinary, commonly-granted tools_import_export_data permission) validated the query with a hand-written parenthesis-balance checker, _is_query_parens_balanced(). That checker always treated a backslash before a single quote (\') as escaping the quote, i.e. as if standard_conforming_strings were off. PostgreSQL has defaulted standard_conforming_strings to on since 9.1 (2010), the default on every PostgreSQL version pgAdmin 4 currently supports (13-18); under that default psql's own \copy tokenizer treats \ as an ordinary character, so a single quote immediately after it closes the string literal. A query such as SELECT 'a\') TO PROGRAM 'echo pwned' x' was therefore accepted as "balanced" by pgAdmin's checker (which believed the ) was still inside the string), while psql, run through the actual rendered command line, closes the string at that point and treats the following ) as the end of the wrapping \copy (...) subquery, exposing an attacker-chosen TO PROGRAM '<command>' clause that psql executes via popen() -- independent of a subsequent syntax error later on the same line. This is the same class of bug as CVE-2025-12762/CVE-2025-13780 (RCE via psql meta-command/COPY injection during PLAIN-format dump restore), reached through an independently written defense in a different module (Import/Export Data rather than Restore) that had its own, different logic bug (inverted backslash-escape semantics rather than a BOM-defeated regex anchor). The fix rejects any backslash inside a single-quoted string in the query outright, rather than picking one of the two possible psql interpretations. This is intentionally conservative: because the correct interpretation of \ depends on the target server's standard_conforming_strings setting, which the checker cannot reliably know at validation time, refusing the query is safer than guessing. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of _is_query_parens_balanced() before 9.18.•CVE-2026-17566
  2. The MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK setting, introduced in pgAdmin 4 7.2, lets an administrator configure an external command that returns a per-user encryption key, with %u in the configured string replaced by the current user's name. The previous implementation substituted the username directly into the command string and executed the result with subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True). Because the username can originate from an external authentication source (OAuth/OIDC claims, Kerberos, webserver auth) rather than a value pgAdmin fully controls, a username containing shell metacharacters (';', '$()', backticks, pipes, '&&', newlines) allowed an authenticated user to execute arbitrary commands as the pgAdmin service account in any deployment where the configured hook string uses %u. Fix tokenises the trusted, administrator-configured hook string into an argument vector first (using shlex in POSIX-quoting mode, with backslash-escaping disabled so Windows-style paths are not mis-parsed), substitutes the untrusted username into the individual argv elements, and executes with shell=False. The username is therefore always confined to a single argv element; any shell metacharacters it contains are inert. Administrators whose MASTER_PASSWORD_HOOK previously relied on shell features (pipes, redirection, environment-variable expansion, globbing) within the hook string itself must move that logic into the invoked script, since it is no longer interpreted by a shell. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 7.2 before 9.17.•CVE-2026-17347
  3. The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single "front door" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission. The reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure. During remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class. An authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs. Because the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means. Socket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission. Fix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user. This issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.•CVE-2026-17350
  4. /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server, part of the Workspaces feature introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.0, when passed the id of an existing server, clones that server via Server.clone(), which copies every column from the source row, including user_id, shared, shared_username, and the stored credential fields password, save_password, and tunnel_password. When a non-owner triggered an adhoc connect against another user's (in practice, typically an administrator's) shared server, the clone inherited that user's ownership, shared flag, and stored database credentials verbatim. pgAdmin persisted this cross-tenant, credential-bearing server row before the connection was even attempted, so it survived even when the connection subsequently failed. The non-owner could then open the newly-owned clone and pgAdmin would connect using the source user's stored database password on the non-owner's behalf, granting the non-owner use of database credentials -- and whatever database privileges they confer -- that were never their own. Fix forces the cloned adhoc record's ownership fields (user_id, shared, shared_username) and stored credential fields (password, save_password, tunnel_password) to belong to the calling user and be cleared/private before committing, regardless of the source server's ownership, sharing state, or stored credentials. A regression test asserts that an adhoc connect triggered by a non-owner against another user's shared server persists a row owned by the caller, not shared, and without the source's stored credentials. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.0 before 9.17.•CVE-2026-17349
  5. The fix for CVE-2026-12045 in pgAdmin 4 9.16 required the LLM-supplied query passed to the AI Assistant's execute_sql_query tool to parse, via sqlparse, as exactly one non-transaction-control statement before running it inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper. sqlparse's string-literal lexing can disagree with PostgreSQL's own parser: under standard_conforming_strings = on (PostgreSQL's default since 9.1), a backslash immediately before a quote is an ordinary character to PostgreSQL, but sqlparse treats it as escaping the quote. A payload such as SELECT '\';COMMIT;CREATE TABLE pwn(x int);SELECT 1 --' therefore parses as a single SELECT to sqlparse's validator, while PostgreSQL executes it as four statements: the smuggled COMMIT ends the wrapping read-only transaction, and the trailing ROLLBACK becomes a no-op. This reintroduces the same write/RCE bypass CVE-2026-12045 was meant to close, reachable via the same indirect prompt-injection delivery (an attacker plants the payload in any object the AI Assistant may read; the LLM emits it as a tool call). An initial candidate fix ran the query with psycopg's execute(..., prepare=True), intending to force PostgreSQL's own Parse step (extended query protocol) to reject multi-statement text regardless of sqlparse's classification. This candidate fix does not work as submitted: psycopg3's PrepareManager silently ignores the prepare argument whenever the connection's prepare_threshold is None, which is pgAdmin's default for every server connection (the per-server "Prepare threshold" field is blank unless an administrator explicitly sets it) -- psycopg3 falls back to the simple query protocol, the same multi-statement-capable path the bypass exploits, so the candidate fix closes nothing on any real-world default configuration. The corrected fix sets conn.prepare_threshold = 0 directly on the dedicated, single-use read-only connection the AI Assistant tool opens, structurally forcing the extended query protocol independent of any server-level configuration. Verified against a live PostgreSQL 18 instance: the payload executes successfully under the prepare_threshold=None (default) behavior, and is rejected with "cannot insert multiple commands into a prepared statement" once prepare_threshold=0 is set on that connection. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.17.•CVE-2026-17351

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.