CVE-2026-22599

Published May 14, 2026

Last updated 5 months ago

CVSS critical 9.3

Overview

Description
Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In versions on the 4.x branch prior to 4.26.1 and on the 5.x branch prior to 5.33.2, a database-query injection vulnerability existed in the Strapi Content-Type Builder write API. An authenticated administrator could inject arbitrary database statements through the `column.defaultTo` attribute when creating or modifying a content type. Setting `defaultTo` as a tuple `[value, { isRaw: true }]` caused the value to be passed directly into Knex's `db.connection.raw()` during schema migration without sanitization, allowing arbitrary statement execution at the database layer. Depending on the database engine, this enabled arbitrary file read via database utility functions, denial of service via forced server crash on schema-migration error, and on engines that permit external program execution, remote code execution against the database server. The patch in versions 4.26.1 and 5.33.2 addresses this by restricting all Content-Type Builder write APIs to development mode only. Production deployments running v5.33.2 or later return 404 for requests against `/content-type-builder/content-types` and related endpoints, removing the network-reachable attack surface entirely.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
strapi

Risk scores

CVSS 4.0

Type
Secondary
Base score
9.3
Impact score
-
Exploitability score
-
Vector string
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Severity
CRITICAL

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.2
Impact score
5.9
Exploitability score
1.2
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-89

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

  1. Two critical flaws in Strapi CMS (CVE-2026-27886 & CVE-2026-22599) allow unauthenticated admin takeover and SQL injection. Update your nodes now! #Strapi #CMS #CyberSecurity #InfoSec #RCE #VulnerabilityAlert #CVE #AdminTakeover #PatchNow #TechNews https://t.co/lbP6vnSmDY htt

    @Daily_CyberSec

    18 May 2026

    528 Impressions

    1 Retweet

    8 Likes

    2 Bookmarks

    0 Replies

    0 Quotes

Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. Strapi users-permissions plugin fails to restrict JWT algorithms when plugin::users-permissions.jwt.algorithm is not explicitly configured, allowing acceptance of HS384 and HS512 tokens alongside HS256. Attackers possessing the jwtSecret can mint tokens with non-standard HMAC variants to bypass algorithm restrictions and weaken authentication controls.•CVE-2026-57997
  2. Strapi is an open source headless content management system. Strapi versions starting in 4.0.0 and prior to 5.37.0 did not sufficiently sanitize query parameters when filtering content via relational fields. An unauthenticated attacker could use the `where` query parameter on any publicly-accessible content-type with an `updatedBy` (or other admin-relation) field to perform a boolean-oracle attack against private fields on the joined `admin_users` table, including the `resetPasswordToken` field. Extracting an admin reset token via this oracle made full administrative account takeover possible without authentication. When a filter such as `where[updatedBy][resetPasswordToken][$startsWith]=a` was applied to a public Content API endpoint, the underlying query generation performed a `LEFT JOIN` against the `admin_users` table and emitted a `WHERE` clause referencing the joined column. The query parameter sanitization layer did not block operator chains that traversed into relational target schemas the caller had no read permission on, allowing the response count to be used as a one-bit oracle on any admin-table field. The patch in version 5.37.0 introduces explicit query-parameter sanitization at the controller and service boundary via three new primitives: `strictParam`, `addQueryParams`, and `addBodyParams`. Operator chains that traverse into restricted relational targets are now rejected before reaching the database.•CVE-2026-27886
  3. Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, the Upload plugin's Content API endpoints did not enforce the administrator-configured MIME type restrictions (`plugin.upload.security.allowedTypes` and `deniedTypes`). The same restrictions were correctly enforced on the Admin Panel upload path. The upload plugin's `enforceUploadSecurity` security check was invoked in the admin upload controller but was missing from the Content API controller. The Content API handlers `uploadFiles` and `replaceFile` (and the `upload` wrapper that dispatches to them) called the underlying upload service directly, bypassing both the magic-byte MIME detection and the configured allow/deny lists. An authenticated user with the Content API upload permission could therefore upload file types the administrator had explicitly disallowed, including HTML and SVG content. In deployments serving uploaded files from the same origin as the admin panel (default), an attacker could upload an HTML or SVG file that, when opened directly by an admin, executed JavaScript in the admin origin, enabling admin-session hijack and authenticated administrative actions against the admin API. The patch in version 5.33.3 introduces a shared `prepareUploadRequest` helper that wraps `enforceUploadSecurity` and is called from both the Content API and admin upload controllers, ensuring identical security policy enforcement on every upload entry point.•CVE-2026-22707
  4. Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate the user's existing refresh-token sessions by default. The refresh-token invalidation step in the users-permissions and admin authentication controllers was conditional on a caller-supplied `deviceId`. When a password change or reset request did not include a `deviceId`, no refresh tokens were revoked, leaving every prior session active. An attacker who had previously obtained a refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, allowing persistent unauthorized access for the lifetime of the refresh token (up to 30 days by default). Rotating credentials no longer terminated an active attacker session, defeating password reset as a containment measure. The patch in version 5.33.3 invalidates all refresh tokens associated with the user on every password change and password reset, regardless of whether a `deviceId` is supplied. A new device-scoped session is then issued to the caller as part of the response.•CVE-2026-22706
  5. Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.•CVE-2025-64526

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.