CVE-2026-22977

Published Jan 21, 2026

Last updated 5 days ago

CVSS medium 5.5

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: sock: fix hardened usercopy panic in sock_recv_errqueue skbuff_fclone_cache was created without defining a usercopy region, [1] unlike skbuff_head_cache which properly whitelists the cb[] field. [2] This causes a usercopy BUG() when CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabled and the kernel attempts to copy sk_buff.cb data to userspace via sock_recv_errqueue() -> put_cmsg(). The crash occurs when: 1. TCP allocates an skb using alloc_skb_fclone() (from skbuff_fclone_cache) [1] 2. The skb is cloned via skb_clone() using the pre-allocated fclone [3] 3. The cloned skb is queued to sk_error_queue for timestamp reporting 4. Userspace reads the error queue via recvmsg(MSG_ERRQUEUE) 5. sock_recv_errqueue() calls put_cmsg() to copy serr->ee from skb->cb [4] 6. __check_heap_object() fails because skbuff_fclone_cache has no usercopy whitelist [5] When cloned skbs allocated from skbuff_fclone_cache are used in the socket error queue, accessing the sock_exterr_skb structure in skb->cb via put_cmsg() triggers a usercopy hardening violation: [ 5.379589] usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object 'skbuff_fclone_cache' (offset 296, size 16)! [ 5.382796] kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102! [ 5.383923] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 5.384903] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 138 Comm: poc_put_cmsg Not tainted 6.12.57 #7 [ 5.384903] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 5.384903] RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0x6c/0x80 [ 5.384903] Code: 1a 86 51 48 c7 c2 40 15 1a 86 41 52 48 c7 c7 c0 15 1a 86 48 0f 45 d6 48 c7 c6 80 15 1a 86 48 89 c1 49 0f 45 f3 e8 84 27 88 ff <0f> 0b 490 [ 5.384903] RSP: 0018:ffffc900006f77a8 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 5.384903] RAX: 000000000000006f RBX: ffff88800f0ad2a8 RCX: 1ffffffff0f72e74 [ 5.384903] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff87b973a0 [ 5.384903] RBP: 0000000000000010 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff0f72e74 [ 5.384903] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 79706f6372657375 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 5.384903] R13: ffff88800f0ad2b8 R14: ffffea00003c2b40 R15: ffffea00003c2b00 [ 5.384903] FS: 0000000011bc4380(0000) GS:ffff8880bf100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 5.384903] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 5.384903] CR2: 000056aa3b8e5fe4 CR3: 000000000ea26004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 5.384903] PKRU: 55555554 [ 5.384903] Call Trace: [ 5.384903] <TASK> [ 5.384903] __check_heap_object+0x9a/0xd0 [ 5.384903] __check_object_size+0x46c/0x690 [ 5.384903] put_cmsg+0x129/0x5e0 [ 5.384903] sock_recv_errqueue+0x22f/0x380 [ 5.384903] tls_sw_recvmsg+0x7ed/0x1960 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5.384903] ? schedule+0x6d/0x270 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 [ 5.384903] ? mutex_unlock+0x81/0xd0 [ 5.384903] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 5.384903] ? __pfx_tls_sw_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 5.384903] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x8f/0xf0 [ 5.384903] ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x20/0x40 [ 5.384903] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 The crash offset 296 corresponds to skb2->cb within skbuff_fclones: - sizeof(struct sk_buff) = 232 - offsetof(struct sk_buff, cb) = 40 - offset of skb2.cb in fclones = 232 + 40 = 272 - crash offset 296 = 272 + 24 (inside sock_exterr_skb.ee) This patch uses a local stack variable as a bounce buffer to avoid the hardened usercopy check failure. [1] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/ipv4/tcp.c#L885 [2] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5104 [3] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5566 [4] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/net/core/skbuff.c#L5491 [5] https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.12.62/source/mm/slub.c#L5719
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-476
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
CWE-400

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

Related CVEs

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References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.