CVE-2026-23440

Published Apr 3, 2026

Last updated 5 days ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix race condition during IPSec ESN update In IPSec full offload mode, the device reports an ESN (Extended Sequence Number) wrap event to the driver. The driver validates this event by querying the IPSec ASO and checking that the esn_event_arm field is 0x0, which indicates an event has occurred. After handling the event, the driver must re-arm the context by setting esn_event_arm back to 0x1. A race condition exists in this handling path. After validating the event, the driver calls mlx5_accel_esp_modify_xfrm() to update the kernel's xfrm state. This function temporarily releases and re-acquires the xfrm state lock. So, need to acknowledge the event first by setting esn_event_arm to 0x1. This prevents the driver from reprocessing the same ESN update if the hardware sends events for other reason. Since the next ESN update only occurs after nearly 2^31 packets are received, there's no risk of missing an update, as it will happen long after this handling has finished. Processing the event twice causes the ESN high-order bits (esn_msb) to be incremented incorrectly. The driver then programs the hardware with this invalid ESN state, which leads to anti-replay failures and a complete halt of IPSec traffic. Fix this by re-arming the ESN event immediately after it is validated, before calling mlx5_accel_esp_modify_xfrm(). This ensures that any spurious, duplicate events are correctly ignored, closing the race window.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
4.7
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-362
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
CWE-362

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163