CVE-2026-28386

Published Apr 7, 2026

Last updated 3 months ago

Overview

Description
Issue summary: Applications using AES-CFB128 encryption or decryption on systems with AVX-512 and VAES support can trigger an out-of-bounds read of up to 15 bytes when processing partial cipher blocks. Impact summary: This out-of-bounds read may trigger a crash which leads to Denial of Service for an application if the input buffer ends at a memory page boundary and the following page is unmapped. There is no information disclosure as the over-read bytes are not written to output. The vulnerable code path is only reached when processing partial blocks (when a previous call left an incomplete block and the current call provides fewer bytes than needed to complete it). Additionally, the input buffer must be positioned at a page boundary with the following page unmapped. CFB mode is not used in TLS/DTLS protocols, which use CBC, GCM, CCM, or ChaCha20-Poly1305 instead. For these reasons the issue was assessed as Low severity according to our Security Policy. Only x86-64 systems with AVX-512 and VAES instruction support are affected. Other architectures and systems without VAES support use different code paths that are not affected. OpenSSL FIPS module in 3.6 version is affected by this issue.
Source
openssl-security@openssl.org
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
openssl

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
3.9
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

openssl-security@openssl.org
CWE-125

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Drain pending requests at net namespace exit The arguments to list_splice_init() in handshake_net_exit() are reversed. The call moves the local empty "requests" list onto hn->hn_requests, leaving the local list empty, so the subsequent drain loop runs zero iterations. Pending handshake requests that had not yet been accepted are not torn down when the net namespace is destroyed; each one keeps a reference on a socket file and on the handshake_req allocation. Pass the source and destination in the documented order (list_splice_init(list, head) moves list onto head) so the pending list is transferred to the local scratch list and drained through handshake_complete(). Fixing the splice direction exposes a list-corruption race. After the splice each req->hr_list still has non-empty link pointers, threading the stack-local scratch list rather than hn_requests. A concurrent handshake_req_cancel() -- for example, from sunrpc's TLS timeout on a kernel socket whose netns reference was not taken -- finds the request through the rhashtable, calls remove_pending(), and sees !list_empty(&req->hr_list). __remove_pending_locked() then list_del_init()s an entry off the scratch list while the drain iterates, corrupting it. The same call arriving after the drain loop has run list_del() on an entry hits LIST_POISON instead. Have remove_pending() check HANDSHAKE_F_NET_DRAINING under hn_lock and report not-found when drain is in progress. The drain has already taken ownership; handshake_complete()'s existing test_and_set on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED still arbitrates between drain and cancel for who calls the consumer's hp_done. Use list_del_init() rather than list_del() in the drain so req->hr_list does not carry LIST_POISON after drain releases the entry. The DRAINING guard in remove_pending() makes cancel return false, but cancel still falls through to test_and_set_bit on HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED and drops the request's hr_file reference. Without another pin, if that is the last reference, sk_destruct frees the request while it is still linked on the drain loop's local list. Pin each request's hr_file under hn_lock before releasing the list, and drop that drain pin after the loop finishes with the request.CVE-2026-63978