CVE-2026-31656

Published Apr 24, 2026

Last updated 5 days ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat A use-after-free / refcount underflow is possible when the heartbeat worker and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() race to release the same engine->heartbeat.systole request. The heartbeat worker reads engine->heartbeat.systole and calls i915_request_put() on it when the request is complete, but clears the pointer in a separate, non-atomic step. Concurrently, a request retirement on another CPU can drop the engine wakeref to zero, triggering __engine_park() -> intel_engine_park_heartbeat(). If the heartbeat timer is pending at that point, cancel_delayed_work() returns true and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() reads the stale non-NULL systole pointer and calls i915_request_put() on it again, causing a refcount underflow: ``` <4> [487.221889] Workqueue: i915-unordered engine_retire [i915] <4> [487.222640] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x68/0xb0 ... <4> [487.222707] Call Trace: <4> [487.222711] <TASK> <4> [487.222716] intel_engine_park_heartbeat.part.0+0x6f/0x80 [i915] <4> [487.223115] intel_engine_park_heartbeat+0x25/0x40 [i915] <4> [487.223566] __engine_park+0xb9/0x650 [i915] <4> [487.223973] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x2e/0xb0 [i915] <4> [487.224408] __intel_wakeref_put_last+0x72/0x90 [i915] <4> [487.224797] intel_context_exit_engine+0x7c/0x80 [i915] <4> [487.225238] intel_context_exit+0xf1/0x1b0 [i915] <4> [487.225695] i915_request_retire.part.0+0x1b9/0x530 [i915] <4> [487.226178] i915_request_retire+0x1c/0x40 [i915] <4> [487.226625] engine_retire+0x122/0x180 [i915] <4> [487.227037] process_one_work+0x239/0x760 <4> [487.227060] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0 <4> [487.227068] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227075] kthread+0x10d/0x150 <4> [487.227083] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227092] ret_from_fork+0x3d4/0x480 <4> [487.227099] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 <4> [487.227107] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 <4> [487.227141] </TASK> ``` Fix this by replacing the non-atomic pointer read + separate clear with xchg() in both racing paths. xchg() is a single indivisible hardware instruction that atomically reads the old pointer and writes NULL. This guarantees only one of the two concurrent callers obtains the non-NULL pointer and performs the put, the other gets NULL and skips it. (cherry picked from commit 13238dc0ee4f9ab8dafa2cca7295736191ae2f42)
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Secondary
Base score
7.8
Impact score
5.9
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-191
134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0
CWE-362

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163