CVE-2026-33349

Published Mar 24, 2026

Last updated a month ago

CVSS medium 5.9

Overview

Description
fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. From version 4.0.0-beta.3 to before version 5.5.7, the DocTypeReader in fast-xml-parser uses JavaScript truthy checks to evaluate maxEntityCount and maxEntitySize configuration limits. When a developer explicitly sets either limit to 0 — intending to disallow all entities or restrict entity size to zero bytes — the falsy nature of 0 in JavaScript causes the guard conditions to short-circuit, completely bypassing the limits. An attacker who can supply XML input to such an application can trigger unbounded entity expansion, leading to memory exhaustion and denial of service. This issue has been patched in version 5.5.7.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
fast-xml-parser

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Secondary
Base score
5.9
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
2.2
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-1284

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. fast-xml-parser allows users to process XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries or callbacks. Versions 4.0.0-beta.3 through 5.5.5 contain a bypass vulnerability where numeric character references (&#NNN;, &#xHH;) and standard XML entities completely evade the entity expansion limits (e.g., maxTotalExpansions, maxExpandedLength) added to fix CVE-2026-26278, enabling XML entity expansion Denial of Service. The root cause is that replaceEntitiesValue() in OrderedObjParser.js only enforces expansion counting on DOCTYPE-defined entities while the lastEntities loop handling numeric/standard entities performs no counting at all. An attacker supplying 1M numeric entity references like A can force ~147MB of memory allocation and heavy CPU usage, potentially crashing the process—even when developers have configured strict limits. This issue has been fixed in version 5.5.6.•CVE-2026-33036
  2. fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. Prior to version 5.3.8, the application crashes with stack overflow when user use XML builder with `preserveOrder:true`. Version 5.3.8 fixes the issue. As a workaround, use XML builder with `preserveOrder:false` or check the input data before passing to builder.•CVE-2026-27942
  3. fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. From 4.1.3to before 5.3.5, a dot (.) in a DOCTYPE entity name is treated as a regex wildcard during entity replacement, allowing an attacker to shadow built-in XML entities (<, >, &, ", ') with arbitrary values. This bypasses entity encoding and leads to XSS when parsed output is rendered. This vulnerability is fixed in 5.3.5.•CVE-2026-25896
  4. fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 4.1.3 through 5.3.5, the XML parser can be forced to do an unlimited amount of entity expansion. With a very small XML input, it’s possible to make the parser spend seconds or even minutes processing a single request, effectively freezing the application. Version 5.3.6 fixes the issue. As a workaround, avoid using DOCTYPE parsing by `processEntities: false` option.•CVE-2026-26278
  5. fast-xml-parser allows users to validate XML, parse XML to JS object, or build XML from JS object without C/C++ based libraries and no callback. In versions 5.0.9 through 5.3.3, a RangeError vulnerability exists in the numeric entity processing of fast-xml-parser when parsing XML with out-of-range entity code points (e.g., `�` or `�`). This causes the parser to throw an uncaught exception, crashing any application that processes untrusted XML input. Version 5.3.4 fixes the issue.•CVE-2026-25128

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.