CVE-2026-35188

Published Jun 9, 2026

Last updated a month ago

Overview

Description
Issue summary: A malicious server can exploit TLS OCSP stapling by delivering a crafted response through the status_request extension, triggering a double-free in the client's certificate verification path. Impact summary: Successful exploitation allows an attacker to corrupt heap memory via a double-free, potentially leading to a Denial of Service or possibly an attacker controlled code execution or other undefined behavior. If OCSP stapling is enabled and the TLS client connects to a malicious server, a crafted OCSP stapled response can trigger a double free in the TLS client when the stapled response is checked. The OCSP stapling is not enabled by default. Reliable code execution through a double-free is technically complex and highly environment-dependent but the Denial of Service impact is straightforward to achieve, warranting Moderate severity. No FIPS modules are affected by this issue as the affected code is outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
Source
openssl-security@openssl.org
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
openssl

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Secondary
Base score
5
Impact score
3.4
Exploitability score
1.6
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

openssl-security@openssl.org
CWE-415

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. Issue summary: When CMS password-based decryption (RFC 3211 / PWRI key unwrap) processes attacker-supplied CMS data, an attacker-chosen stream-mode KEK cipher can trigger a heap out-of-bounds read in kek_unwrap_key(). Impact summary: A heap buffer over-read may trigger a crash which leads to Denial of Service for an application if the input buffer ends at a memory page boundary and the following page is unmapped. There is no information disclosure as the over-read bytes are not revealed to the attacker. The key unwrapping function performs a check-byte test as specified in the RFC that reads 7 bytes from a heap allocation that is based on the wrapped key length from the message. There is a minimum length check based on the block length of the wrapping cipher. However the cipher is selected from an OID carried in the attacker's PWRI keyEncryptionAlgorithm with no requirement that the cipher be a block cipher. When an attacker selects a stream-mode cipher the guard will be ineffective and the allocated buffer containing the unwrapped key can be too small to fit the check-bytes specified in the RFC and a buffer over-read can happen. Applications calling CMS_decrypt() or CMS_decrypt_set1_password() (equivalently openssl cms -decrypt -pwri_password ...) on untrusted CMS data are vulnerable to this issue. No password knowledge is required: the over-read happens during the unwrap attempt before any authentication succeeds. The over-read is limited to a few bytes and is not written to output, so there is no information disclosure. Triggering a crash requires the allocation to border unmapped memory, which is unlikely with the normal allocator. The FIPS modules are not affected by this issue.CVE-2026-9076