CVE-2026-43056

Published May 1, 2026

Last updated 7 hours ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mana: fix use-after-free in add_adev() error path If auxiliary_device_add() fails, add_adev() jumps to add_fail and calls auxiliary_device_uninit(adev). The auxiliary device has its release callback set to adev_release(), which frees the containing struct mana_adev. Since adev is embedded in struct mana_adev, the subsequent fall-through to init_fail and access to adev->id may result in a use-after-free. Fix this by saving the allocated auxiliary device id in a local variable before calling auxiliary_device_add(), and use that saved id in the cleanup path after auxiliary_device_uninit().
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Secondary
Base score
7.8
Impact score
5.9
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-416

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: tcm_loop: Drain commands in target_reset handler tcm_loop_target_reset() violates the SCSI EH contract: it returns SUCCESS without draining any in-flight commands. The SCSI EH documentation (scsi_eh.rst) requires that when a reset handler returns SUCCESS the driver has made lower layers "forget about timed out scmds" and is ready for new commands. Every other SCSI LLD (virtio_scsi, mpt3sas, ipr, scsi_debug, mpi3mr) enforces this by draining or completing outstanding commands before returning SUCCESS. Because tcm_loop_target_reset() doesn't drain, the SCSI EH reuses in-flight scsi_cmnd structures for recovery commands (e.g. TUR) while the target core still has async completion work queued for the old se_cmd. The memset in queuecommand zeroes se_lun and lun_ref_active, causing transport_lun_remove_cmd() to skip its percpu_ref_put(). The leaked LUN reference prevents transport_clear_lun_ref() from completing, hanging configfs LUN unlink forever in D-state: INFO: task rm:264 blocked for more than 122 seconds. rm D 0 264 258 0x00004000 Call Trace: __schedule+0x3d0/0x8e0 schedule+0x36/0xf0 transport_clear_lun_ref+0x78/0x90 [target_core_mod] core_tpg_remove_lun+0x28/0xb0 [target_core_mod] target_fabric_port_unlink+0x50/0x60 [target_core_mod] configfs_unlink+0x156/0x1f0 [configfs] vfs_unlink+0x109/0x290 do_unlinkat+0x1d5/0x2d0 Fix this by making tcm_loop_target_reset() actually drain commands: 1. Issue TMR_LUN_RESET via tcm_loop_issue_tmr() to drain all commands that the target core knows about (those not yet CMD_T_COMPLETE). 2. Use blk_mq_tagset_busy_iter() to iterate all started requests and flush_work() on each se_cmd — this drains any deferred completion work for commands that already had CMD_T_COMPLETE set before the TMR (which the TMR skips via __target_check_io_state()). This is the same pattern used by mpi3mr, scsi_debug, and libsas to drain outstanding commands during reset.CVE-2026-43054
  2. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: close crash window in attr dabtree inactivation When inactivating an inode with node-format extended attributes, xfs_attr3_node_inactive() invalidates all child leaf/node blocks via xfs_trans_binval(), but intentionally does not remove the corresponding entries from their parent node blocks. The implicit assumption is that xfs_attr_inactive() will truncate the entire attr fork to zero extents afterwards, so log recovery will never reach the root node and follow those stale pointers. However, if a log shutdown occurs after the leaf/node block cancellations commit but before the attr bmap truncation commits, this assumption breaks. Recovery replays the attr bmap intact (the inode still has attr fork extents), but suppresses replay of all cancelled leaf/node blocks, maybe leaving them as stale data on disk. On the next mount, xlog_recover_process_iunlinks() retries inactivation and attempts to read the root node via the attr bmap. If the root node was not replayed, reading the unreplayed root block triggers a metadata verification failure immediately; if it was replayed, following its child pointers to unreplayed child blocks triggers the same failure: XFS (pmem0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_da3_node_read_verify+0x53/0x220, xfs_da3_node block 0x78 XFS (pmem0): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (pmem0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ XFS (pmem0): metadata I/O error in "xfs_da_read_buf+0x104/0x190" at daddr 0x78 len 8 error 117 Fix this in two places: In xfs_attr3_node_inactive(), after calling xfs_trans_binval() on a child block, immediately remove the entry that references it from the parent node in the same transaction. This eliminates the window where the parent holds a pointer to a cancelled block. Once all children are removed, the now-empty root node is converted to a leaf block within the same transaction. This node-to-leaf conversion is necessary for crash safety. If the system shutdown after the empty node is written to the log but before the second-phase bmap truncation commits, log recovery will attempt to verify the root block on disk. xfs_da3_node_verify() does not permit a node block with count == 0; such a block will fail verification and trigger a metadata corruption shutdown. on the other hand, leaf blocks are allowed to have this transient state. In xfs_attr_inactive(), split the attr fork truncation into two explicit phases. First, truncate all extents beyond the root block (the child extents whose parent references have already been removed above). Second, invalidate the root block and truncate the attr bmap to zero in a single transaction. The two operations in the second phase must be atomic: as long as the attr bmap has any non-zero length, recovery can follow it to the root block, so the root block invalidation must commit together with the bmap-to-zero truncation.CVE-2026-43053