CVE-2026-43247

Published May 6, 2026

Last updated 5 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: chips-media: wave5: Fix SError of kernel panic when closed SError of kernel panic rarely happened while testing fluster. The root cause was to enter suspend mode because timeout of autosuspend delay happened. [ 48.834439] SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0x00000000bf000000 -- SError [ 48.834455] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1067 Comm: v4l2h265dec0:sr Not tainted 6.12.9-gc9e21a1ebd75-dirty #7 [ 48.834461] Hardware name: ti Texas Instruments J721S2 EVM/Texas Instruments J721S2 EVM, BIOS 2025.01-00345-gbaf3aaa8ecfa 01/01/2025 [ 48.834464] pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 48.834468] pc : wave5_dec_clr_disp_flag+0x40/0x80 [wave5] [ 48.834488] lr : wave5_dec_clr_disp_flag+0x40/0x80 [wave5] [ 48.834495] sp : ffff8000856e3a30 [ 48.834497] x29: ffff8000856e3a30 x28: ffff0008093f6010 x27: ffff000809158130 [ 48.834504] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffff00080b625000 x24: ffff000804a9ba80 [ 48.834509] x23: ffff000802343028 x22: ffff000809158150 x21: ffff000802218000 [ 48.834513] x20: ffff0008093f6000 x19: ffff0008093f6000 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 48.834518] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffff74009618 [ 48.834523] x14: 000000010000000c x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [ 48.834527] x11: ffffffffffffffff x10: ffffffffffffffff x9 : ffff000802343028 [ 48.834532] x8 : ffff00080b6252a0 x7 : 0000000000000038 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 48.834536] x5 : ffff00080b625060 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000 [ 48.834541] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff800084bf0118 x0 : ffff800084bf0000 [ 48.834547] Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt [ 48.834549] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1067 Comm: v4l2h265dec0:sr Not tainted 6.12.9-gc9e21a1ebd75-dirty #7 [ 48.834554] Hardware name: ti Texas Instruments J721S2 EVM/Texas Instruments J721S2 EVM, BIOS 2025.01-00345-gbaf3aaa8ecfa 01/01/2025 [ 48.834556] Call trace: [ 48.834559] dump_backtrace+0x94/0xec [ 48.834574] show_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 48.834579] dump_stack_lvl+0x38/0x90 [ 48.834585] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 48.834588] panic+0x35c/0x3e0 [ 48.834592] nmi_panic+0x40/0x8c [ 48.834595] arm64_serror_panic+0x64/0x70 [ 48.834598] do_serror+0x3c/0x78 [ 48.834601] el1h_64_error_handler+0x34/0x4c [ 48.834605] el1h_64_error+0x64/0x68 [ 48.834608] wave5_dec_clr_disp_flag+0x40/0x80 [wave5] [ 48.834615] wave5_vpu_dec_clr_disp_flag+0x54/0x80 [wave5] [ 48.834622] wave5_vpu_dec_buf_queue+0x19c/0x1a0 [wave5] [ 48.834628] __enqueue_in_driver+0x3c/0x74 [videobuf2_common] [ 48.834639] vb2_core_qbuf+0x508/0x61c [videobuf2_common] [ 48.834646] vb2_qbuf+0xa4/0x168 [videobuf2_v4l2] [ 48.834656] v4l2_m2m_qbuf+0x80/0x238 [v4l2_mem2mem] [ 48.834666] v4l2_m2m_ioctl_qbuf+0x18/0x24 [v4l2_mem2mem] [ 48.834673] v4l_qbuf+0x48/0x5c [videodev] [ 48.834704] __video_do_ioctl+0x180/0x3f0 [videodev] [ 48.834725] video_usercopy+0x2ec/0x68c [videodev] [ 48.834745] video_ioctl2+0x18/0x24 [videodev] [ 48.834766] v4l2_ioctl+0x40/0x60 [videodev] [ 48.834786] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec [ 48.834793] invoke_syscall+0x44/0x100 [ 48.834800] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0 [ 48.834804] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28 [ 48.834809] el0_svc+0x30/0xd0 [ 48.834813] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc4 [ 48.834816] el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 [ 48.834820] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 48.834831] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 48.834833] CPU features: 0x08,00002002,80200000,4200421b [ 48.834837] Memory Limit: none [ 49.161404] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt ]---
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163