CVE-2026-43363

Published May 8, 2026

Last updated 5 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/apic: Disable x2apic on resume if the kernel expects so When resuming from s2ram, firmware may re-enable x2apic mode, which may have been disabled by the kernel during boot either because it doesn't support IRQ remapping or for other reasons. This causes the kernel to continue using the xapic interface, while the hardware is in x2apic mode, which causes hangs. This happens on defconfig + bare metal + s2ram. Fix this in lapic_resume() by disabling x2apic if the kernel expects it to be disabled, i.e. when x2apic_mode = 0. The ACPI v6.6 spec, Section 16.3 [1] says firmware restores either the pre-sleep configuration or initial boot configuration for each CPU, including MSR state: When executing from the power-on reset vector as a result of waking from an S2 or S3 sleep state, the platform firmware performs only the hardware initialization required to restore the system to either the state the platform was in prior to the initial operating system boot, or to the pre-sleep configuration state. In multiprocessor systems, non-boot processors should be placed in the same state as prior to the initial operating system boot. (further ahead) If this is an S2 or S3 wake, then the platform runtime firmware restores minimum context of the system before jumping to the waking vector. This includes: CPU configuration. Platform runtime firmware restores the pre-sleep configuration or initial boot configuration of each CPU (MSR, MTRR, firmware update, SMBase, and so on). Interrupts must be disabled (for IA-32 processors, disabled by CLI instruction). (and other things) So at least as per the spec, re-enablement of x2apic by the firmware is allowed if "x2apic on" is a part of the initial boot configuration. [1] https://uefi.org/specs/ACPI/6.6/16_Waking_and_Sleeping.html#initialization [ bp: Massage. ]
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163