- Description
- OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions 3.4.0 through 3.4.11, an integer overflow in ht_undo_impl() in src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_ht.cpp leads to a heap-buffer overflow when decoding a crafted HTJ2K-compressed EXR file. decode->channels[i].width (int32_t) is multiplied by bytes_per_element in 32-bit signed arithmetic. With large widths (e.g., >= 536870912 for FLOAT data), this overflows, producing a corrupted offset that is later used for pointer arithmetic and can cause a heap out-of-bounds write. The same unchecked multiplication pattern appears in two other HTJ2K paths (bytes-per-line accumulation and pixel-line pointer advancement). As with related CVE-2026-34378 through CVE-2026-34589 fixes in other codecs, validating only after the multiplication is too late because the value may already be overflowed. This issue has been fixed in version 3.4.12.
- Source
- security-advisories@github.com
- NVD status
- Analyzed
- Products
- openexr
CVSS 3.1
- Type
- Primary
- Base score
- 7.1
- Impact score
- 5.2
- Exploitability score
- 1.8
- Vector string
- CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
- Severity
- HIGH
- security-advisories@github.com
- CWE-190
- Hype score
- Not currently trending
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