CVE-2026-45845

Published May 27, 2026

Last updated 4 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: taprio: fix NULL pointer dereference in class dump When a TAPRIO child qdisc is deleted via RTM_DELQDISC, taprio_graft() is called with new == NULL and stores NULL into q->qdiscs[cl - 1]. Subsequent RTM_GETTCLASS dump operations walk all classes via taprio_walk() and call taprio_dump_class(), which calls taprio_leaf() returning the NULL pointer, then dereferences it to read child->handle, causing a kernel NULL pointer dereference. The bug is reachable with namespace-scoped CAP_NET_ADMIN on any kernel with CONFIG_NET_SCH_TAPRIO enabled. On systems with unprivileged user namespaces enabled, an unprivileged local user can trigger a kernel panic by creating a taprio qdisc inside a new network namespace, grafting an explicit child qdisc, deleting it, and requesting a class dump. The RTM_GETTCLASS dump itself requires no capability. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000007: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000038-0x000000000000003f] RIP: 0010:taprio_dump_class (net/sched/sch_taprio.c:2478) Call Trace: <TASK> tc_fill_tclass (net/sched/sch_api.c:1966) qdisc_class_dump (net/sched/sch_api.c:2326) taprio_walk (net/sched/sch_taprio.c:2514) tc_dump_tclass_qdisc (net/sched/sch_api.c:2352) tc_dump_tclass_root (net/sched/sch_api.c:2370) tc_dump_tclass (net/sched/sch_api.c:2431) rtnl_dumpit (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6864) netlink_dump (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2325) rtnetlink_rcv_msg (net/core/rtnetlink.c:6959) netlink_rcv_skb (net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550) </TASK> Fix this by substituting &noop_qdisc when new is NULL in taprio_graft(), a common pattern used by other qdiscs (e.g., multiq_graft()) to ensure the q->qdiscs[] slots are never NULL. This makes control-plane dump paths safe without requiring individual NULL checks. Since the data-plane paths (taprio_enqueue and taprio_dequeue_from_txq) previously had explicit NULL guards that would drop/skip the packet cleanly, update those checks to test for &noop_qdisc instead. Without this, packets would reach taprio_enqueue_one() which increments the root qdisc's qlen and backlog before calling the child's enqueue; noop_qdisc drops the packet but those counters are never rolled back, permanently inflating the root qdisc's statistics. After this change *old can be a valid qdisc, NULL, or &noop_qdisc. Only call qdisc_put(*old) in the first case to avoid decreasing noop_qdisc's refcount, which was never increased.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-476

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163