CVE-2026-47692

Published Jun 26, 2026

Last updated 25 days ago

Overview

Description
Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. From 1.34.0 until 1.35.13, 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3, PROXY Protocol v2 header generator emits TLVs beyond the maximum length of 65535 bytes, causing a mismatch between bytes written and the length field in the header. This can result in smuggled bytes on the upstream request. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.35.13, 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
envoy

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
4.3
Impact score
1.4
Exploitability score
2.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-130

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. From 1.36.0 until 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3, a Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability leading to a sudden segmentation fault exists in Envoy's ext_authz HTTP filter when processing per-route authorization overrides concurrently with rapid downstream client disconnects. During standard request lifecycles, Envoy instantiates the ext_authz filter with a foundational authorization client object (client_). If a matched route dictates a dynamic per-route HTTP or gRPC authorization service override, the filter generates a localized client. In the vulnerable implementation, this transient client aggressively overwrote the default client_ unique pointer by executing client_ = std::move(per_route_client). When a client rapidly establishes and subsequently tears down a stream (such as rapidly refreshing a protected WebSocket endpoint), the downstream triggers the ConnectionManagerImpl::doDeferredStreamDestroy() -> ActiveStream::onResetStream() lifecycle. Envoy immediately sequences Filter::onDestroy() in an attempt to securely abort dispatched asynchronous authorization check transactions via client_->cancel(). By destructing the default client abruptly during initiateCall, a memory lifecycle misalignment occurs within the async client manager. The stream teardown fails to reliably track and cancel the dynamically bound asynchronous authorization tasks, orchestrating a sequence where a late asynchronous callback from the network evaluates against a heavily destroyed ActiveStream validation span, generating a UAF process crash. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.36.9, 1.37.5, and 1.38.3.CVE-2026-47205