CVE-2026-54085

Published Aug 28, 2026

Last updated 5 days ago

CVSS high 7.1

Overview

Description
Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.2.0 through 4.14.6, multiple active response scripts pass attacker-influenced alert fields to privileged system commands without validating their format, allowing argument injection into tools that run as root. Five of the eight scripts that handle the srcip field, route-null.c, netsh.c, pf.c, npf.c, and ipfw.c, omit the get_ip_version() check that rejects non-IP input, and disable-account.c passes the dstuser field to passwd/chuser with only a comparison against "root". An attacker who can inject crafted log events, for example via syslog, can supply srcip or dstuser values that, when an active response rule triggers, are passed unvalidated to firewall and account-management commands such as pfctl, npfctl, ipfw, route, netsh, and passwd. This enables injecting additional command arguments, and on Windows the unquoted CreateProcess command-line concatenation in wpopenv() lets a srcip containing spaces add further arguments, while disable-account.c can be abused to lock arbitrary system accounts. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
wazuh

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Secondary
Base score
7.1
Impact score
4.2
Exploitability score
2.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-88

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.4.0 through 4.14.6, a party holding the cluster key can write, overwrite, or delete arbitrary files under /var/ossec on worker nodes, leading to remote code execution as root. During cluster file synchronization, the non-merged branch of update_master_files_in_worker() moves each staged file to a destination derived only from safe_join(), which confines the path to /var/ossec but never verifies that the file lands in the directory declared by its cluster_item_key. Because the destination check present on the primary node and on the worker's merged branch was not applied, a peer can place files at attacker-chosen locations under /var/ossec, including paths that are executed as root, and the delete branch has the same gap. This is an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-30893, which addressed traversal outside /var/ossec but left this path able to redirect files anywhere within it. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.•CVE-2026-61800
  2. Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.14.0 through 4.14.6, a low-privilege API user can read the cleartext cluster key from a configuration endpoint that fails to redact it. The REST API provides a masking control, mask_sensitive_config, that redacts sensitive fields such as authd.pass and cluster.key from configuration responses for users who lack update-config permission, and every config-read endpoint carries this decorator except GET /cluster/local/config. That endpoint, backed by read_config_wrapper, is gated only by cluster:read and returns the local node's cluster configuration including the cleartext key, whereas its siblings return the same value masked. As a result, any account with the default readonly or cluster_readonly role, which is explicitly denied update-config precisely so it cannot view secrets, receives the real cluster key. Because the cluster key authenticates and encrypts traffic between cluster nodes, disclosing it to an unprivileged account provides the authentication precondition for the cluster-peer remote code execution chains established by prior advisories. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.•CVE-2026-61802
  3. Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. The  ip-customblock  active response script contains a path traversal vulnerability that lets an attacker create or delete arbitrary files on the filesystem as root. The script builds a file path by concatenating the  srcip  field taken from alert JSON directly onto the fixed  /ipblock/  base directory, without validating that the value is a well-formed IP address. Because the extraction routine returns the raw string unchecked, an attacker who can trigger alert-matching log events with a crafted  srcip  containing  ../  sequences can escape the base directory. The block action opens the resulting path in append mode, creating an empty file at an arbitrary location, while the unblock action passes it to remove(), deleting an arbitrary file; since the active response daemon runs as root, this includes sensitive files such as system credentials and Wazuh configuration. Unlike the sibling scripts host-deny.c, default-firewall-drop.c, and firewalld-drop.c, which reject non-IP input via get_ip_version(), ip-customblock.c omits this validation. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.•CVE-2026-54083
  4. Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.14.0 through 4.14.6, an authenticated low-privilege user can read the cluster secret from the manager configuration because the logic that masks sensitive values is disabled by any update-config RBAC rule, including an explicit deny. The mask_sensitive_config() decorator applies masking only when _has_update_permissions() returns false, but that gate treats a user as able to update the config whenever a  manager:update_config  or  cluster:update_config  rule exists, without ever checking whether the rule's effect is allow or deny. Because a deny rule is stored as a real entry, a read-only account that is hardened by explicitly denying config edits is counted as having update permission, which turns masking off. A single authenticated GET request to the configuration endpoint with  raw=true  then returns the verbatim ossec.conf XML with  cluster.key  in clear, whereas an otherwise identical account without the deny rule sees the value masked. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.•CVE-2026-61783
  5. Wazuh is an open-source security platform providing unified XDR and SIEM protection for endpoints and cloud workloads. In versions 4.0.0 through 4.14.6, a malicious or man-in-the-middle enrollment manager can crash a Wazuh agent during enrollment by returning a malformed key response with fewer than four fields, causing a NULL pointer dereference. The  w_enrollment_process_agent_key()  routine splits the manager-provided key into four space-separated fields but does not verify that all fields are present before passing them to validators. Because OS_StrBreak() leaves missing trailing entries as NULL and OS_IsValidName() calls strlen() on its argument without a NULL check, a response such as  OSSEC K:'1'  reaches OS_IsValidName(NULL) and terminates the agent process. Since Wazuh permits enrollment against an unverified manager when no CA certificate is configured, an attacker operating a rogue manager or intercepting the enrollment flow can deterministically crash agents, resulting in denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.14.7.•CVE-2026-54084

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.