CVE-2026-64083

Published Jul 19, 2026

Last updated 3 days ago

CVSS medium 5.5

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject short block-read responses in the GPIO accessors adm1266_gpio_get() and adm1266_gpio_get_multiple() both compose the pin-status word as pins_status = read_buf[0] + (read_buf[1] << 8); right after i2c_smbus_read_block_data(), guarding only against an error return. A well-behaved device returns 2 bytes for GPIO_STATUS/PDIO_STATUS, but the helper happily reports a 0- or 1-byte response too. If the device returns 0 bytes, both read_buf slots are uninitialized stack memory; if it returns 1 byte, read_buf[1] is. The composed value then flows through set_bit() into the caller's *bits in adm1266_gpio_get_multiple(), or into the return value of adm1266_gpio_get(), and ends up in userspace via gpiolib (sysfs and the char-dev ioctls). That leaks a few bits of kernel stack per request on any device whose firmware glitch, bus error, or hostile slave produces a short block-read response. Add the missing length check to both call sites and surface a short response as -EIO.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: misc: usbio: fix disconnect UAF in client teardown usbio_disconnect() walks usbio->cli_list in reverse and uninitializes each auxiliary device. auxiliary_device_uninit() drops the device reference, and for an unbound child that can run usbio_auxdev_release() and free the containing struct usbio_client. list_for_each_entry_reverse() advances after the loop body by reading client->link.prev. If the current client is freed by auxiliary_device_uninit(), the iterator dereferences freed memory. Use list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse() so the previous client is cached before the body can drop the final reference. This preserves reverse teardown order while keeping the next iterator cursor independent of the current client's lifetime. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x320 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x400 really_probe+0x316/0x660 __driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240 driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110 __device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __device_attach+0x133/0x2a0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70 bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0 device_add+0x9b9/0xc10 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? usb_enable_lpm+0x3c/0x260 usb_set_configuration+0xb64/0xf20 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x5f/0x90 usb_probe_device+0x71/0x1b0 really_probe+0x46b/0x660 __driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240 driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110 __device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __device_attach+0x133/0x2a0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70 bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0 device_add+0x9b9/0xc10 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? add_device_randomness+0xb7/0xf0 usb_new_device+0x492/0x870 hub_event+0x1b10/0x29c0 ? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_acquire+0x187/0x300 ? process_one_work+0x475/0xb90 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 process_one_work+0x4d7/0xb90 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0xf0 ? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK>•CVE-2026-64453
  2. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error path drops the lock before printing nhc->name. lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net core RX critical section, for example the Bluetooth 6LoWPAN L2CAP receive path. This leaves a race where one task drops lowpan_nhc_lock in the error path, another task unregisters and frees the matching descriptor after synchronize_net() returns, and the first task then dereferences nhc->name for the warning. With the post-unlock window widened, KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression+0x1f4/0x220 Read of size 8 lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression lowpan_header_decompress Fix this by printing the warning before dropping lowpan_nhc_lock, so the descriptor name is read while unregister is still excluded. The malformed packet is still rejected with -ENOTSUPP.•CVE-2026-64452
  3. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Fix NULL pointer dereference in func_set_flag() func_set_flag() dereferences tr->current_trace_flags before verifying that the current tracer is actually the function tracer. When the active tracer has been switched away from "function" (e.g., to "wakeup_rt"), tr->current_trace_flags can be NULL, leading to a NULL pointer dereference and kernel crash. The call chain that triggers this is: trace_options_write() -> __set_tracer_option() -> trace->set_flag() /* func_set_flag */ In func_set_flag(), the first operation is: if (!!set == !!(tr->current_trace_flags->val & bit)) This dereferences tr->current_trace_flags unconditionally. The safety check that guards against a non-function tracer: if (tr->current_trace != &function_trace) return 0; is placed *after* the dereference, which is too late. This was observed with the following crash dump: BUG: unable to handle page fault at 0000000000000000 RIP: func_set_flag+0xd Call Trace: __set_tracer_option+0x27 trace_options_write+0x75 vfs_write+0x12a ksys_write+0x66 do_syscall_64+0x5b RIP: ffffffff914c973d RSP: ff67ec88b01dfdf0 RFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff3a826e80354580 RCX: 0000000000000001 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff93918080 The disassembly confirms the fault: func_set_flag+0: mov 0x1f08(%rdi), %rax ; RAX = tr->current_trace_flags = NULL func_set_flag+13: mov (%rax), %eax ; page fault: dereference NULL At the time of the crash: tr->current_trace_flags = 0x0 (NULL) tr->current_trace = wakeup_rt_tracer (not function_trace) The scenario is that a process opens a function tracer option file (such as "func_stack_trace"), then the current tracer is switched to another tracer (e.g., "wakeup_rt"), which sets current_trace_flags to NULL. When the process subsequently writes to the option file, func_set_flag() is invoked and crashes on the NULL dereference. Fix this by moving the current_trace check before the current_trace_flags dereference, so that func_set_flag() returns early when the function tracer is not active.•CVE-2026-64451
  4. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: fix out-of-bounds read in broadcast Gap ACK blocks A broadcast PROTOCOL/STATE_MSG can carry a Gap ACK blocks record in its data area. tipc_get_gap_ack_blks() only verifies that the record's len field is self-consistent with its ugack_cnt/bgack_cnt counts (sz == struct_size(p, gacks, ugack_cnt + bgack_cnt)); it does not check that the record actually fits in the message data area, msg_data_sz(). The unicast caller tipc_link_proto_rcv() bounds it ("if (glen > dlen) break;"), but the broadcast caller tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() discards the returned size, so tipc_link_advance_transmq() copies the record off the receive skb with an attacker-controlled count: this_ga = kmemdup(ga, struct_size(ga, gacks, ga->bgack_cnt), GFP_ATOMIC); A TIPC neighbour that negotiated TIPC_GAP_ACK_BLOCK triggers it with one ordinary broadcast STATE_MSG (msg_bc_ack_invalid() clear), sized so its data area is short, carrying a Gap ACK record with len = 0x400, bgack_cnt = 0xff and ugack_cnt = 0. len then equals struct_size(p, gacks, 255), so the consistency check passes and ga is non-NULL; kmemdup() reads struct_size(ga, gacks, 255) = 1024 bytes out of the much smaller skb: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 Read of size 1024 at addr ffff0000c7030d38 by task poc864/69 Call trace: kmemdup_noprof+0x48/0x60 tipc_link_advance_transmq+0x86c/0xb80 tipc_link_bc_ack_rcv+0x19c/0x1e0 tipc_bcast_sync_rcv+0x1c4/0x2c4 tipc_rcv+0x85c/0x1340 tipc_l2_rcv_msg+0xac/0x104 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff0000c7030d00 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 704 The buggy address is located 56 bytes inside of allocated 704-byte region [ffff0000c7030d00, ffff0000c7030fc0) The copied-out bytes are subsequently consumed as gap/ack values, but the read is already out of bounds at the kmemdup() regardless of how they are used. The unicast STATE path drops such a message: "if (glen > dlen) break;" skips the rest of STATE_MSG handling and the skb is freed. Make the broadcast path drop it too. tipc_bcast_sync_rcv() now bounds the record against msg_data_sz() and, when it does not fit, reports it back through tipc_node_bc_sync_rcv() to tipc_rcv() so the skb is discarded rather than processed. ga is not cleared on this path: ga == NULL already means "legacy peer without Selective ACK", a distinct legitimate state.•CVE-2026-64450
  5. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf. vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation. Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer. Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68 _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user] vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0 ksys_write+0xb8/0x150•CVE-2026-64449

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.