CVE-2026-64177

Published Jul 19, 2026

Last updated 2 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: phonet/pep: disable BH around forwarded sk_receive_skb() The networking receive path is usually run from softirq context, but protocols that take the socket lock may have packets stored in the backlog and processed later from process context. In that case release_sock() -> __release_sock() drops the slock with spin_unlock_bh() and then calls sk->sk_backlog_rcv() with bottom halves enabled. Typical sk_backlog_rcv handlers process the socket whose backlog is being drained, so the BH state at entry is irrelevant for the slocks they touch. pep_do_rcv() is different: when the inbound skb targets an existing PEP pipe, it forwards the skb to a different *child* socket via sk_receive_skb(). That helper takes the child slock with bh_lock_sock_nested(), which is just spin_lock_nested() and assumes BH is already off. The same child slock therefore ends up acquired with BH on (process path) and with BH off (softirq path): process context softirq context --------------- --------------- release_sock(listener) __netif_receive_skb() __release_sock() phonet_rcv() spin_unlock_bh() __sk_receive_skb(listener) [BH now ENABLED] [BH already disabled] sk_backlog_rcv: sk_backlog_rcv: pep_do_rcv() pep_do_rcv() sk_receive_skb(child) sk_receive_skb(child) bh_lock_sock_nested(child) bh_lock_sock_nested(child) => SOFTIRQ-ON-W => IN-SOFTIRQ-W Lockdep flags this as inconsistent lock state, and it can become a real self-deadlock if a softirq on the same CPU tries to receive to the same child socket while its slock is held in the BH-enabled path: WARNING: inconsistent lock state inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. (slock-AF_PHONET/1){+.?.}-{3:3}, at: __sk_receive_skb+0x1cf/0x900 __sk_receive_skb net/core/sock.c:563 sk_receive_skb include/net/sock.h:2022 [inline] pep_do_rcv net/phonet/pep.c:675 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1190 __release_sock net/core/sock.c:3216 release_sock net/core/sock.c:3815 pep_sock_accept net/phonet/pep.c:879 Wrap the forwarded sk_receive_skb() in local_bh_disable() / local_bh_enable() so the child slock is always acquired with BH off. local_bh_disable() nests safely on the softirq path. Discovered via in-house syzkaller fuzzing; the same root cause also on the linux-6.1.y syzbot dashboard as extid 44f0626dd6284f02663c. Reproduced under KASAN + LOCKDEP + PROVE_LOCKING, reproducer: https://pastebin.com/A3t8xzCR
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163