CVE-2026-64359

Published Jul 25, 2026

Last updated 2 months ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: reject CLEAN_SEGMENTS ioctl with out-of-range segment numbers Syzbot reported a hung task in nilfs_transaction_begin() where multiple tasks performing chmod() on a nilfs2 mount blocked for over 143 seconds waiting to acquire ns_segctor_sem for read: INFO: task syz.0.17:5918 blocked for more than 143 seconds. Call Trace: schedule+0x164/0x360 rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x6d9/0x940 down_read+0x99/0x2e0 nilfs_transaction_begin+0x364/0x710 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:221 nilfs_setattr+0x124/0x2c0 fs/nilfs2/inode.c:921 notify_change+0xc1a/0xf40 chmod_common+0x273/0x4a0 do_fchmodat+0x12d/0x230 The writer holding ns_segctor_sem was a concurrent NILFS_IOCTL_CLEAN_SEGMENTS caller, stuck inside printk while emitting per-element warnings from nilfs_sufile_updatev(): __nilfs_msg+0x373/0x450 fs/nilfs2/super.c:78 nilfs_sufile_updatev+0x21c/0x6d0 fs/nilfs2/sufile.c:186 nilfs_sufile_freev fs/nilfs2/sufile.h:93 [inline] nilfs_free_segments fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1140 [inline] nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1261 [inline] nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x1f55/0x76c0 nilfs_clean_segments+0x3bd/0xa50 nilfs_ioctl_clean_segments fs/nilfs2/ioctl.c:922 [inline] nilfs_ioctl+0x261f/0x2780 The root cause is that user-supplied segment numbers are not validated before nilfs_clean_segments() begins doing work; the range check on each segnum is performed deep inside the call chain by nilfs_sufile_updatev(), which emits a nilfs_warn() per invalid entry while still holding the segctor lock and the sufile mi_sem. Under load (repeated invocations across multiple mounts saturating the global printk path), the cumulative printk latency keeps ns_segctor_sem held long enough to trip the hung_task watchdog, blocking concurrent operations such as chmod() that need ns_segctor_sem for read. Fix by validating the contents of kbufs[4] in nilfs_clean_segments() immediately after acquiring ns_segctor_sem via nilfs_transaction_lock(). Holding ns_segctor_sem serializes the check against nilfs_ioctl_resize(), which can modify ns_nsegments, so the validation uses a consistent value. Out-of-range segment numbers are rejected with -EINVAL before any segment-cleaning work begins, so the bad entries never reach the per-element diagnostic path inside nilfs_sufile_updatev().
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163