CVE-2026-89135

Published Sep 27, 2026

Last updated 20 days ago

CVSS medium 6.3

Overview

Description
A failed X509_verify_cert call permanently plants an unverified attacker CA in the shared CertManager, bypassing certificate validation in every type-blind sibling consumer (native TLS, OCSP, CRL, direct CM verify). This affects version 5.8.4 through 5.9.2 of wolfSSL with the macros (OPENSSL_EXTRA && !NO_CERTS && !WOLFCRYPT_ONLY) defined or built with --enable-opensslextra and the application is specifically making calls to the X509_verify_cert function.
Source
facts@wolfssl.com
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
wolfssl

Risk scores

CVSS 4.0

Type
Secondary
Base score
6.3
Impact score
-
Exploitability score
-
Vector string
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Severity
MEDIUM

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
6.5
Impact score
2.5
Exploitability score
3.9
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

facts@wolfssl.com
CWE-295

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

Related CVEs

  1. When an application enables both OCSP and CRL revocation checking on one WOLFSSL_CTX or certificate manager, wolfSSL skips the CRL check for any peer certificate that carries no Authority Information Access OCSP URL, and accepts a certificate the loaded CRL lists as revoked. The soft-fail policy for a missing responder collapses the OCSP result onto success before the code decides whether the CRL fallback is still needed, so "no responder exists" becomes indistinguishable from "the responder answered good". Affected builds define both HAVE_OCSP and HAVE_CRL: --enable-ocsp --enable-crl directly, and implicitly --enable-all, --enable-distro, --enable-curl, --enable-nginx, --enable-haproxy, --enable-stunnel, --enable-lighty, --enable-wpas, --enable-strongswan, --enable-mosquitto, --enable-jni, --enable-openvpn and --enable-krb. An application is affected only if it calls both wolfSSL_CTX_EnableOCSP() (or wolfSSL_EnableOCSP() / wolfSSL_CertManagerEnableOCSP()) and wolfSSL_CTX_EnableCRL() (or the equivalents) with a CRL loaded; an application that uses OCSP stapling alone through wolfSSL_CTX_EnableOCSPStapling() is not affected, because that sets up a separate OCSP instance. The defect sits in ProcessPeerCerts() and is reachable over TLS 1.0 through TLS 1.3 and DTLS, both on a client verifying a server certificate and on a server verifying a client certificate under mutual or post-handshake authentication. When the skipped check falls on a chain certificate rather than the leaf, the unchecked intermediate is promoted into the certificate manager and stays a trusted signer for every later connection on that context, so an affected long-running process needs its WOLFSSL_CTX torn down and not only its library replaced. All wolfSSL versions from 5.9.2 and earlier are affected; on versions 5.9.1 and 5.9.2 the WOLFSSL_OCSP_CHECKALL configuration fails closed with OCSP_NEED_URL, which leaves wolfSSL_CTX_EnableOCSP() without CHECKALL as the exposed configuration on 5.9.2.•CVE-2026-94417
  2. A (D)TLS 1.2 client can accept a ChangeCipherSpec message before it has sent its ClientKeyExchange. No master secret has been derived at that point, so the client installs read keys derived from a known (deterministic) key and checks the server's Finished against that same key. An out-of-order ChangeCipherSpec can therefore be used by an attacker to complete the handshake in place of the server and send data the client accepts as authentic. The client's own traffic still uses correctly derived keys, so the attacker cannot read it, and the genuine server never completes the handshake. DTLS 1.2 clients are exposed because a datagram read can deliver the out-of-order records on its own. TLS 1.2 clients are exposed when the application supplies received bytes with wolfSSL_inject() or enables read ahead. For certificate suites, the attacker must be in a man-in-the-middle position. For PSK (Pre Shared Key) connections, any fake server can succeed without knowing the PSK.•CVE-2026-93304
  3. MatchTrustedPeer ignores the public key used, leading to forged CA clones passing verification. Affected builds are any that enable the macro WOLFSSL_TRUST_PEER_CERT and load CA certificates with wolfSSL_CTX_trust_peer_cert() or wolfSSL_trust_peer_cert(). The peer must know the certificates being loaded to either of those APIs to take advantage of the issue. When OPENSSL_COMPATIBLE_DEFAULTS is also defined this widens the affected API to include all CA certificate loading. Both macros are defined when using autoconf builds such as (nginx, haproxy, stunnel, wpas, apache httpd, hitch, bind, rsyslog, ffmpeg, all, distro). When the certificate is listed as a trusted peer certificate the issue previously allowed for a malicious (D)TLS server to bypass authentication once knowing which CA’s the client would accept. This also affects mutual authentication cases where the client knows which CA’s the server has loaded. If building with any of these configurations and using (D)TLS where the loaded CA’s could be known and authentication of the peer is desired, users should either: update to the latest wolfSSL version, apply the fix patch, or use the configure flag --disable-openssl-compatible-defaults and not load CA’s with wolfSSL_CTX_trust_peer_cert() or wolfSSL_trust_peer_cert() to mitigate the issue.•CVE-2026-93302
  4. A certificate with no dNSName SAN but another SAN type present (e.g. registeredID or iPAddress) bypassed the Subject CN dNSName name-constraint check. The CN-as-DNS fallback was gated on cert->subjectCN != NULL && cert->altNames == NULL && !cert->isCA instead of "no dNSName SAN", so an out-of-scope CN was accepted. This incomplete fix from CVE-2026-6731, leading to the name-constraint check issue, was introduced in wolfSSL version 5.9.2.•CVE-2026-89134
  5. wolfSSL versions 5.9.2 and earlier contain a flaw in the X.509 certificate validation logic where it fails to properly enforce NameConstraints extensions when there is an unconstrained CA tier between a name-constrained intermediate CA and the leaf certificate. wolfSSL incorrectly accepted certificates for hostnames they shouldn't be allowed to cover, due to a chain-walking state-machine bug that resets the validation state when encountering an intermediate without NameConstraints, thereby bypassing cryptographic delegation controls. This defect exists in the default build configuration that makes use of certificates where name constraint extensions are used. Thanks to Jack Lloyd, PathDiff, and Ben Smyth for reporting the issue.•CVE-2026-89133

References

Sources include official advisories and independent security research.