CVE-2023-53087

Published May 2, 2025

Last updated 8 days ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/active: Fix misuse of non-idle barriers as fence trackers Users reported oopses on list corruptions when using i915 perf with a number of concurrently running graphics applications. Root cause analysis pointed at an issue in barrier processing code -- a race among perf open / close replacing active barriers with perf requests on kernel context and concurrent barrier preallocate / acquire operations performed during user context first pin / last unpin. When adding a request to a composite tracker, we try to reuse an existing fence tracker, already allocated and registered with that composite. The tracker we obtain may already track another fence, may be an idle barrier, or an active barrier. If the tracker we get occurs a non-idle barrier then we try to delete that barrier from a list of barrier tasks it belongs to. However, while doing that we don't respect return value from a function that performs the barrier deletion. Should the deletion ever fail, we would end up reusing the tracker still registered as a barrier task. Since the same structure field is reused with both fence callback lists and barrier tasks list, list corruptions would likely occur. Barriers are now deleted from a barrier tasks list by temporarily removing the list content, traversing that content with skip over the node to be deleted, then populating the list back with the modified content. Should that intentionally racy concurrent deletion attempts be not serialized, one or more of those may fail because of the list being temporary empty. Related code that ignores the results of barrier deletion was initially introduced in v5.4 by commit d8af05ff38ae ("drm/i915: Allow sharing the idle-barrier from other kernel requests"). However, all users of the barrier deletion routine were apparently serialized at that time, then the issue didn't exhibit itself. Results of git bisect with help of a newly developed igt@gem_barrier_race@remote-request IGT test indicate that list corruptions might start to appear after commit 311770173fac ("drm/i915/gt: Schedule request retirement when timeline idles"), introduced in v5.5. Respect results of barrier deletion attempts -- mark the barrier as idle only if successfully deleted from the list. Then, before proceeding with setting our fence as the one currently tracked, make sure that the tracker we've got is not a non-idle barrier. If that check fails then don't use that tracker but go back and try to acquire a new, usable one. v3: use unlikely() to document what outcome we expect (Andi), - fix bad grammar in commit description. v2: no code changes, - blame commit 311770173fac ("drm/i915/gt: Schedule request retirement when timeline idles"), v5.5, not commit d8af05ff38ae ("drm/i915: Allow sharing the idle-barrier from other kernel requests"), v5.4, - reword commit description. (cherry picked from commit 506006055769b10d1b2b4e22f636f3b45e0e9fc7)
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
NVD-CWE-noinfo

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cgroup: Avoid iteration of dying tasks with zero refcount The commit 260fbcb92bbea ("cgroup: Move dying_tasks cleanup from cgroup_task_release() to cgroup_task_free()") extended the lifetime of tasks on the dying_tasks list. The iterators have provision to go through dying_tasks because of dying threadgroup leaders or explicit CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD, however, it was expected that such tasks can obtain a new reference (that is possible before cgroup_task_release()/put_task_struct_rcu_user()). The tasks after cgroup_task_release() and before cgroup_task_free() are subject to race when they may or may not have ->usage count > 0. The race window is between css_task_iter_next() invocations when css_set_lock is released and we may arrive at a new ->task_pos. The iterator should not attempt to resurrect tasks whose ->usage count dropped to zero. (When that happens, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb() is already imminent and the returned task_struct would could be used after free.) As for the fix, we cannot simply check the signal->live count of a task on the dying list because that won't distinguish regular zombies waiting to be reaped from RCU remnant tasks that are going to be free'd. Therefore add an extra check to rule out ->usage==0 tasks from any iteration. The repeat: loop in css_task_iter_advance() doesn't consider ->usage count, so add a new loop to css_task_iter_next() to skip de-used tasks on the dying_list. Rough illustration of the possible race R (reader of cgroup.procs) T (thread) L (group leader) --------------------------------- -------------------------------- -------------------------------- L exits, signal->live > 0 cgroup_task_dead(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // skips only cset->tasks list_add_tail(&L->cg_list, &cset->dying_tasks) css_task_iter_next() take css_set_lock css_task_iter_advance() leader && signal->live != 0 => it->task_pos = &L->cg_list release css_set_lock T exits --signal->live == 0 cgroup_task_dead(T) // css_set_lock release_task(T) cgroup_task_release(T) release_task(L) // zap_leader cgroup_task_release(L) put_task_struct_rcu_user(L) ...RCU... put_task_struct(L) L->usage = 0 /* L still on dying_tasks */ ...RCU... __put_task_struct(L) css_task_iter_next() // another iteration take css_set_lock it->task_pos = &L->cg_list get_task_struct(L) => addition on 0 drop css_set_lock cgroup_task_free(L) css_set_skip_task_iters() // dying skip comes too late free_task(L) cgroup_procs_show() task_pid_vnr(L)•CVE-2026-98163