CVE-2024-26644

Published Mar 26, 2024

Last updated a year ago

Overview

Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: don't abort filesystem when attempting to snapshot deleted subvolume If the source file descriptor to the snapshot ioctl refers to a deleted subvolume, we get the following abort: BTRFS: Transaction aborted (error -2) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 833 at fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1875 create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] Modules linked in: pata_acpi btrfs ata_piix libata scsi_mod virtio_net blake2b_generic xor net_failover virtio_rng failover scsi_common rng_core raid6_pq libcrc32c CPU: 0 PID: 833 Comm: t_snapshot_dele Not tainted 6.7.0-rc6 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] RSP: 0018:ffffa09c01337af8 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9982053e7c78 RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: ffff99827dc20848 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff99827dc20840 RBP: ffffa09c01337c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffa09c01337998 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffffffb96da248 R12: fffffffffffffffe R13: ffff99820535bb28 R14: ffff99820b7bd000 R15: ffff99820381ea80 FS: 00007fe20aadabc0(0000) GS:ffff99827dc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000559a120b502f CR3: 00000000055b6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] ? __warn+0x81/0x130 ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] ? report_bug+0x171/0x1a0 ? handle_bug+0x3a/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x70 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] ? create_pending_snapshot+0x1040/0x1190 [btrfs] create_pending_snapshots+0x92/0xc0 [btrfs] btrfs_commit_transaction+0x66b/0xf40 [btrfs] btrfs_mksubvol+0x301/0x4d0 [btrfs] btrfs_mksnapshot+0x80/0xb0 [btrfs] __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x1c2/0x1d0 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0xc4/0x150 [btrfs] btrfs_ioctl+0x8a6/0x2650 [btrfs] ? kmem_cache_free+0x22/0x340 ? do_sys_openat2+0x97/0xe0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x97/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 RIP: 0033:0x7fe20abe83af RSP: 002b:00007ffe6eff1360 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fe20abe83af RDX: 00007ffe6eff23c0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe20ad16cd0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007ffe6eff13c0 R14: 00007fe20ad45000 R15: 0000559a120b6d58 </TASK> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- BTRFS: error (device vdc: state A) in create_pending_snapshot:1875: errno=-2 No such entry BTRFS info (device vdc: state EA): forced readonly BTRFS warning (device vdc: state EA): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS: error (device vdc: state EA) in cleanup_transaction:2055: errno=-2 No such entry This happens because create_pending_snapshot() initializes the new root item as a copy of the source root item. This includes the refs field, which is 0 for a deleted subvolume. The call to btrfs_insert_root() therefore inserts a root with refs == 0. btrfs_get_new_fs_root() then finds the root and returns -ENOENT if refs == 0, which causes create_pending_snapshot() to abort. Fix it by checking the source root's refs before attempting the snapshot, but after locking subvol_sem to avoid racing with deletion.
Source
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
NVD status
Modified
Products
linux_kernel, debian_linux

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
5.5
Impact score
3.6
Exploitability score
1.8
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Severity
MEDIUM

Weaknesses

nvd@nist.gov
CWE-908

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: account for fraggap on the paged allocation path In __ip6_append_data(), when the paged-allocation branch is taken (MSG_MORE / NETIF_F_SG / large fraglen), alloclen and pagedlen are computed as alloclen = fragheaderlen + transhdrlen; pagedlen = datalen - transhdrlen; datalen already includes fraggap (datalen = length + fraggap). When fraggap is non-zero, this is not the first skb and transhdrlen is zero. The fraggap bytes carried over from the previous skb are copied just past the fragment headers in the new skb's linear area. The linear area is therefore undersized by fraggap bytes while pagedlen is overstated by the same amount, and the copy writes past skb->end into the trailing skb_shared_info. An unprivileged user can trigger this via a UDPv6 socket using MSG_MORE together with MSG_SPLICE_PAGES. The bad accounting was introduced by commit 773ba4fe9104 ("ipv6: avoid partial copy for zc"). Before commit ce650a166335 ("udp6: Fix __ip6_append_data()'s handling of MSG_SPLICE_PAGES"), the negative copy value caused -EINVAL to be returned. That later commit allowed MSG_SPLICE_PAGES to proceed in this case, making the corruption triggerable. The non-paged branch sets alloclen to fraglen, which already accounts for fraggap because datalen does. Bring the paged branch in line by adding fraggap to alloclen and subtracting it from pagedlen. After this adjustment, copy no longer collapses to -fraggap on the paged path, so remove the stale comment describing that old arithmetic. Since a negative copy is no longer expected for a valid MSG_SPLICE_PAGES case, remove the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES exception from the negative copy check.CVE-2026-53362