CVE-2025-25297

Published Feb 14, 2025

Last updated 7 months ago

Overview

Description
Label Studio is an open source data labeling tool. Prior to version 1.16.0, Label Studio's S3 storage integration feature contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its endpoint configuration. When creating an S3 storage connection, the application allows users to specify a custom S3 endpoint URL via the s3_endpoint parameter. This endpoint URL is passed directly to the boto3 AWS SDK without proper validation or restrictions on the protocol or destination. The vulnerability allows an attacker to make the application send HTTP requests to arbitrary internal services by specifying them as the S3 endpoint. When the storage sync operation is triggered, the application attempts to make S3 API calls to the specified endpoint, effectively making HTTP requests to the target service and returning the response in error messages. This SSRF vulnerability enables attackers to bypass network segmentation and access internal services that should not be accessible from the external network. The vulnerability is particularly severe because error messages from failed requests contain the full response body, allowing data exfiltration from internal services. Version 1.16.0 contains a patch for the issue.
Source
security-advisories@github.com
NVD status
Analyzed
Products
label_studio

Risk scores

CVSS 3.1

Type
Primary
Base score
7.7
Impact score
4
Exploitability score
3.1
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Severity
HIGH

Weaknesses

security-advisories@github.com
CWE-918

Social media

Hype score
Not currently trending

Configurations

  1. ### Summary On all Label Studio versions prior to 1.11.0, data imported via file upload feature is not properly sanitized prior to being rendered within a [`Choices`](https://labelstud.io/tags/choices) or [`Labels`](https://labelstud.io/tags/labels) tag, resulting in an XSS vulnerability. ### Details Need permission to use the "data import" function. This was reproduced on Label Studio 1.10.1. ### PoC 1. Create a project. ![Create a project](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/assets/3943358/9b1536ad-feac-4238-a1bd-ca9b1b798673) 2. Upload a file containing the payload using the "Upload Files" function. ![2 Upload a file containing the payload using the Upload Files function](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/assets/3943358/26bb7af1-1cd2-408f-9adf-61e31a5b7328) ![3 complete](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/assets/3943358/f2f62774-1fa6-4456-9e6f-8fa1ca0a2d2e) The following are the contents of the files used in the PoC ``` { "data": { "prompt": "labelstudio universe image", "images": [ { "value": "id123#0", "style": "margin: 5px", "html": "<img width='400' src='https://labelstud.io/_astro/images-tab.64279c16_ZaBSvC.avif' onload=alert(document.cookie)>" } ] } } ``` 3. Select the text-to-image generation labeling template of Ranking and scoring ![3 Select the text-to-image generation labelling template for Ranking and scoring](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/assets/3943358/f227f49c-a718-4738-bc2a-807da4f97155) ![5 save](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/assets/3943358/9b529f8a-8e99-4bb0-bdf6-bb7a95c9b75d) 4. Select a task ![4 Select a task](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/assets/3943358/71856b7a-2b1f-44ea-99ab-fc48bc20caa7) 5. Check that the script is running ![5 Check that the script is running](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/assets/3943358/e396ae7b-a591-4db7-afe9-5bab30b48cb9) ### Impact Malicious scripts can be injected into the code, and when linked with vulnerabilities such as CSRF, it can cause even greater damage. In particular, It can become a source of further attacks, especially when linked to social engineering. CVE-2024-26152
  2. Label Studio, an open source data labeling tool had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. Prior to version 1.10.1, this feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image. `data_import/uploader.py` lines 125C5 through 146 showed that if a URL passed the server side request forgery verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, `data_import/api.py`lines 595C1 through 616C62 demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension. Since the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a `.html` file that would execute JavaScript when visited. Version 1.10.1 contains a patch for this issue. Other remediation strategies are also available. For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;` response header when viewed on the site. The `sandbox` directive restricts a page's actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a `same-origin` policy. Alternatively, restrict the allowed file extensions that may be downloaded.CVE-2024-23633