Linux vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: amdkfd: use calloc instead of kzalloc to avoid integer overflow This uses calloc instead of doing the multiplication which might overflow.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_report_tgtpgs() The following issue was observed running syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831 Read of size 2132 at addr ffff8880aea95dc8 by task syz-executor.0/9815 CPU: 0 PID: 9815 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 4.19.202-00874-gfc0fe04215a9 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xe4/0x14a lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description+0x73/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:253 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352 [inline] kasan_report+0x272/0x370 mm/kasan/report.c:410 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302 memcpy include/linux/string.h:377 [inline] sg_copy_buffer+0x150/0x1c0 lib/scatterlist.c:831 fill_from_dev_buffer+0x14f/0x340 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1021 resp_report_tgtpgs+0x5aa/0x770 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:1772 schedule_resp+0x464/0x12f0 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:4429 scsi_debug_queuecommand+0x467/0x1390 drivers/scsi/scsi_debug.c:5835 scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x3fc/0x9b0 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:1896 scsi_request_fn+0x1042/0x1810 drivers/scsi/scsi_lib.c:2034 __blk_run_queue_uncond block/blk-core.c:464 [inline] __blk_run_queue+0x1a4/0x380 block/blk-core.c:484 blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1c2/0x2d0 block/blk-exec.c:78 sg_common_write.isra.19+0xd74/0x1dc0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:847 sg_write.part.23+0x6e0/0xd00 drivers/scsi/sg.c:716 sg_write+0x64/0xa0 drivers/scsi/sg.c:622 __vfs_write+0xed/0x690 fs/read_write.c:485 kill_bdev:block_device:00000000e138492c vfs_write+0x184/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:549 ksys_write+0x107/0x240 fs/read_write.c:599 do_syscall_64+0xc2/0x560 arch/x86/entry/common.c:293 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe We get 'alen' from command its type is int. If userspace passes a large length we will get a negative 'alen'. Switch n, alen, and rlen to u32.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: kTLS, Fix crash in RX resync flow For the TLS RX resync flow, we maintain a list of TLS contexts that require some attention, to communicate their resync information to the HW. Here we fix list corruptions, by protecting the entries against movements coming from resync_handle_seq_match(), until their resync handling in napi is fully completed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: fix null pointer dereference on pointer cs_desc The pointer cs_desc return from snd_usb_find_clock_source could be null, so there is a potential null pointer dereference issue. Fix this by adding a null check before dereference.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tipd: Remove WARN_ON in tps6598x_block_read Calling tps6598x_block_read with a higher than allowed len can be handled by just returning an error. There's no need to crash systems with panic-on-warn enabled.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched/fair: Prevent dead task groups from regaining cfs_rq's Kevin is reporting crashes which point to a use-after-free of a cfs_rq in update_blocked_averages(). Initial debugging revealed that we've live cfs_rq's (on_list=1) in an about to be kfree()'d task group in free_fair_sched_group(). However, it was unclear how that can happen. His kernel config happened to lead to a layout of struct sched_entity that put the 'my_q' member directly into the middle of the object which makes it incidentally overlap with SLUB's freelist pointer. That, in combination with SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED's freelist pointer mangling, leads to a reliable access violation in form of a #GP which made the UAF fail fast. Michal seems to have run into the same issue[1]. He already correctly diagnosed that commit a7b359fc6a37 ("sched/fair: Correctly insert cfs_rq's to list on unthrottle") is causing the preconditions for the UAF to happen by re-adding cfs_rq's also to task groups that have no more running tasks, i.e. also to dead ones. His analysis, however, misses the real root cause and it cannot be seen from the crash backtrace only, as the real offender is tg_unthrottle_up() getting called via sched_cfs_period_timer() via the timer interrupt at an inconvenient time. When unregister_fair_sched_group() unlinks all cfs_rq's from the dying task group, it doesn't protect itself from getting interrupted. If the timer interrupt triggers while we iterate over all CPUs or after unregister_fair_sched_group() has finished but prior to unlinking the task group, sched_cfs_period_timer() will execute and walk the list of task groups, trying to unthrottle cfs_rq's, i.e. re-add them to the dying task group. These will later -- in free_fair_sched_group() -- be kfree()'ed while still being linked, leading to the fireworks Kevin and Michal are seeing. To fix this race, ensure the dying task group gets unlinked first. However, simply switching the order of unregistering and unlinking the task group isn't sufficient, as concurrent RCU walkers might still see it, as can be seen below: CPU1: CPU2: : timer IRQ: : do_sched_cfs_period_timer(): : : : distribute_cfs_runtime(): : rcu_read_lock(); : : : unthrottle_cfs_rq(): sched_offline_group(): : : walk_tg_tree_from(…,tg_unthrottle_up,…): list_del_rcu(&tg->list); : (1) : list_for_each_entry_rcu(child, &parent->children, siblings) : : (2) list_del_rcu(&tg->siblings); : : tg_unthrottle_up(): unregister_fair_sched_group(): struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq = tg->cfs_rq[cpu_of(rq)]; : : list_del_leaf_cfs_rq(tg->cfs_rq[cpu]); : : : : if (!cfs_rq_is_decayed(cfs_rq) || cfs_rq->nr_running) (3) : list_add_leaf_cfs_rq(cfs_rq); : : : : : : : : : ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: lpfc: Fix list_add() corruption in lpfc_drain_txq() When parsing the txq list in lpfc_drain_txq(), the driver attempts to pass the requests to the adapter. If such an attempt fails, a local "fail_msg" string is set and a log message output. The job is then added to a completions list for cancellation. Processing of any further jobs from the txq list continues, but since "fail_msg" remains set, jobs are added to the completions list regardless of whether a wqe was passed to the adapter. If successfully added to txcmplq, jobs are added to both lists resulting in list corruption. Fix by clearing the fail_msg string after adding a job to the completions list. This stops the subsequent jobs from being added to the completions list unless they had an appropriate failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iavf: free q_vectors before queues in iavf_disable_vf iavf_free_queues() clears adapter->num_active_queues, which iavf_free_q_vectors() relies on, so swap the order of these two function calls in iavf_disable_vf(). This resolves a panic encountered when the interface is disabled and then later brought up again after PF communication is restored.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/prime: Fix use after free in mmap with drm_gem_ttm_mmap drm_gem_ttm_mmap() drops a reference to the gem object on success. If the gem object's refcount == 1 on entry to drm_gem_prime_mmap(), that drop will free the gem object, and the subsequent drm_gem_object_get() will be a UAF. Fix by grabbing a reference before calling the mmap helper. This issue was forseen when the reference dropping was adding in commit 9786b65bc61ac ("drm/ttm: fix mmap refcounting"): "For that to work properly the drm_gem_object_get() call in drm_gem_ttm_mmap() must be moved so it happens before calling obj->funcs->mmap(), otherwise the gem refcount would go down to zero."

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: nullify cq->dbg pointer in mlx5_debug_cq_remove() Prior to this patch in case mlx5_core_destroy_cq() failed it proceeds to rest of destroy operations. mlx5_core_destroy_cq() could be called again by user and cause additional call of mlx5_debug_cq_remove(). cq->dbg was not nullify in previous call and cause the crash. Fix it by nullify cq->dbg pointer after removal. Also proceed to destroy operations only if FW return 0 for MLX5_CMD_OP_DESTROY_CQ command. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x2000300004058: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 5 PID: 1228 Comm: python Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5_for_upstream_min_debug_2021_10_14_11_06 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:lockref_get+0x1/0x60 Code: 5d e9 53 ff ff ff 48 8d 7f 70 e8 0a 2e 48 00 c7 85 d0 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 c6 45 70 00 fb 5d c3 c3 cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc 53 <48> 8b 17 48 89 fb 85 d2 75 3d 48 89 d0 bf 64 00 00 00 48 89 c1 48 RSP: 0018:ffff888137dd7a38 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888107d5f458 RCX: 00000000fffffffe RDX: 000000000002c2b0 RSI: ffffffff8155e2e0 RDI: 0002000300004058 RBP: ffff888137dd7a88 R08: 0002000300004058 R09: ffff8881144a9f88 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8881141d4000 R13: ffff888137dd7c68 R14: ffff888137dd7d58 R15: ffff888137dd7cc0 FS: 00007f4644f2a4c0(0000) GS:ffff8887a2d40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000055b4500f4380 CR3: 0000000114f7a003 CR4: 0000000000170ea0 Call Trace: simple_recursive_removal+0x33/0x2e0 ? debugfs_remove+0x60/0x60 debugfs_remove+0x40/0x60 mlx5_debug_cq_remove+0x32/0x70 [mlx5_core] mlx5_core_destroy_cq+0x41/0x1d0 [mlx5_core] devx_obj_cleanup+0x151/0x330 [mlx5_ib] ? __pollwait+0xd0/0xd0 ? xas_load+0x5/0x70 ? xa_load+0x62/0xa0 destroy_hw_idr_uobject+0x20/0x80 [ib_uverbs] uverbs_destroy_uobject+0x3b/0x360 [ib_uverbs] uobj_destroy+0x54/0xa0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xaf2/0x1160 [ib_uverbs] ? uverbs_finalize_object+0xd0/0xd0 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x1b0 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x3e4/0x8e0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/core: Set send and receive CQ before forwarding to the driver Preset both receive and send CQ pointers prior to call to the drivers and overwrite it later again till the mlx4 is going to be changed do not overwrite ibqp properties. This change is needed for mlx5, because in case of QP creation failure, it will go to the path of QP destroy which relies on proper CQ pointers. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib] Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880064c55c0 by task a.out/246 CPU: 0 PID: 246 Comm: a.out Not tainted 5.15.0+ #291 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x45/0x59 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x140 kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf create_qp.cold+0x164/0x16e [mlx5_ib] mlx5_ib_create_qp+0x358/0x28a0 [mlx5_ib] create_qp.part.0+0x45b/0x6a0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Allocated by task 246: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa4/0xd0 create_qp.part.0+0x92/0x6a0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae Freed by task 246: kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 __kasan_slab_free+0x10c/0x150 slab_free_freelist_hook+0xb4/0x1b0 kfree+0xe7/0x2a0 create_qp.part.0+0x52b/0x6a0 [ib_core] ib_create_qp_user+0x97/0x150 [ib_core] ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_QP_CREATE+0x92c/0x1250 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0x1c38/0x3150 [ib_uverbs] ib_uverbs_ioctl+0x169/0x260 [ib_uverbs] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x866/0x14d0 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cfg80211: call cfg80211_stop_ap when switch from P2P_GO type If the userspace tools switch from NL80211_IFTYPE_P2P_GO to NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), it does not call the cleanup cfg80211_stop_ap(), this leads to the initialization of in-use data. For example, this path re-init the sdata->assigned_chanctx_list while it is still an element of assigned_vifs list, and makes that linked list corrupt.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: pm80xx: Fix memory leak during rmmod Driver failed to release all memory allocated. This would lead to memory leak during driver removal. Properly free memory when the module is removed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: scsi_debug: Fix out-of-bound read in resp_readcap16() The following warning was observed running syzkaller: [ 3813.830724] sg_write: data in/out 65466/242 bytes for SCSI command 0x9e-- guessing data in; [ 3813.830724] program syz-executor not setting count and/or reply_len properly [ 3813.836956] ================================================================== [ 3813.839465] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0 [ 3813.841773] Read of size 4096 at addr ffff8883cf80f540 by task syz-executor/1549 [ 3813.846612] Call Trace: [ 3813.846995] dump_stack+0x108/0x15f [ 3813.847524] print_address_description+0xa5/0x372 [ 3813.848243] kasan_report.cold+0x236/0x2a8 [ 3813.849439] check_memory_region+0x240/0x270 [ 3813.850094] memcpy+0x30/0x80 [ 3813.850553] sg_copy_buffer+0x157/0x1e0 [ 3813.853032] sg_copy_from_buffer+0x13/0x20 [ 3813.853660] fill_from_dev_buffer+0x135/0x370 [ 3813.854329] resp_readcap16+0x1ac/0x280 [ 3813.856917] schedule_resp+0x41f/0x1630 [ 3813.858203] scsi_debug_queuecommand+0xb32/0x17e0 [ 3813.862699] scsi_dispatch_cmd+0x330/0x950 [ 3813.863329] scsi_request_fn+0xd8e/0x1710 [ 3813.863946] __blk_run_queue+0x10b/0x230 [ 3813.864544] blk_execute_rq_nowait+0x1d8/0x400 [ 3813.865220] sg_common_write.isra.0+0xe61/0x2420 [ 3813.871637] sg_write+0x6c8/0xef0 [ 3813.878853] __vfs_write+0xe4/0x800 [ 3813.883487] vfs_write+0x17b/0x530 [ 3813.884008] ksys_write+0x103/0x270 [ 3813.886268] __x64_sys_write+0x77/0xc0 [ 3813.886841] do_syscall_64+0x106/0x360 [ 3813.887415] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 This issue can be reproduced with the following syzkaller log: r0 = openat(0xffffffffffffff9c, &(0x7f0000000040)='./file0\x00', 0x26e1, 0x0) r1 = syz_open_procfs(0xffffffffffffffff, &(0x7f0000000000)='fd/3\x00') open_by_handle_at(r1, &(0x7f00000003c0)=ANY=[@ANYRESHEX], 0x602000) r2 = syz_open_dev$sg(&(0x7f0000000000), 0x0, 0x40782) write$binfmt_aout(r2, &(0x7f0000000340)=ANY=[@ANYBLOB="00000000deff000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000047f007af9e107a41ec395f1bded7be24277a1501ff6196a83366f4e6362bc0ff2b247f68a972989b094b2da4fb3607fcf611a22dd04310d28c75039d"], 0x126) In resp_readcap16() we get "int alloc_len" value -1104926854, and then pass the huge arr_len to fill_from_dev_buffer(), but arr is only 32 bytes. This leads to OOB in sg_copy_buffer(). To solve this issue, define alloc_len as u32.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix memory ordering between normal and ordered work functions Ordered work functions aren't guaranteed to be handled by the same thread which executed the normal work functions. The only way execution between normal/ordered functions is synchronized is via the WORK_DONE_BIT, unfortunately the used bitops don't guarantee any ordering whatsoever. This manifested as seemingly inexplicable crashes on ARM64, where async_chunk::inode is seen as non-null in async_cow_submit which causes submit_compressed_extents to be called and crash occurs because async_chunk::inode suddenly became NULL. The call trace was similar to: pc : submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0 lr : async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0 sp : ffff800015d4bc20 <registers omitted for brevity> Call trace: submit_compressed_extents+0x38/0x3d0 async_cow_submit+0x50/0xd0 run_ordered_work+0xc8/0x280 btrfs_work_helper+0x98/0x250 process_one_work+0x1f0/0x4ac worker_thread+0x188/0x504 kthread+0x110/0x114 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 Fix this by adding respective barrier calls which ensure that all accesses preceding setting of WORK_DONE_BIT are strictly ordered before setting the flag. At the same time add a read barrier after reading of WORK_DONE_BIT in run_ordered_work which ensures all subsequent loads would be strictly ordered after reading the bit. This in turn ensures are all accesses before WORK_DONE_BIT are going to be strictly ordered before any access that can occur in ordered_func.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: ufs: core: Improve SCSI abort handling The following has been observed on a test setup: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 250 at drivers/scsi/ufs/ufshcd.c:2737 ufshcd_queuecommand+0x468/0x65c Call trace: ufshcd_queuecommand+0x468/0x65c scsi_send_eh_cmnd+0x224/0x6a0 scsi_eh_test_devices+0x248/0x418 scsi_eh_ready_devs+0xc34/0xe58 scsi_error_handler+0x204/0x80c kthread+0x150/0x1b4 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30 That warning is triggered by the following statement: WARN_ON(lrbp->cmd); Fix this warning by clearing lrbp->cmd from the abort handler.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i40e: Fix NULL ptr dereference on VSI filter sync Remove the reason of null pointer dereference in sync VSI filters. Added new I40E_VSI_RELEASING flag to signalize deleting and releasing of VSI resources to sync this thread with sync filters subtask. Without this patch it is possible to start update the VSI filter list after VSI is removed, that's causing a kernel oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: lpfc: Fix link down processing to address NULL pointer dereference If an FC link down transition while PLOGIs are outstanding to fabric well known addresses, outstanding ABTS requests may result in a NULL pointer dereference. Driver unload requests may hang with repeated "2878" log messages. The Link down processing results in ABTS requests for outstanding ELS requests. The Abort WQEs are sent for the ELSs before the driver had set the link state to down. Thus the driver is sending the Abort with the expectation that an ABTS will be sent on the wire. The Abort request is stalled waiting for the link to come up. In some conditions the driver may auto-complete the ELSs thus if the link does come up, the Abort completions may reference an invalid structure. Fix by ensuring that Abort set the flag to avoid link traffic if issued due to conditions where the link failed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86, relocs: Ignore relocations in .notes section When building with CONFIG_XEN_PV=y, .text symbols are emitted into the .notes section so that Xen can find the "startup_xen" entry point. This information is used prior to booting the kernel, so relocations are not useful. In fact, performing relocations against the .notes section means that the KASLR base is exposed since /sys/kernel/notes is world-readable. To avoid leaking the KASLR base without breaking unprivileged tools that are expecting to read /sys/kernel/notes, skip performing relocations in the .notes section. The values readable in .notes are then identical to those found in System.map.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: taprio: proper TCA_TAPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX check taprio_parse_tc_entry() is not correctly checking TCA_TAPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX attribute: int tc; // Signed value tc = nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_TAPRIO_TC_ENTRY_INDEX]); if (tc >= TC_QOPT_MAX_QUEUE) { NL_SET_ERR_MSG_MOD(extack, "TC entry index out of range"); return -ERANGE; } syzbot reported that it could fed arbitary negative values: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1722:18 shift exponent -2147418108 is negative CPU: 0 PID: 5066 Comm: syz-executor367 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc7-syzkaller-00136-gc8a5c731fd12 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2e0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x3c7/0x420 lib/ubsan.c:386 taprio_parse_tc_entry net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1722 [inline] taprio_parse_tc_entries net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1768 [inline] taprio_change+0xb87/0x57d0 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:1877 taprio_init+0x9da/0xc80 net/sched/sch_taprio.c:2134 qdisc_create+0x9d4/0x1190 net/sched/sch_api.c:1355 tc_modify_qdisc+0xa26/0x1e40 net/sched/sch_api.c:1776 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x885/0x1040 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6617 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1367 netlink_sendmsg+0xa3b/0xd70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7f1b2dea3759 Code: 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 d7 19 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffd4de452f8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1b2def0390 RCX: 00007f1b2dea3759 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200007c0 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000555500000000 R09: 0000555500000000 R10: 0000555500000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd4de45340 R13: 00007ffd4de45310 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffd4de45340

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate payload size in ipc response If installing malicious ksmbd-tools, ksmbd.mountd can return invalid ipc response to ksmbd kernel server. ksmbd should validate payload size of ipc response from ksmbd.mountd to avoid memory overrun or slab-out-of-bounds. This patch validate 3 ipc response that has payload.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Disable auto-enable of exclusive INTx IRQ Currently for devices requiring masking at the irqchip for INTx, ie. devices without DisINTx support, the IRQ is enabled in request_irq() and subsequently disabled as necessary to align with the masked status flag. This presents a window where the interrupt could fire between these events, resulting in the IRQ incrementing the disable depth twice. This would be unrecoverable for a user since the masked flag prevents nested enables through vfio. Instead, invert the logic using IRQF_NO_AUTOEN such that exclusive INTx is never auto-enabled, then unmask as required.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/fsl-mc: Block calling interrupt handler without trigger The eventfd_ctx trigger pointer of the vfio_fsl_mc_irq object is initially NULL and may become NULL if the user sets the trigger eventfd to -1. The interrupt handler itself is guaranteed that trigger is always valid between request_irq() and free_irq(), but the loopback testing mechanisms to invoke the handler function need to test the trigger. The triggering and setting ioctl paths both make use of igate and are therefore mutually exclusive. The vfio-fsl-mc driver does not make use of irqfds, nor does it support any sort of masking operations, therefore unlike vfio-pci and vfio-platform, the flow can remain essentially unchanged.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/platform: Create persistent IRQ handlers The vfio-platform SET_IRQS ioctl currently allows loopback triggering of an interrupt before a signaling eventfd has been configured by the user, which thereby allows a NULL pointer dereference. Rather than register the IRQ relative to a valid trigger, register all IRQs in a disabled state in the device open path. This allows mask operations on the IRQ to nest within the overall enable state governed by a valid eventfd signal. This decouples @masked, protected by the @locked spinlock from @trigger, protected via the @igate mutex. In doing so, it's guaranteed that changes to @trigger cannot race the IRQ handlers because the IRQ handler is synchronously disabled before modifying the trigger, and loopback triggering of the IRQ via ioctl is safe due to serialization with trigger changes via igate. For compatibility, request_irq() failures are maintained to be local to the SET_IRQS ioctl rather than a fatal error in the open device path. This allows, for example, a userspace driver with polling mode support to continue to work regardless of moving the request_irq() call site. This necessarily blocks all SET_IRQS access to the failed index.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Create persistent INTx handler A vulnerability exists where the eventfd for INTx signaling can be deconfigured, which unregisters the IRQ handler but still allows eventfds to be signaled with a NULL context through the SET_IRQS ioctl or through unmask irqfd if the device interrupt is pending. Ideally this could be solved with some additional locking; the igate mutex serializes the ioctl and config space accesses, and the interrupt handler is unregistered relative to the trigger, but the irqfd path runs asynchronous to those. The igate mutex cannot be acquired from the atomic context of the eventfd wake function. Disabling the irqfd relative to the eventfd registration is potentially incompatible with existing userspace. As a result, the solution implemented here moves configuration of the INTx interrupt handler to track the lifetime of the INTx context object and irq_type configuration, rather than registration of a particular trigger eventfd. Synchronization is added between the ioctl path and eventfd_signal() wrapper such that the eventfd trigger can be dynamically updated relative to in-flight interrupts or irqfd callbacks.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Lock external INTx masking ops Mask operations through config space changes to DisINTx may race INTx configuration changes via ioctl. Create wrappers that add locking for paths outside of the core interrupt code. In particular, irq_type is updated holding igate, therefore testing is_intx() requires holding igate. For example clearing DisINTx from config space can otherwise race changes of the interrupt configuration. This aligns interfaces which may trigger the INTx eventfd into two camps, one side serialized by igate and the other only enabled while INTx is configured. A subsequent patch introduces synchronization for the latter flows.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: release elements in clone only from destroy path Clone already always provides a current view of the lookup table, use it to destroy the set, otherwise it is possible to destroy elements twice. This fix requires: 212ed75dc5fb ("netfilter: nf_tables: integrate pipapo into commit protocol") which came after: 9827a0e6e23b ("netfilter: nft_set_pipapo: release elements in clone from abort path").

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_chain_filter: handle NETDEV_UNREGISTER for inet/ingress basechain Remove netdevice from inet/ingress basechain in case NETDEV_UNREGISTER event is reported, otherwise a stale reference to netdevice remains in the hook list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Both cadence-quadspi ->runtime_suspend() and ->runtime_resume() implementations start with: struct cqspi_st *cqspi = dev_get_drvdata(dev); struct spi_controller *host = dev_get_drvdata(dev); This obviously cannot be correct, unless "struct cqspi_st" is the first member of " struct spi_controller", or the other way around, but it is not the case. "struct spi_controller" is allocated by devm_spi_alloc_host(), which allocates an extra amount of memory for private data, used to store "struct cqspi_st". The ->probe() function of the cadence-quadspi driver then sets the device drvdata to store the address of the "struct cqspi_st" structure. Therefore: struct cqspi_st *cqspi = dev_get_drvdata(dev); is correct, but: struct spi_controller *host = dev_get_drvdata(dev); is not, as it makes "host" point not to a "struct spi_controller" but to the same "struct cqspi_st" structure as above. This obviously leads to bad things (memory corruption, kernel crashes) directly during ->probe(), as ->probe() enables the device using PM runtime, leading the ->runtime_resume() hook being called, which in turns calls spi_controller_resume() with the wrong pointer. This has at least been reported [0] to cause a kernel crash, but the exact behavior will depend on the memory contents. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240226121803.5a7r5wkpbbowcxgx@dhruva/ This issue potentially affects all platforms that are currently using the cadence-quadspi driver.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: cadence-qspi: remove system-wide suspend helper calls from runtime PM hooks The ->runtime_suspend() and ->runtime_resume() callbacks are not expected to call spi_controller_suspend() and spi_controller_resume(). Remove calls to those in the cadence-qspi driver. Those helpers have two roles currently: - They stop/start the queue, including dealing with the kworker. - They toggle the SPI controller SPI_CONTROLLER_SUSPENDED flag. It requires acquiring ctlr->bus_lock_mutex. Step one is irrelevant because cadence-qspi is not queued. Step two however has two implications: - A deadlock occurs, because ->runtime_resume() is called in a context where the lock is already taken (in the ->exec_op() callback, where the usage count is incremented). - It would disallow all operations once the device is auto-suspended. Here is a brief call tree highlighting the mutex deadlock: spi_mem_exec_op() ... spi_mem_access_start() mutex_lock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex) cqspi_exec_mem_op() pm_runtime_resume_and_get() cqspi_resume() spi_controller_resume() mutex_lock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex) ... spi_mem_access_end() mutex_unlock(&ctlr->bus_lock_mutex) ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netlink: Fix kernel-infoleak-after-free in __skb_datagram_iter syzbot reported the following uninit-value access issue [1]: netlink_to_full_skb() creates a new `skb` and puts the `skb->data` passed as a 1st arg of netlink_to_full_skb() onto new `skb`. The data size is specified as `len` and passed to skb_put_data(). This `len` is based on `skb->end` that is not data offset but buffer offset. The `skb->end` contains data and tailroom. Since the tailroom is not initialized when the new `skb` created, KMSAN detects uninitialized memory area when copying the data. This patch resolved this issue by correct the len from `skb->end` to `skb->len`, which is the actual data offset. BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak-after-free in _copy_to_iter+0x364/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:186 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:114 [inline] copy_to_user_iter lib/iov_iter.c:24 [inline] iterate_ubuf include/linux/iov_iter.h:29 [inline] iterate_and_advance2 include/linux/iov_iter.h:245 [inline] iterate_and_advance include/linux/iov_iter.h:271 [inline] _copy_to_iter+0x364/0x2520 lib/iov_iter.c:186 copy_to_iter include/linux/uio.h:197 [inline] simple_copy_to_iter+0x68/0xa0 net/core/datagram.c:532 __skb_datagram_iter+0x123/0xdc0 net/core/datagram.c:420 skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x5c/0x200 net/core/datagram.c:546 skb_copy_datagram_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3960 [inline] packet_recvmsg+0xd9c/0x2000 net/packet/af_packet.c:3482 sock_recvmsg_nosec net/socket.c:1044 [inline] sock_recvmsg net/socket.c:1066 [inline] sock_read_iter+0x467/0x580 net/socket.c:1136 call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2014 [inline] new_sync_read fs/read_write.c:389 [inline] vfs_read+0x8f6/0xe00 fs/read_write.c:470 ksys_read+0x20f/0x4c0 fs/read_write.c:613 __do_sys_read fs/read_write.c:623 [inline] __se_sys_read fs/read_write.c:621 [inline] __x64_sys_read+0x93/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:621 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was stored to memory at: skb_put_data include/linux/skbuff.h:2622 [inline] netlink_to_full_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:181 [inline] __netlink_deliver_tap_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:298 [inline] __netlink_deliver_tap+0x5be/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:325 netlink_deliver_tap net/netlink/af_netlink.c:338 [inline] netlink_deliver_tap_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:347 [inline] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1341 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x10f1/0x1250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1368 netlink_sendmsg+0x1238/0x13d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1910 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x9c2/0xd60 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2638 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2667 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2676 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2674 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x490 net/socket.c:2674 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x44/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Uninit was created at: free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1087 [inline] free_unref_page_prepare+0xb0/0xa40 mm/page_alloc.c:2347 free_unref_page_list+0xeb/0x1100 mm/page_alloc.c:2533 release_pages+0x23d3/0x2410 mm/swap.c:1042 free_pages_and_swap_cache+0xd9/0xf0 mm/swap_state.c:316 tlb_batch_pages ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip_tunnel: prevent perpetual headroom growth syzkaller triggered following kasan splat: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __skb_flow_dissect+0x19d1/0x7a50 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1170 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88812fb4000e by task syz-executor183/5191 [..] kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:588 __skb_flow_dissect+0x19d1/0x7a50 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1170 skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys include/linux/skbuff.h:1514 [inline] ___skb_get_hash net/core/flow_dissector.c:1791 [inline] __skb_get_hash+0xc7/0x540 net/core/flow_dissector.c:1856 skb_get_hash include/linux/skbuff.h:1556 [inline] ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1855/0x33c0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:748 ipip_tunnel_xmit+0x3cc/0x4e0 net/ipv4/ipip.c:308 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3564 __dev_queue_xmit+0x7c1/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4349 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x42c/0x5d0 net/core/neighbour.c:1592 ... ip_finish_output2+0x833/0x2550 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235 ip_finish_output+0x31/0x310 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:323 .. iptunnel_xmit+0x5b4/0x9b0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel_core.c:82 ip_tunnel_xmit+0x1dbc/0x33c0 net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c:831 ipgre_xmit+0x4a1/0x980 net/ipv4/ip_gre.c:665 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4940 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4954 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3548 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x13d/0x6d0 net/core/dev.c:3564 ... The splat occurs because skb->data points past skb->head allocated area. This is because neigh layer does: __skb_pull(skb, skb_network_offset(skb)); ... but skb_network_offset() returns a negative offset and __skb_pull() arg is unsigned. IOW, we skb->data gets "adjusted" by a huge value. The negative value is returned because skb->head and skb->data distance is more than 64k and skb->network_header (u16) has wrapped around. The bug is in the ip_tunnel infrastructure, which can cause dev->needed_headroom to increment ad infinitum. The syzkaller reproducer consists of packets getting routed via a gre tunnel, and route of gre encapsulated packets pointing at another (ipip) tunnel. The ipip encapsulation finds gre0 as next output device. This results in the following pattern: 1). First packet is to be sent out via gre0. Route lookup found an output device, ipip0. 2). ip_tunnel_xmit for gre0 bumps gre0->needed_headroom based on the future output device, rt.dev->needed_headroom (ipip0). 3). ip output / start_xmit moves skb on to ipip0. which runs the same code path again (xmit recursion). 4). Routing step for the post-gre0-encap packet finds gre0 as output device to use for ipip0 encapsulated packet. tunl0->needed_headroom is then incremented based on the (already bumped) gre0 device headroom. This repeats for every future packet: gre0->needed_headroom gets inflated because previous packets' ipip0 step incremented rt->dev (gre0) headroom, and ipip0 incremented because gre0 needed_headroom was increased. For each subsequent packet, gre/ipip0->needed_headroom grows until post-expand-head reallocations result in a skb->head/data distance of more than 64k. Once that happens, skb->network_header (u16) wraps around when pskb_expand_head tries to make sure that skb_network_offset() is unchanged after the headroom expansion/reallocation. After this skb_network_offset(skb) returns a different (and negative) result post headroom expansion. The next trip to neigh layer (or anything else that would __skb_pull the network header) makes skb->data point to a memory location outside skb->head area. v2: Cap the needed_headroom update to an arbitarily chosen upperlimit to prevent perpetual increase instead of dropping the headroom increment completely.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: veth: clear GRO when clearing XDP even when down veth sets NETIF_F_GRO automatically when XDP is enabled, because both features use the same NAPI machinery. The logic to clear NETIF_F_GRO sits in veth_disable_xdp() which is called both on ndo_stop and when XDP is turned off. To avoid the flag from being cleared when the device is brought down, the clearing is skipped when IFF_UP is not set. Bringing the device down should indeed not modify its features. Unfortunately, this means that clearing is also skipped when XDP is disabled _while_ the device is down. And there's nothing on the open path to bring the device features back into sync. IOW if user enables XDP, disables it and then brings the device up we'll end up with a stray GRO flag set but no NAPI instances. We don't depend on the GRO flag on the datapath, so the datapath won't crash. We will crash (or hang), however, next time features are sync'ed (either by user via ethtool or peer changing its config). The GRO flag will go away, and veth will try to disable the NAPIs. But the open path never created them since XDP was off, the GRO flag was a stray. If NAPI was initialized before we'll hang in napi_disable(). If it never was we'll crash trying to stop uninitialized hrtimer. Move the GRO flag updates to the XDP enable / disable paths, instead of mixing them with the ndo_open / ndo_close paths.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: stmmac: Clear variable when destroying workqueue Currently when suspending driver and stopping workqueue it is checked whether workqueue is not NULL and if so, it is destroyed. Function destroy_workqueue() does drain queue and does clear variable, but it does not set workqueue variable to NULL. This can cause kernel/module panic if code attempts to clear workqueue that was not initialized. This scenario is possible when resuming suspended driver in stmmac_resume(), because there is no handling for failed stmmac_hw_setup(), which can fail and return if DMA engine has failed to initialize, and workqueue is initialized after DMA engine. Should DMA engine fail to initialize, resume will proceed normally, but interface won't work and TX queue will eventually timeout, causing 'Reset adapter' error. This then does destroy workqueue during reset process. And since workqueue is initialized after DMA engine and can be skipped, it will cause kernel/module panic. To secure against this possible crash, set workqueue variable to NULL when destroying workqueue. Log/backtrace from crash goes as follows: [88.031977]------------[ cut here ]------------ [88.031985]NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth0 (sxgmac): transmit queue 1 timed out [88.032017]WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:477 dev_watchdog+0x390/0x398 <Skipping backtrace for watchdog timeout> [88.032251]---[ end trace e70de432e4d5c2c0 ]--- [88.032282]sxgmac 16d88000.ethernet eth0: Reset adapter. [88.036359]------------[ cut here ]------------ [88.036519]Call trace: [88.036523] flush_workqueue+0x3e4/0x430 [88.036528] drain_workqueue+0xc4/0x160 [88.036533] destroy_workqueue+0x40/0x270 [88.036537] stmmac_fpe_stop_wq+0x4c/0x70 [88.036541] stmmac_release+0x278/0x280 [88.036546] __dev_close_many+0xcc/0x158 [88.036551] dev_close_many+0xbc/0x190 [88.036555] dev_close.part.0+0x70/0xc0 [88.036560] dev_close+0x24/0x30 [88.036564] stmmac_service_task+0x110/0x140 [88.036569] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x4a0 [88.036573] worker_thread+0x54/0x408 [88.036578] kthread+0x164/0x170 [88.036583] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [88.036588]---[ end trace e70de432e4d5c2c1 ]--- [88.036597]Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000004

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Avoid potential use-after-free in hci_error_reset While handling the HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event, if the underlying BT controller is not responding, the GPIO reset mechanism would free the hci_dev and lead to a use-after-free in hci_error_reset. Here's the call trace observed on a ChromeOS device with Intel AX201: queue_work_on+0x3e/0x6c __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x2ee/0x4c0 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a6>] ? init_wait_entry+0x31/0x31 __hci_cmd_sync+0x16/0x20 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>] hci_error_reset+0x4f/0xa4 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x33f worker_thread+0x21b/0x373 kthread+0x13a/0x152 ? pr_cont_work+0x54/0x54 ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This patch holds the reference count on the hci_dev while processing a HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event to avoid potential crash.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tls: fix use-after-free on failed backlog decryption When the decrypt request goes to the backlog and crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EBUSY, tls_do_decryption will wait until all async decryptions have completed. If one of them fails, tls_do_decryption will return -EBADMSG and tls_decrypt_sg jumps to the error path, releasing all the pages. But the pages have been passed to the async callback, and have already been released by tls_decrypt_done. The only true async case is when crypto_aead_decrypt returns -EINPROGRESS. With -EBUSY, we already waited so we can tell tls_sw_recvmsg that the data is available for immediate copy, but we need to notify tls_decrypt_sg (via the new ->async_done flag) that the memory has already been released.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drivers: perf: ctr_get_width function for legacy is not defined With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n linux kernel crashes when you try perf record: $ perf record ls [ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 [ 46.750199] Oops [#1] [ 46.750342] Modules linked in: [ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 #2 [ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT) [ 46.751184] epc : 0x0 [ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e [ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0 [ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0 [ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930 [ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000 [ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004 [ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2 [ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000 [ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078 [ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001 [ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff [ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30 [ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c [ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec. [ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled [ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4 This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage. Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: dev-replace: properly validate device names There's a syzbot report that device name buffers passed to device replace are not properly checked for string termination which could lead to a read out of bounds in getname_kernel(). Add a helper that validates both source and target device name buffers. For devid as the source initialize the buffer to empty string in case something tries to read it later. This was originally analyzed and fixed in a different way by Edward Adam Davis (see links).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: qcom: Fix uninitialized pointer dmactl In the case where __lpass_get_dmactl_handle is called and the driver id dai_id is invalid the pointer dmactl is not being assigned a value, and dmactl contains a garbage value since it has not been initialized and so the null check may not work. Fix this to initialize dmactl to NULL. One could argue that modern compilers will set this to zero, but it is useful to keep this initialized as per the same way in functions __lpass_platform_codec_intf_init and lpass_cdc_dma_daiops_hw_params. Cleans up clang scan build warning: sound/soc/qcom/lpass-cdc-dma.c:275:7: warning: Branch condition evaluates to a garbage value [core.uninitialized.Branch]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbcon: always restore the old font data in fbcon_do_set_font() Commit a5a923038d70 (fbdev: fbcon: Properly revert changes when vc_resize() failed) started restoring old font data upon failure (of vc_resize()). But it performs so only for user fonts. It means that the "system"/internal fonts are not restored at all. So in result, the very first call to fbcon_do_set_font() performs no restore at all upon failing vc_resize(). This can be reproduced by Syzkaller to crash the system on the next invocation of font_get(). It's rather hard to hit the allocation failure in vc_resize() on the first font_set(), but not impossible. Esp. if fault injection is used to aid the execution/failure. It was demonstrated by Sirius: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffff8 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD cb7b067 P4D cb7b067 PUD cb7d067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 1 PID: 8007 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.7.0-g9d1694dc91ce #20 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:fbcon_get_font+0x229/0x800 drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2286 Call Trace: <TASK> con_font_get drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:4558 [inline] con_font_op+0x1fc/0xf20 drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:4673 vt_k_ioctl drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:474 [inline] vt_ioctl+0x632/0x2ec0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:752 tty_ioctl+0x6f8/0x1570 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2803 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] ... So restore the font data in any case, not only for user fonts. Note the later 'if' is now protected by 'old_userfont' and not 'old_data' as the latter is always set now. (And it is supposed to be non-NULL. Otherwise we would see the bug above again.)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Prevent potential buffer overflow in map_hw_resources Adds a check in the map_hw_resources function to prevent a potential buffer overflow. The function was accessing arrays using an index that could potentially be greater than the size of the arrays, leading to a buffer overflow. Adds a check to ensure that the index is within the bounds of the arrays. If the index is out of bounds, an error message is printed and break it will continue execution with just ignoring extra data early to prevent the buffer overflow. Reported by smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dml2/dml2_wrapper.c:79 map_hw_resources() error: buffer overflow 'dml2->v20.scratch.dml_to_dc_pipe_mapping.disp_cfg_to_stream_id' 6 <= 7 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dml2/dml2_wrapper.c:81 map_hw_resources() error: buffer overflow 'dml2->v20.scratch.dml_to_dc_pipe_mapping.disp_cfg_to_plane_id' 6 <= 7

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: Sparse-Memory/vmemmap out-of-bounds fix Offset vmemmap so that the first page of vmemmap will be mapped to the first page of physical memory in order to ensure that vmemmap’s bounds will be respected during pfn_to_page()/page_to_pfn() operations. The conversion macros will produce correct SV39/48/57 addresses for every possible/valid DRAM_BASE inside the physical memory limits. v2:Address Alex's comments

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: fix use-after-free and null-ptr-deref in gtp_newlink() The gtp_link_ops operations structure for the subsystem must be registered after registering the gtp_net_ops pernet operations structure. Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in gtp_genl_dump_pdp' bug: [ 1010.702740] gtp: GTP module unloaded [ 1010.715877] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1010.715888] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] [ 1010.715895] CPU: 1 PID: 128616 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-std-def-alt1 #1 [ 1010.715899] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-alt1 04/01/2014 [ 1010.715908] RIP: 0010:gtp_newlink+0x4d7/0x9c0 [gtp] [ 1010.715915] Code: 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 41 04 00 00 48 8b bb d8 05 00 00 e8 ed f6 ff ff 48 89 c2 48 89 c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 04 00 00 4c 89 e2 4c 8b 6d 00 48 b8 00 00 00 [ 1010.715920] RSP: 0018:ffff888020fbf180 EFLAGS: 00010203 [ 1010.715929] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88800399c000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1010.715933] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff84805280 RDI: 0000000000000282 [ 1010.715938] RBP: 000000000000000d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1010.715942] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88800399cc80 [ 1010.715947] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000400 [ 1010.715953] FS: 00007fd1509ab5c0(0000) GS:ffff88805b300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1010.715958] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1010.715962] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000001c07a000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0 [ 1010.715968] PKRU: 55555554 [ 1010.715972] Call Trace: [ 1010.715985] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f [ 1010.715995] ? die_addr+0x43/0x70 [ 1010.716002] ? exc_general_protection+0x199/0x2f0 [ 1010.716016] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x1e/0x30 [ 1010.716026] ? gtp_newlink+0x4d7/0x9c0 [gtp] [ 1010.716034] ? gtp_net_exit+0x150/0x150 [gtp] [ 1010.716042] __rtnl_newlink+0x1063/0x1700 [ 1010.716051] ? rtnl_setlink+0x3c0/0x3c0 [ 1010.716063] ? is_bpf_text_address+0xc0/0x1f0 [ 1010.716070] ? kernel_text_address.part.0+0xbb/0xd0 [ 1010.716076] ? __kernel_text_address+0x56/0xa0 [ 1010.716084] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x5a/0xa0 [ 1010.716091] ? create_prof_cpu_mask+0x30/0x30 [ 1010.716098] ? arch_stack_walk+0x9e/0xf0 [ 1010.716106] ? stack_trace_save+0x91/0xd0 [ 1010.716113] ? stack_trace_consume_entry+0x170/0x170 [ 1010.716121] ? __lock_acquire+0x15c5/0x5380 [ 1010.716139] ? mark_held_locks+0x9e/0xe0 [ 1010.716148] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x35f/0x3c0 [ 1010.716155] ? __rtnl_newlink+0x1700/0x1700 [ 1010.716160] rtnl_newlink+0x69/0xa0 [ 1010.716166] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x43b/0xc50 [ 1010.716172] ? rtnl_fdb_dump+0x9f0/0x9f0 [ 1010.716179] ? lock_acquire+0x1fe/0x560 [ 1010.716188] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x12f/0xd50 [ 1010.716196] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x440 [ 1010.716202] ? rtnl_fdb_dump+0x9f0/0x9f0 [ 1010.716208] ? netlink_ack+0xab0/0xab0 [ 1010.716213] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x202/0xd50 [ 1010.716220] ? netlink_deliver_tap+0x218/0xd50 [ 1010.716226] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x30b/0x590 [ 1010.716233] netlink_unicast+0x54b/0x800 [ 1010.716240] ? netlink_attachskb+0x870/0x870 [ 1010.716248] ? __check_object_size+0x2de/0x3b0 [ 1010.716254] netlink_sendmsg+0x938/0xe40 [ 1010.716261] ? netlink_unicast+0x800/0x800 [ 1010.716269] ? __import_iovec+0x292/0x510 [ 1010.716276] ? netlink_unicast+0x800/0x800 [ 1010.716284] __sock_sendmsg+0x159/0x190 [ 1010.716290] ____sys_sendmsg+0x712/0x880 [ 1010.716297] ? sock_write_iter+0x3d0/0x3d0 [ 1010.716304] ? __ia32_sys_recvmmsg+0x270/0x270 [ 1010.716309] ? lock_acquire+0x1fe/0x560 [ 1010.716315] ? drain_array_locked+0x90/0x90 [ 1010.716324] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 [ 1010.716331] ? sendmsg_copy_msghdr+0x170/0x170 [ 1010.716337] ? lockdep_init_map ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix double free of anonymous device after snapshot creation failure When creating a snapshot we may do a double free of an anonymous device in case there's an error committing the transaction. The second free may result in freeing an anonymous device number that was allocated by some other subsystem in the kernel or another btrfs filesystem. The steps that lead to this: 1) At ioctl.c:create_snapshot() we allocate an anonymous device number and assign it to pending_snapshot->anon_dev; 2) Then we call btrfs_commit_transaction() and end up at transaction.c:create_pending_snapshot(); 3) There we call btrfs_get_new_fs_root() and pass it the anonymous device number stored in pending_snapshot->anon_dev; 4) btrfs_get_new_fs_root() frees that anonymous device number because btrfs_lookup_fs_root() returned a root - someone else did a lookup of the new root already, which could some task doing backref walking; 5) After that some error happens in the transaction commit path, and at ioctl.c:create_snapshot() we jump to the 'fail' label, and after that we free again the same anonymous device number, which in the meanwhile may have been reallocated somewhere else, because pending_snapshot->anon_dev still has the same value as in step 1. Recently syzbot ran into this and reported the following trace: ------------[ cut here ]------------ ida_free called for id=51 which is not allocated. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 31038 at lib/idr.c:525 ida_free+0x370/0x420 lib/idr.c:525 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 31038 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00410-gc02197fc9076 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/25/2024 RIP: 0010:ida_free+0x370/0x420 lib/idr.c:525 Code: 10 42 80 3c 28 (...) RSP: 0018:ffffc90015a67300 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: be5130472f5dd000 RBX: 0000000000000033 RCX: 0000000000040000 RDX: ffffc90009a7a000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000 RBP: ffffc90015a673f0 R08: ffffffff81577992 R09: 1ffff92002b4cdb4 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff52002b4cdb5 R12: 0000000000000246 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffffffff8e256b80 R15: 0000000000000246 FS: 00007fca3f4b46c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f167a17b978 CR3: 000000001ed26000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> btrfs_get_root_ref+0xa48/0xaf0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1346 create_pending_snapshot+0xff2/0x2bc0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1837 create_pending_snapshots+0x195/0x1d0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1931 btrfs_commit_transaction+0xf1c/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2404 create_snapshot+0x507/0x880 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:848 btrfs_mksubvol+0x5d0/0x750 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:998 btrfs_mksnapshot+0xb5/0xf0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1044 __btrfs_ioctl_snap_create+0x387/0x4b0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1306 btrfs_ioctl_snap_create_v2+0x1ca/0x400 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:1393 btrfs_ioctl+0xa74/0xd40 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:871 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xfe/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:857 do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 RIP: 0033:0x7fca3e67dda9 Code: 28 00 00 00 (...) RSP: 002b:00007fca3f4b40c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fca3e7abf80 RCX: 00007fca3e67dda9 RDX: 00000000200005c0 RSI: 0000000050009417 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007fca3e6ca47a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fca3e7abf80 R15: 00007fff6bf95658 </TASK> Where we get an explicit message where we attempt to free an anonymous device number that is not currently allocated. It happens in a different code path from the example below, at btrfs_get_root_ref(), so this change may not fix the case triggered by sy ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: fsl-qdma: fix SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read There is chip (ls1028a) errata: The SoC may hang on 16 byte unaligned read transactions by QDMA. Unaligned read transactions initiated by QDMA may stall in the NOC (Network On-Chip), causing a deadlock condition. Stalled transactions will trigger completion timeouts in PCIe controller. Workaround: Enable prefetch by setting the source descriptor prefetchable bit ( SD[PF] = 1 ). Implement this workaround.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: arm64/neonbs - fix out-of-bounds access on short input The bit-sliced implementation of AES-CTR operates on blocks of 128 bytes, and will fall back to the plain NEON version for tail blocks or inputs that are shorter than 128 bytes to begin with. It will call straight into the plain NEON asm helper, which performs all memory accesses in granules of 16 bytes (the size of a NEON register). For this reason, the associated plain NEON glue code will copy inputs shorter than 16 bytes into a temporary buffer, given that this is a rare occurrence and it is not worth the effort to work around this in the asm code. The fallback from the bit-sliced NEON version fails to take this into account, potentially resulting in out-of-bounds accesses. So clone the same workaround, and use a temp buffer for short in/outputs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: fsl-qdma: init irq after reg initialization Initialize the qDMA irqs after the registers are configured so that interrupts that may have been pending from a primary kernel don't get processed by the irq handler before it is ready to and cause panic with the following trace: Call trace: fsl_qdma_queue_handler+0xf8/0x3e8 __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x78/0x2b0 handle_irq_event_percpu+0x1c/0x68 handle_irq_event+0x44/0x78 handle_fasteoi_irq+0xc8/0x178 generic_handle_irq+0x24/0x38 __handle_domain_irq+0x90/0x100 gic_handle_irq+0x5c/0xb8 el1_irq+0xb8/0x180 _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x14/0x40 __setup_irq+0x4bc/0x798 request_threaded_irq+0xd8/0x190 devm_request_threaded_irq+0x74/0xe8 fsl_qdma_probe+0x4d4/0xca8 platform_drv_probe+0x50/0xa0 really_probe+0xe0/0x3f8 driver_probe_device+0x64/0x130 device_driver_attach+0x6c/0x78 __driver_attach+0xbc/0x158 bus_for_each_dev+0x5c/0x98 driver_attach+0x20/0x28 bus_add_driver+0x158/0x220 driver_register+0x60/0x110 __platform_driver_register+0x44/0x50 fsl_qdma_driver_init+0x18/0x20 do_one_initcall+0x48/0x258 kernel_init_freeable+0x1a4/0x23c kernel_init+0x10/0xf8 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: mmci: stm32: fix DMA API overlapping mappings warning Turning on CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG_SG results in the following warning: DMA-API: mmci-pl18x 48220000.mmc: cacheline tracking EEXIST, overlapping mappings aren't supported WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 51 at kernel/dma/debug.c:568 add_dma_entry+0x234/0x2f4 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.1.28 #1 Hardware name: STMicroelectronics STM32MP257F-EV1 Evaluation Board (DT) Workqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan Call trace: add_dma_entry+0x234/0x2f4 debug_dma_map_sg+0x198/0x350 __dma_map_sg_attrs+0xa0/0x110 dma_map_sg_attrs+0x10/0x2c sdmmc_idma_prep_data+0x80/0xc0 mmci_prep_data+0x38/0x84 mmci_start_data+0x108/0x2dc mmci_request+0xe4/0x190 __mmc_start_request+0x68/0x140 mmc_start_request+0x94/0xc0 mmc_wait_for_req+0x70/0x100 mmc_send_tuning+0x108/0x1ac sdmmc_execute_tuning+0x14c/0x210 mmc_execute_tuning+0x48/0xec mmc_sd_init_uhs_card.part.0+0x208/0x464 mmc_sd_init_card+0x318/0x89c mmc_attach_sd+0xe4/0x180 mmc_rescan+0x244/0x320 DMA API debug brings to light leaking dma-mappings as dma_map_sg and dma_unmap_sg are not correctly balanced. If an error occurs in mmci_cmd_irq function, only mmci_dma_error function is called and as this API is not managed on stm32 variant, dma_unmap_sg is never called in this error path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Fix iopt_access_list_id overwrite bug Syzkaller reported the following WARN_ON: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4738 at drivers/iommu/iommufd/io_pagetable.c:1360 Call Trace: iommufd_access_change_ioas+0x2fe/0x4e0 iommufd_access_destroy_object+0x50/0xb0 iommufd_object_remove+0x2a3/0x490 iommufd_object_destroy_user iommufd_access_destroy+0x71/0xb0 iommufd_test_staccess_release+0x89/0xd0 __fput+0x272/0xb50 __fput_sync+0x4b/0x60 __do_sys_close __se_sys_close __x64_sys_close+0x8b/0x110 do_syscall_x64 The mismatch between the access pointer in the list and the passed-in pointer is resulting from an overwrite of access->iopt_access_list_id, in iopt_add_access(). Called from iommufd_access_change_ioas() when xa_alloc() succeeds but iopt_calculate_iova_alignment() fails. Add a new_id in iopt_add_access() and only update iopt_access_list_id when returning successfully.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Fix protection fault in iommufd_test_syz_conv_iova Syzkaller reported the following bug: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000038: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000001c0-0x00000000000001c7] Call Trace: lock_acquire lock_acquire+0x1ce/0x4f0 down_read+0x93/0x4a0 iommufd_test_syz_conv_iova+0x56/0x1f0 iommufd_test_access_rw.isra.0+0x2ec/0x390 iommufd_test+0x1058/0x1e30 iommufd_fops_ioctl+0x381/0x510 vfs_ioctl __do_sys_ioctl __se_sys_ioctl __x64_sys_ioctl+0x170/0x1e0 do_syscall_x64 do_syscall_64+0x71/0x140 This is because the new iommufd_access_change_ioas() sets access->ioas to NULL during its process, so the lock might be gone in a concurrent racing context. Fix this by doing the same access->ioas sanity as iommufd_access_rw() and iommufd_access_pin_pages() functions do.