CVEs

draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.

dnspython is a DNS toolkit for Python. Prior to 2.9.0, dns.name.from_wire_parser follows attacker-controlled DNS compression pointer chains without a hop limit. A malicious DNS wire-format message can force excessive pointer traversal during name decompression, causing high CPU use, application degradation, or denial of service in applications that process untrusted DNS messages. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0.

JetBackup plugin for WordPress before 3.1.24.10 contains a symlink-based arbitrary file write vulnerability that allows an authenticated WordPress administrator to write attacker-controlled file contents outside the intended restore destination during backup import and restore. Attackers can craft a backup archive containing a symbolic link that archive extraction follows without validating targets or enforcing destination containment, potentially leading to server-side code execution depending on the writable destination and server configuration.

Next.js is a React framework for building full-stack web applications. From 13.0.0 until 15.5.28 and 16.4.1, crafted requests targeting App Router applications with at least one Server Action can cause excessive CPU consumption and block processing of further requests in the same process. Applications using the Pages Router and App Router applications without Server Actions are not affected. This issue is fixed in versions 15.5.28 and 16.4.1.

An issue in Webasyst Framework 4.0.3 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted OAuth authorization URL with an arbitrary redirect_uri.

Overly informative error messages in the catalog functionality of KNIME Business Hub prior to version 1.18.5 may allow an authenticated remote attacker to see workflow names if their ID is known. A workaround is not possible.

A flaw in the cross-site request forgery (CSRF) prevention of KNIME Business Hub prior to version 1.19.0 allows an authenticated attacker to perform a CSRF attack with passive user interaction. This means the state of a resource could be changed without the user noticing. As a workaround, an API gateway for firewall in front of KNIME Business Hub could remove the X-Forwaded-For header from all incoming requests.

In lsquic before 4.9.0, the HTTP/3 implementation can use an excessive amount of memory because the number of buffered header sets is not limited, as demonstrated by a QPACK amplification attack. This is related to header_out_dynamic_entry and es_max_header_list_size.

An excessive resource allocation issue in the remote workflow editing capabilities of KNIME Business Hub prior to version 1.19.0 allows a authenticated attack to exhaust resources on the server side. This leads to intermittent unavailability of workflow execution functionality. A workaround is not possible.

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (CWE-639) in the cart and wishlist repositories of MarcosCamara01 Ecommerce Template allows any authenticated user to delete and modify the cart and wishlist rows of any other user, because cartRepository.delete(), cartRepository.updateQuantityInternal() and wishlistRepository.delete() in src/lib/db/drizzle/repositories/ match rows by primary key alone, with no predicate on the owning user, and the per user authorization for those three operations rests on PostgreSQL row level security. The migrations run ALTER TABLE ... ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY and create policies comparing app.current_user_id() with user_id, but never ALTER TABLE ... FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY, and PostgreSQL does not apply policies to the role that owns a table. The template uses one DATABASE_URL both to run the migrations, which create the tables, and for the application at runtime, so the application connects as the owner of the tables and the policies do not apply to it. cart_items.id and wishlist.id are sequential bigserial values, so the identifiers of rows belonging to other users can be enumerated, and the update path returns the modified row, which carries the identifier of the user it belongs to. This results in the destruction and modification of cart and wishlist contents belonging to other accounts of the installation.